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ABSTRACT 
 
We can no longer be certain whether the central terms and conceptual matrix that the Italian 
Autonomist Marxist tradition richly develops and draws on¾the common, the general intellect, 
immaterial labour, psychopolitics, cognitariat¾are able to survive unscathed the theoretical problems 
that the epoch of the Anthropocene poses. In an attempt to push this conceptual matrix to its 
political and ontological limits, I expose a series of “ecological deficits” at the core of Autonomist 
thought and make the argument that semiocapitalism is a geological operator just as much it is a 
cognitive, financial or linguistic one. This has a plethora of paradoxical implications that are 
constellated throughout the three chapters. The first chapter explores the non-mediatic 
conditions of possibility behind “mediation”: following Jussi Parikka and Matteo Pasquinelli, the 
first “ecological deficit” emerges due to conflating the mediasphere with the subjective operations 
of the “sign” (semiotic flows of labour, knowledge, information) and “desire” (creative flows, 
libidinal energy, affects) as well as over-valuing the “general intellect” (the productive powers of 
the social brain) and its exclusive relation to the infosphere (knowledge transmission, big data, 
linguistic networks of communication), the cognitariat (social subjectivity, value-producing 
labour) and the technosphere (machines, fixed capital). The second chapter critiques Antonio 
Negri’s ontological theory of value: following Silvia Federici and Jason W. Moore, the second 
“ecological deficit” emerges due to Autonomism’s negligence of socially necessary unpaid work, 
non-human relations of reproduction and cheap nature that make possible value-producing 
labour; this chapter also, following Bernard Stiegler, critiques an ontology of the sign that 
privileges expressionism (immaterial semiotic productivity, meaning and epistemics) over 
impressionism (retentional systems of incarnation, reproduction and energetics). The third chapter 
develops a critique of representational eco-politics or the spectacular Anthropocene: following 
Jean Baudrillard and Yves Citton, the final “ecological deficit” emerges due to the hyperplasia of 
images, data and simulacra of the Anthropocene itself, whereby the referent is spectralized by the 
luminescent aura of the sign, resulting in complicated forms of irrelevance, boredom and 
attentional scarcities. Each chapter in its own way develops the speculative leitmotif of a 
“transcendental geology”¾i.e. the claim that the earth is a condition of possibility for thought.  
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Autonomist Marxism, Post-Fordism, Semiocapitalism, Anthropocene, Transcendental Geology, 
Geophilosophy, Capitalocene, General Intellect 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to extend my thanks to the Centre, SSHRC and OGS; I am extremely fortunate for 
the encouragement and support that I was generously bestowed in order to carry out this project.  
 
Thank you, Melanie, for answering all my questions and concerns¾and making sure that I had 
all my academic and bureaucratic affairs in order. You definitely made my life easier in times of 
stress.  
 
To Antonio, Michael and John V., your courses on Italian theory, Boredom and Deleuze have 
dramatically influenced the trajectory of my thought. For your supernatural patience and 
intellect, I thank you immensely.  
 
To Michael, I thank you for your infinite guidance, support and knowledge¾for having the 
stamina to put up with the incessant dialectical pirouettes of my thought, my theoretical 
mutations and infernal detours. You provided me with the direction and freedom that I needed 
to complete this project, even if I times I was paralytically hesitant or unsure of myself. To Josh, 
for all of our, however brief, encounters, thank you for taking your time to help me and answer 
my questions.  
 
To all of my friends at the Centre and at home, as many of you know, due to many traumatic, 
health-related and personal circumstances, as well as other exogenous stressors, the writing of this 
thesis and the existential momentum required to finish it were perpetually interrupted, splintered 
and halted. For better or for worse, the majority of the thesis was written in a masochistically 
short time period of approximately two months. Thank you for believing in me and encouraging 
me to keep going during this period of delirium, quasi-insomnia and intensity.  
 
To Dom, thank you for our many conservations about the Frankfurt School, Hegel, jazz, 
American literature and that enigmatic thing called life. I think you helped me realize and affirm 
that, contra Deleuze, the philosopher can never just be the “friend of the concept.” 
 
To Dave, I will never forget when we blasted Drake’s “Hotline Bling” remixes for about a month 
while writing papers first semester of studying at the Centre. I sometimes wish we could be 
transported back to those incandescent moments of anxiety mixed with bliss.  
 
To Mom and Dad, saying thank you could never express how grateful I am for you in my life. 
This thesis would be impossible without you.  
 
Lastly, to people who decide to read this, I have never considered myself a systematic thinker. 
My thought is a thought that picnics on the spasm¾a thought infatuated with the ricochet. I 
hope, however, though not as rigorous as I would have like it to be, this thesis will still provoke 
some movement in your own thought.  
 
 
 
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract............................................................................................................................................ii 
Acknowledgments...........................................................................................................................iii  
Table of Contents............................................................................................................................iv  
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................1  
Chapter 1: Geopsychopolitics: A Critique of Pure Desire...............................................................8  
 1.0 Introduction: Notes Towards a Transcendental Geology.............................................8 
 1.1 An Ecological Deficit: A New Logocentricism of the Digital......................................15 
 1.2 Spectral Materialism: The Geology of the General Intellect.......................................25 
 1.3 Dark Vitalism: The Geopsychopolitics of Exhaustion.................................................31 
 1.4 Libidinal Parasites: The Uses and Abuses of Pure Desire...........................................39 
Chapter 2: Abstract Machines: Geology and Reproduction.........................................................48 
 2.0 Introduction: Notes on the Proletarianization of Geology..........................................48 
 2.1 Against Productivism: An Ecological Critique of Value..............................................54 
 2.2 Semiocapitalism: A Pre-History of Putting Nature to Work.......................................69 
 2.3 Expulsion Machines: A Negative Transcendental Regime.........................................79 
Chapter 3: Grey Ecology: Boredom in the Anthrobscene.............................................................83 
 3.0 Introduction: Notes on the Netflixication of Ecology..................................................83 
 3.1 Anthrobscene: Environmentalism and Semiocapitalism.............................................87 
 3.2 Attention: Competing with the Doritos-Netflix Assemblage.......................................94 
Conclusion: Towards an Ecological Autonomism.......................................................................103 
Bibliography.................................................................................................................................107 
Curriculum Vitae.........................................................................................................................115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
   Natural history is precisely that science that generates epochs  
   in the universal unground, running from nature to ideation.  
              ¾Iain Hamilton Grant, “Transcendental Geology” 
 
   The Earth layer is not only The Stack’s schematic foundation; 
   it is also the driving force and form of its logic: the world  
   remaking itself in waves, bit by bit, pebble by pebble.  
               ¾Benjamin Bratton, “Earth Layer” 
 
   Rather, it is the machine which possesses skill and strength in  
   place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own 
   in the mechanical laws acting through it; and it consumes coal,  
   oil etc. (matiéres instrumentals), just as the worker consumes 
   food, to keep up its perpetual motion. 
               ¾Karl Marx, “Fragment on Machines” 
 
 Autonomist theoretical and organizational praxis emerges from the experience of 
revolutionary conflict in Italy (1968 to 1979) that took shape around the changing political, 
economic, industrial and postwar landscape. As the country’s “productive capacity and share of 
the world trade ballooned throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, commentators hailed the 
‘economic miracle’ that transformed Italy from a largely rural economy into an industrial 
powerhouse centered on the automotive industry.”1 As Bifo notes, however, this ‘miracle’ was 
established on the basis of the amplification of exploitation: abject wages and vicious exploitation 
made possible by high levels of unemployment and a large reserve army of migrant workers from 
an impoverished Southern Italy.2 This series of crises, revolutionary experiences and 
transformations were captured and diagnosed by the Italian neo-Marxist group Potere Operaio 
(Workers’ Power)¾comprised of figures such as Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Franco Piperno, Antonio 
Negri, Mario Tronti and Paolo Virno¾until its dissolution in 1973 mutated into the movement 
known as Autonomia Operaio (Workers’ Autonomy).3  
 These groups¾established in the midst of political turmoil and massive post-war industrial 
growth¾made up a broad movement consisting of factory workers, university students and 
                                                        
1 Nelson and Braun, “Autonomia in the Anthropocene,” 225.   
2 Bifo, “Anatomy of Autonomy,” 150.  
3 ibid., 149.  
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Marxist intellectuals who collectively “refused capital’s ‘gift’ of work...and advanced a politics of 
self-determination and self-valorization outside of state and party politics.”4 Stuck between a 
Center-Left government (the pact between Christian Democrats and Socialists) “founded on the 
policy of vague reform” and the “bureaucratic intransigence” of trade unions, the manifestation of 
early Autonomist thought and revolutionary practice¾orbiting around axioms of self-organizing 
labour, the ontological primacy of labour-power, the refusal of work and post-Leninist modes of 
organization outside of state or party politics¾can be attributed to disgruntled automotive workers 
at FIAT, FATME and Montedison throughout the 1960s disillusioned by traditional 
representational organizations played by authoritarian leadership and the compromising decision-
making of trade unions.5 In the troubled autumn of 1969, the culmination of these discontents 
exploded into “widespread strikes, factory occupations, and sabotage” that “rocked the 
manufacturing sector, resulting in the loss of 40 million worker hours that autumn alone.”6 
 These waves of struggle continued into the mid 1970s until “a technological reorganization 
aimed at the reassertion of capitalist rule defeated the worker’s power. The technical 
restructuration implied the substitution of human labor with machines, the automation of entire 
productive cycles and the subjugation of mental activity”¾in other words, the emergence of a 
post-Fordist economy (i.e. semiocapitalism) increasingly favouring “fixed capital” (machinery) over 
“variable capital” (labour-time), debt over wages, financial markets (stocks, shareholders) over 
producers and material goods (commodities, communities) and individualistic competition over 
social welfare programs.7 Rather than fight for full employment, a right to a job, or neoliberal 
entrepreneurial fantasies of finding oneself in one’s creative work, however, Autonomism 
fights¾in the “cognitive” stage of capitalism¾to unleash the “energies and potential that exist for 
socialized intelligence, for a general intellect” that could make possible a massive reduction in 
working hours via automated machinery, basic minimum income and a post-capitalist social 
commons generated by the creative powers of the multitude.8  
 Semiocapitalism also necessitates a shift in the political grammar and political terrain of 
struggle. The logic of production and site of struggle shifts outside of the walls of the factory into the 
                                                        
4 Nelson and Braun, “Autonomia in the Anthropocene,” 223.  
5 Bifo, “Anatomy of Autonomy,” 149, 150. 
6 Nelson and Braun, “Autonomia in the Anthropocene,” 226.  
7 Bifo, The Soul at Work, 28.  
8 Bifo, “Anatomy of Autonomy,” 157-158. 
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entire plane of social relations making up networked life (i.e. the “social factory”¾where 
“productive time” becomes indistinguishable from “life time” as firms do not merely exploit blocks 
of regimented labour-time but constant flows of social co-operation, desire and communication, 
demanding subjects “give themselves” to tasks, problems and objectives within the company or 
larger neoliberal climate). As Carlo Vercellone asserts, in “the exploitation of the use-value of 
labour-power expands to the entire social day.”9 This implies, for Autonomist theorists, a 
concomitant shift from the revolutionary subjectivity of the industrial proletariat to the revolutionary 
subjectivity of the cognitariat¾in other words, semiocapitalism puts the theory of proletarianization into 
crisis because digital workers are highly fragmented in terms of tasks, job security, wages, roles and 
physical locality, no longer existentially “side by side” on the factory floor.  
 One of the major problems that emerges as Autonomist thinkers attempt to make sense of 
this epochal transition from the Keynesian-Fordist paradigm (characterized by features such as the 
welfare state, full employment and factory work) to the neoliberal and post-Fordist paradigm 
(characterized by features such as precarity, competition, financialization and immaterial labour), 
where production processes become more and more “informationalized,” “communicative” and 
“expressive,” is the repression of the relation between the cognitive (i.e. global North) and the 
geological (i.e. global South). As indicated in the concept of “immaterial” labour and a revolutionary 
theory premised in the techno-scientific possibilities of the cognitariat, “the material conditions of 
this new economy in extractivism and the globalization of manufacturing remained 
unacknowledged,” and, as a result, liberation becomes reduced to “a particular anthropos situated 
in a particular locus of global production networks, whose freedom from work depended on an 
intensified appropriation of non-human ‘work/energy.’”10 
 Despite Virno’s claim that Autonomia’s disengagement from environmental struggle 
potentially stems from or is conditioned by the fact that in Italy¾unlike in places like Germany or 
France¾the Italian Greens were too conservative and Italian “ecologism was born against the class 
struggles of the 1970s,” it is clear that the real ecological deficit that emerges in Autonomist thought 
is predicated on an anthropology and political ontology that is inexorably linguistic, technological, 
social and productive (à la Marx, Virno, Negri, Deleuze) rather than geological, metabolic, parasitic and 
                                                        
9 Vercellone, “From Formal Subsumption to General Intellect: Elements for a Marxist Reading of the Thesis of 
Cognitive Capitalism,” 34.  
10 Nelson and Braun, “Autonomia in the Anthropocene,” 229, 230. 
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reproductive (à la Parikka, Pasquinelli, Bataille and Federici).11 As Autonomist feminist theorist Silvia 
Federici and eco-Marxist Jason W. Moore argue, what enables commodified wage labour to 
function as the “substance” of value at all is socially necessary unpaid work and reproductive labour. Thus, 
Deleuze and Negri’s relentless Spinozism has to be called into question insofar as it supports an 
increasingly mystified anthropological or machinic Prometheanism¾or, to borrow Alexander 
Galloway’s wonderful term, “Brometheanism.” The Anthropocene forces us to confront the fact 
that we have never been autonomous, exclusively productive or purely social creatures.12 If there 
is a Spinozism to be redeemed here at all, it is not one that reads Spinoza’s ontologization of the 
principle of sufficient reason qua Substance as an infinite casual productive force (i.e. permanent 
dynamic genesis, becoming, process) but rather qua Nature as a causal network of serial dependencies 
(i.e. permanent asymmetries, parasitisms, non-synchronic strata imbrication). Contra Bifo’s 
noöcentric claim that “we all sit in front of a screen” and “type,” it seems more pertinent to 
decipher the computational as a geological object¾complicit in complexes of petroleum, rare 
earth extractivism, hyper-exploitation of global workers, flows of electricity and pollution¾rather 
than as a reified techno-linguistic dispositif of post-Foucauldian psychopolitical control.13    
 As Jussi Parikka provocatively claims, the “periodic table is one of the most important 
reference points in the history of technological capitalism” given that the “insides of computers are 
folded with their outsides in material ways; the abstract topologies of information are entwined 
with geophysical realities.”14 Semiocapitalism is not just about the mobilization of signs, desires 
and cognitive actors. It is also about the mobilization of rare earths, minerals and geological 
actors¾from cobalt (lithium ion batteries) to germanium (fiber-optic cable)¾the earth is 
deterritorialized and reterritorialized as composite elements of media materiality that high-tech 
sectors of the global North infinitely rely upon. Semiocapitalism is a geological operator: it puts 
nature to work. Given that almost every action performed on the Internet emits carbon dioxide, 
to put communication to work at this juncture of historical development and techno-capitalism is 
automatically to put nature to work:  
making a Google search emits .2g of CO2, watching a YouTube video for only 10 minutes 
emits 1g of CO2, and simply owning a Gmail account for a year emits 1200g of CO2. 
Regardless of whether a user is actively using the Internet or not, a user’s carbon footprint 
                                                        
11 Virno, “Do You Remember Counterrevolution?,” 253.  
12 Nelson and Braun, “Autonomia in the Anthropocene,” 230. 
13 Bifo, The Soul at Work, 74.  
14 Parikka, A Geology of Media, 110.  
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is quantified by the volume of data the user creates and its subsequent manipulation which 
can be independent of user action.15 
 
The “pre-history” of the general intellect and semiocapitalism¾from Gutenberg (the printing 
press) to Zuckerberg (the data center)¾attests to a process of semiotic incarnation and the absolute 
entanglement of the geological with the cognitive via the machine, forcing us to reconfigure the 
Autonomist notion of the general intellect and the presumption that knowledge, information and 
semiotic fluxes operate in a feedback loop between labour, language and machines¾i.e.  between 
linguistic cooperation (intersubjectivity), communication networks (digital platforms) and fixed 
capital (computerized technology). 
 This thesis, therefore, attempts to read cognitive or semiocapitalism through a 
geophilosophical prism that takes, not the “thinking subject” as its primary matter of concern, but 
rather the “earth.” The speculative claim running throughout the thesis is that the earth is a condition 
of possibility for thought¾a speculative appeal for a “transcendental geology” that can be traced in 
concepts like “chemical thought” (Schelling), “abstract geology” (Smithson), “a geology of media” 
(Pasquinelli, Parikka) and “nature-thought” (Deleuze-Guattari).16 This means that, against certain 
readings of Spinoza, nature is “not simply natured nature (an object to be shaped or that is 
manipulable)” or a “naturing nature (a producing subject)”17¾insofar as this gives way to a militant 
geo-constructivism (e.g. climate engineering) or mystified organicism (e.g. nature as cyborgic 
process or vitalistic quasi-subject). Likewise, against certain Marxist-Hegelian readings, Nature is 
                                                        
15 Jacob, “Data Centers: A Latent Environmental Threat,” https://sites.duke.edu/lit290s-
1_02_s2017/2017/03/08/data-centers-a-latent-environmental-threat/ 
16 Although I am using the term as a heuristic device to talk about the non-mediatic conditions of possibility behind 
“mediation,” there are post-Kantian implications for thinking a “transcendental geology” laid out rigorously by 
thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze, Iain Hamilton Grant, Ben Woodard and Benjamin Bratton. While Grant’s 
transcendental geology favors Schelling’s geophysicalist process of universal ungrounding over Deleuze’s onto-
realist process of universal ungrounding, he sutures it to a kind of philosophical realism that makes one question if 
the earth even exists or is merely a mystical “nature-subject” or “specimen of debate”¾losing the earth in a 
fabricated philosophical hyperspace in the process. Ben Woodard’s transcendental geology quickly becomes 
“geeky” and “indulgent,” making the earth a hyper-porous sci-fi domain of “swiss-cheese” for extra-terrestrial 
worms. Bratton’s transcendental geology is interesting, though, because it implies that capitalism’s empirical 
operations of exploitation, innovation and accumulation already engage in a hyper-speculative transcendental 
geology via “The Stack” (i.e. a global megastructure made possible by planetary computation). With Bratton, the 
earth is the layer that provides the material, energy and geological inputs needed to meet the demands of 
computing but also structures the horizon of cognition’s powers or potential. The earth could even become 
“obsolete” if capitalist technicity learns to harness energy from “stars”¾literalizing what Gaston Bachelard calls 
the “anthropocosmic tissue,” a relation of the human to the cosmos that only had an imaginative, theological or 
poetic role prior.    
17 Neyrat, The Unconstructable Earth, 134.  
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not merely an external object or material (an “in-itself,” “the given,” “necessity”) pliable to the 
artificial socio-historical constructions or forms of “consciously acting Subjects confronting nature itself 
as forces of nature.”18 Nature is a contingent and dispersed platform that pre-conditions, animates and 
(un)grounds the Subject-Object dialectic in the totality of its interactions as a transcendental agent or 
natural history enclosed unto itself.  
 What is interesting in Alfred Schmidt, then, is how nature operates as a precarious 
transcendental grounding and ungrounding that encapsulates¾englobes¾productive human 
agents, consciousness and machines. Nothing escapes or is outside nature. Conscious human agents are 
merely nature combining with itself¾where via labour and technology “nature sheds a part of itself 
and confronts itself through the division into ‘material of nature’ [i.e. Object] and the purposeful ‘force 
of nature’ [i.e. Subject].”19 In other words, nature becomes non-identical with itself through 
generating asymmetrical forms and imbricating strata (anthropological, technological, geological) 
that are “mutually indifferent” to one another. This is not simply the mutual indifference of  
Subject (form) and Object (material) that Schmidt affirms, showing how use-values are subject to 
decay in spite of formal molds or subjective intentions¾but of singular developments of particular 
terrestrial coagulations, different pieces of nature shedding itself and becoming heterogeneous so 
as to produce separate and internally consistent histories, strata, lines of flight or trajectories.20 To 
put it simply, the cognitive is always already interlaced with the geological without these two strata 
becoming identical to each other or the typical elimination of the latter by the former.  
 This has major implications for the “general intellect” or “social brain” at both the 
ontological and political level¾especially given that such concepts retain a parodic residue of 
Hegelian idealism. This means that not only are the social brain, digital culture and the value-
producing labour-power of semiocapital parasitic on an ecological surplus (global labour, unpaid 
work/energy) that operates outside of them (Pasquinelli, Parikka, Moore) but also that mediation 
taken in all of its senses¾representation, computation, interiority, consciousness¾is only possible 
on the basis of a primordial operation or process of exteriorization that precedes, exceeds and conditions it 
(Virno, Stiegler, Cubitt). In other words, thinking is co-determined by its material outside. Thought 
                                                        
18 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, 61. “Nature is the Subject-Object of labour. Its dialectic consists in this: 
that men change their own nature as they progressively deprive external nature of its strangeness and externality, 
as they mediate nature through themselves, and as they make nature itself work for their own purposes” (61).  
19 ibid., 106. My emphasis.  
20 ibid., 74.  
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(i.e. the noosphere as noetic basis of the general intellect and cognitive biocapitalism) is literally 
“stretched” and becomes more a “movement of multiplicities that pertain to territories rather than 
as a cognitive faculty restricted to already formed human subjects.”21 But this “stretching” does 
not mean the “social factory” is either omnipresent or a hegemonic tendency waiting to be realized 
globally. We should be dubious of concepts like the “social factory” and “real subsumption” insofar 
as they are predicated on a loquacious “social being” that has access to a computer, sufficient 
purchasing power, streams of knowledge and privileged educational apparatuses¾that is, the 
paraphernalia of cyber-Enlightenment. The machine might have a soul, but it also has a stomach. 
Underpinning cyber-labour’s techno-productivity is always the decadent consumption of energy, 
global labour and the earth.  
 Autonomist thought and analyses of semiocapitalism are therefore jeopardized by an 
incorrigible “ecological deficit” due to conflating the mediasphere with the subjective operations 
of the “sign” (semiotic flows of labour, knowledge, information) and “desire” (creative flows, 
libidinal energy, affects) as well as over-valuing the “general intellect” (the productive powers of 
the social brain) and its exclusive relation to the infosphere (knowledge transmission, big data, 
linguistic networks of communication), the cognitariat (social subjectivity, value-producing labour) 
and the technosphere (machines, fixed capital). The geophilosophical line of thought that I propose 
to deploy in my critique of semiocapitalism and the ethereal axioms of Autonomist thought, over 
the course of three chapters, reads a host of privileged concepts and objects¾signs, desire, the 
general intellect, the commons, machines, time, value, productivism and attention¾from the 
vantage point of “becoming-earth.” These concepts breakdown and undo themselves simply by 
way of practicing the minor or nomadic science of “following the flow of matter.”22 Logistics 
becomes immanent critique. Disassembly becomes a radical form of deconstructive and critical 
materialism. Thought becomes a permanent fragility¾a porcelain surface resting on a universal 
volcanism, the “will of the deeps.”  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
21 Parikka, A Geology of Media, 21.  
22 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 373.  
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GEOPSYCHOPOLITICS: A CRITIQUE OF PURE DESIRE 
  
   It is estimated that an avatar on Second Life consumes more electricity  
   than the average Brazilian.  
      ¾Matteo Pasquinelli, Animal Spirits 
 
   Mines are a central part of cognitive capitalism. 
                     ¾Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media 
 
Does the libido come with a carbon-footprint? If so, how might we  
measure its size? How to account for its effects? What might the  
environmental “impact” of our personal and collective desires be?... 
Are we living through the moment of “peak libido”—a concept that  
may in fact uncannily mirror the discourse of “peak oil”? 
   ¾Dominic Pettman, “Libidinal Ecology” 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION: NOTES TOWARD A TRANSCENDENTAL GEOLOGY  
 
 We can no longer be certain whether the central terms and conceptual matrix that the 
Italian Autonomist Marxist tradition richly develops and draws on¾the common, the general intellect, 
immaterial labour, psychopolitics, cognitariat¾are able to survive unscathed the theoretical problems that 
the epoch of the Anthropocene poses. Despite Autonomist Marxism’s omnipresent impact on 
political activism and post-Marxist thought over the last thirty years, especially with the 
international success of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000), it has been exceptionally 
slow to elaborate theoretical positions that address the ecological crisis, anthropogenic global 
warming or environmental politics in any systematic fashion. With a neurotic focus on the 
modalities of cognitive capitalism, the production of subjectivity (regarded by way of language, habit or 
affect) as well as the quaint semiotic (“signs” à la Saussure, Barthes, Baudrillard) and libidinal objects 
(“desires” à la Freud, Lacan, Deleuze) indigenous to media studies, many scholars working within 
the Autonomist tradition have attached little importance to or completely neglected the ecological 
components of post-Fordism¾namely, its roots in the material economies of extraction (e.g. 
minerals for mediatic devices), destructive terraforming (e.g. deforestation for the book printing 
industry, an industry Amazon thrives on), financialization of nature (e.g. ecosystem services and 
carbon markets), abysmal circuits of e-waste (e.g. proliferation of zombie media due to 
technological innovation and obsolescence), let alone the immensely uneven toxic geographies that 
emerge as a necessary consequence of the globalized manufacturing relations between the global 
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North (e.g. Silicon Valley) and the global South (e.g. Shenzhen). As Sara Nelson and Bruce Braun 
claim, “the Anthropocene names autonomist Marxism’s unthought, an unthought that intrudes on 
its political imaginaries.”23   
 One aspect of this chapter, then, is to expose and examine the existence of an “ecological 
deficit” at the core of Autonomist thought. The other, more speculative aspect of this chapter, 
however, is to explore the consequences of what happens to Autonomist concepts when they are 
stretched to their breaking point¾that is, what happens to the “general intellect” when we leave 
the infosphere; to mediatic objects when we leave the mediasphere; to subjectivity and 
consciousness when we leave the psychosphere. This does not mean these concepts break-down 
and stop functioning altogether; rather, they come into absolute proximity with what they repress at 
both the theoretical and material level¾the geological, complex telluric flows, global labour. This 
requires us to adopt a geophilosophical orientation and understanding of the media¾of 
semiocapitalism and the general intellect¾that does not get caught up in the descriptive vortex of 
hermetic, self-referential terms and endogenous categories that collude in the fetish of presenting 
the mediasphere as a disembodied, ethereal and immaterial phenomenon.24 
 As it stands, there exists a proliferation of theoretical prisms¾concepts, arguments,  
diagnostic tools, neologisms¾that attest to an epochal shift and new configuration of capitalism 
that fully integrates the sphere of linguistic activity, affective propensities, abstract knowledge and 
communication into its regime of accumulation as the central force in the production process: 
“immaterial labour,” “noopolitics” (Lazzarato), “general intellect” (Marx), “loquacious factory” 
(Virno), “creative factories” (Raunig), “communicative capitalism” (Dean), “semiocapitalism,” 
“cognitariat” (Bifo), “psychopolitics” (Han), “attention economy” (Citton), “cognitive capitalism” 
(Moulier-Boutang), “cyber-proletariat” (Dyer-Witheford), “language economy” (Marazzi). There 
                                                        
23 Nelson and Braun, “Autonomia in the Anthropocene: New Challenges to Radical Politics,” 225.  
24 Parts of this particular argument are not anything spectacularly new. There are a number of critical polemics 
waged against Autonomist thought on account of its theoretical suture to a constellation of concepts like 
“immaterial labour,” a “smooth” Empire and a “cognitive” capitalism that all seem to negate the persistence of 
hard, material work, ecological degradation, rifts between the global North and South, as well as the “peripheral 
Fordism” operative in low-waged and hyper-exploitative zones that provide cheap labour. See, for instance, the 
following: Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.) Debating Empire (2003); Jodi Dean and Paul Passavant (eds.) Empire’s New 
Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri. (2003); George Caffentzis “The End of Work or the Renaissance of Slavery? A 
Critique of Rifkin and Negri” (2003); David Camfield “The Multitude and the Kangaroo: A Critique of Hardt and 
Negri’s Theory of Immaterial Labour” (2007); Nick Dyer-Witheford Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital 
Vortex (2015); Sara Nelson and Bruce Braun “Autonomia in the Anthropocene: New Challenges to Radical Politics” 
(2017).  
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also exists¾concomitantly¾a whole new host of ethereal actors and mediatic creatures that 
multipy within the expanding domain of the digital universe: “algorithms,” “data,” “computers,” 
“information,” “cellular phones,” “networks,” “social media platforms,” “neurochemicals,” and 
infinite streams of “audiovisual content.” As Andrew Culp has pointed out, it seems as though we 
live in the age of angels, surrounded by a myriad of invisible messengers who “crisscross the sky” 
and are “tasked with communication, connection, transmission and translation.”25 These angelic 
beings compel us with the nervous injunction to click, like, act, comment and poke. We are caught 
up in a giddy regime of compulsory expression, hyper-productivity and overexposure that attempts 
to extrovert the creative recesses of our interiority as a means to extract surplus value and generate 
infinitudes of content and knowledge for social media platforms, creativity industries, universities 
and finance. This is what Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi calls “putting the soul to work” and the “pathologies 
of hyper-expressivity” that characterize the demands on subjectivity made by semiocapitalism.26 
We might also just call it the primitive accumulation of the soul. 
 Semiocapitalism is defined exclusively in terms of a tormented “sociology of inwardness” 
or “metaphysics of subjectivity”: it “takes the mind, language and creativity as its primary tools for 
the production of value” in the digital sphere of exploitation.27 “Semiocapital puts neuro-psychic 
energies to work, submitting them to mechanistic speed, compelling cognitive activity to follow the 
rhythm of networked productivity” to the point that “cognition is stressed to its limit.”28 Despite 
Bifo’s grandiloquent exposure of a “phenomenological deficit” rampant in both the digital culture 
of semiocapitalism, Autonomist Marxism’s and Accelerationist Marxism’s myopic fetishes with 
immateriality, technology and the logosphere, arguing that semiocapital undeniably stifles the 
aesthetic, emotional and corporeal dimensions of the social organism, he reduces semiocapitalism 
to the neuro-psychic stratum of social labour that is caught up in the endless production, elaboration, 
distribution, manipulation and interpretation of signs and informational units. His mediasphere is 
about the manipulation of signs and desires. It lacks mineshafts¾a pre-mediatic depth and the 
geopolitical corporeality of sweatshops that both haunts the hyperreal epidermis of the digital 
surface and makes it possible.  
                                                        
25 Culp, Dark Deleuze, 4.  
26 Bifo, “The Pathologies of Hyper-expression, Discomfort and Repression,” 
http://eipcp.net/transversal/1007/bifo/en. 
27 Bifo, The Soul at Work, 21.  
28 Bifo, “Cognitarian Subjectivation,” 1.  
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 Semiocapitalism is not just about the mobilization of signs and cognitive actors. It is also 
about the mobilization of rare earths, minerals and geological actors¾cobalt (lithium ion 
batteries), gallium (thin layer photovoltaics), indium (display screens), tantalum (microcapacitors), 
antimony (electronic optics), platinum (fuel cells), palladium (seawater desalination), niobium 
(microcapacitors), neodymium (laser technology), germanium (fiber-optic cable)¾that sputter 
across supply chains and make up the composite elements of media materiality.29 Semiocapitalism 
is a geological operator. It requires the lithosphere. It requires an immense deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization of the earth in order to produce the media infrastructure and digital 
technologies that make possible the “loquacious” horizons of the language economy: “swift 
communicational transactions” and ubiquitous “[c]ommunicational events are sustained by the 
broader aspects of geology of media.”30 It is precisely this repressed subterranean relationship 
between the cognitive and the geological that remains unthought in Autonomist theory. What is more, 
perhaps, is that this repression is symptomatic of a greater repression active in a philosophical 
tradition that locates thinking¾that is, the conditions necessary for its production and re-
production¾solely in the transhistorical powers of the cogito. This is why, in the second chapter, at 
least embryonically, there is a need to sketch out the pre-history of semiocapitalism (and by 
extension, the process of Enlightenment) as it is entangled with the geological via machines¾from 
Gutenberg (the printing press) to Zuckerberg (the data center).   
 One of the implications of the increased symbiotic interdependence of the mediasphere on 
the biosphere (and vice versa) that thinkers like Jussi Parikka illuminate is that “immaterial events” 
(language, cognition, desire) can no longer be grounded in an abstract “noumenal subjectivity” 
(Kant), the “metastructure of the unconscious” (Freud) or “the vibrant biological fluidum of living 
labour” (Virno). We have to take seriously what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari claim in What is 
Philosophy? about the enterprise of geophilosopy: “[s]ubject and object give a poor approximation 
of thought. Thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one 
around the other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth.”31 
Thinking cannot be reduced to a cognitive faculty that only concerns the feedback loop of 
intersubjective experience. Parikka deciphers¾or rather, digs¾further: the “notion of 
                                                        
29 Parikka, A Geology of Media, 51. 
30 ibid., 49.  
31 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 84.  
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geophilosophy attaches thinking to its conditions of existence, which are, however, always 
immanent to the event of thought itself.”32 Desire, likewise, cannot be reduced to a libidinal faculty 
that only concerns the feedback loop of personological impulses channeled by the socius¾a 
reduction that even revered exegetes of “desiring-machines” (e.g. Eugene Holland, Daniel W. 
Smith) unwittingly relapse back into as they fail to appreciate that beneath the Spinozist-
Nietzschean and Freud-Marxist synthesis operative in Anti-Oedipus is a non-philosophical earth. Too 
often, in the Deleuzo-Guattarian critique of psychoanalysis’ notion of “desire as lack,” desire is 
subsumed by a new crypto-form of identity thinking, that is, under the identity of production: the “rule of 
continually producing production, of grafting producing unto the product, is characteristic of 
desiring-machines or of primary production: the production of production.”33 Desire produces and 
is produced. But it also consumes materials¾oil, electricity, minerals, bodies¾in order to continue its 
passionate circuitry, materials that do not spawn from the philosophical hyperspace of ontology, 
the “auto-productive real” (of “partial objects”) or Spinoza’s “divine auto-causal substance” 
(generating “modes”) but geology complicatedly mediated by labour. Both cognition and desire 
are grounded in and return back to the earth and the exploited labour that helps deterritorialize it 
in very specific and material ways.  
 If anything, following Parikka, this chapter is an attempted “katabasis” or exercise in 
“transcendental geology,” one that asks what conditions make the digital heaven of 
communication, semiotic flows and immaterial labour possible¾that is, such a method or 
approach to semiocapitalism emphasizes the fact that the “materiality of media starts much before 
media become media” and persists after media is no longer media anymore.34 This geological 
approach, then, forces us to abandon the hegemonic “image of thought” reified within media 
studies. Matteo Pasquinelli’s luminary Animal Spirits (2008) has been acutely instructive in this 
regard: he argues that media studies have been unable to develop a conceptual paradigm and 
understanding that can think the media outside the media because it “reduces and neutralizes the 
network to a dialectics of two internal coordinates: (digital) code and (desiring) flows.”35 It remains 
caught within a configuration of the media as a immaterial entity or frictionless platform of co-
operation, informational sharing and smooth facilitator of desiring flows devoid of any negativity, 
                                                        
32 Parikka, A Geology of Media, 21.  
33 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 7.  
34ibid., 37. 
35Pasquinelli, Animal Spirits: A Bestiary of the Commons, 15.  
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asymmetry or conflict; the argument here, however, is that media networks are sustained and 
reproduced by a spectral geomaterialism of exploited subterranean chains of hardware and 
hardwork. What Pasquinelli’s work also helps unearth¾especially for our purposes¾are two 
fetishes or ontological knots that Autonomism remains trapped within and that contribute to its 
disconnect from the larger material ramifications of collective “human capital,” the “digital 
commons” and the “general intellect” within the Anthropocene: a new logocentricism of the digital (the 
fetish of the sign) and a neo-Spinozist hydraulic idealism of flows (the fetish of desire). This new 
“logocentricism,” “digitalism” or “semiotic imperialism” gives ontological primacy to language 
over other material inputs, outputs and configurations. This new “cult of joy,” “productivism” or 
“hydraulic idealism of flows” gives ontological primacy to creative flows over material 
resources¾the infinite plane of creating over the finite complexes of the creaturely. While Pasquinelli 
critiques the mediasphere on the basis of its negation of a “biological surplus,” a “global civil 
warming,” I want to push the critique of the mediasphere on the basis of its negation of a 
“geological surplus,” a “planetary global warming.” Either way, the message is clear: we need to 
recalibrate theories of semiocapitalism on a more robust, planetary and politically “material” basis.   
 The goal of this chapter, then, is to deconstruct the fetishistic aura that has encrusted 
around the beloved theoretical objects of both Autonomist Marxist scholarship and media 
studies¾the “sign” (semiotic flows, knowledge, language, symbolic orders, digital code, loquacious 
factories) and “desire” (ontological creativity, the psychosphere, affects, flows of libidinal energy, 
desiring-machines). This deconstructive effort interrogates network culture and cognitive or 
semiocapitalism from the vantage point of a “transcendental geology” or, less pretentiously, a geo-
material perspective¾a perspective that is perpetually downplayed or altogether absent in the 
analyses of post-Fordist thinkers¾in order to establish a different political grammar and 
epistemological terrain for thinking about the mediasphere, one that avoids focusing on the 
privileged sites of post-industrial labour and social life. This does not mean that the analyses of 
cognitive capitalism are unimportant. It simply means that the “sign” and “desire”¾notions which 
bolster and give primacy to the subjectivity and existentialism of the cognitariat¾ are not the only 
conceptual devices or indexes for understanding the complex strata that constitute the digital 
universe (i.e. offline labour and media materiality).   
 Geology, as a critical apparatus, then, allows us to short-circuit the explanatory templates 
and push back against the accumulating theoretical attention given to the semiotic imperialism of 
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the “sign” and fevered energetics of “desire” as they have become reified knots of “non-thinking” 
within the core of Autonomist scholarship (but also critical theory at large), while at the same time 
gives us the ability to ground “communicational” and “libidinal” vectors in the tumultuous 
movements of the earth and global labour. This is not to say that the “sign” (semiotic regimes of 
expression, knowledge and communication) and “desire” (libidinal energy, affects and desirous 
loops of valorization) are naively praised by Autonomist thinkers or not important parts of 
semiocapitalism and the mediasphere. The problem is that even under a surgical gesture or the 
scalpel of critique these notions retain a fetishistic aura that obscures larger global issues taking 
place “offline,” in the periphery of the global South and outside of the holographic circumference 
of semiocapitalism.36 What happens in these ethereal analyses is that they unconsciously reproduce 
a mediasphere that adheres to a McLuhanite paradigm. The “geophilosophical” line of thought 
that I propose to deploy here, following thinkers such as Jussi Parikka, Matteo Pasquinelli, Sean 
Cubitt, Richard Maxwell, Toby Miller and Jennifer Gabrys, is unabashedly anti-McLuhanite: 
media is not an extension of man but rather an extension of the earth.37 
 
                                                        
36 My use of the term “fetish” here is not purely facetious (as in polemical) or psychoanalytic (as in an irrational 
hyper-cathexis or fantasy projection onto an object in order to obviate particular confrontations with trauma—
where, in our case, that trauma is geology and global labour). It is used in an inflected Marxist sense as the 
displacement of power onto commodities (money and material things, “products of labour themselves”) when in 
fact this power inheres in the social relations between people (namely, the relation between exploited social 
labour and capitalists). We think capital moves things when it is instead living labour that does. Thus, social 
relations are structurally misrecognized as a “fantastic form of a relation between things.” Fetishism is often 
presented as a procedure of “ideological obfuscation,” “reification” or the “spontaneous” emanation of the 
bourgeoise commodity world. To a certain extent this is true: social life functions precisely through the necessity of 
appearances (appearances would not simply implode in a utopia). What semiocapitalism brings into relief, 
however, is actually that fetishism is itself an intricate form of work; it is a form of social labour that produces 
“objective appearances” and “phantasmagoria.” In brief, it is the labour that produces the “signs” and “desires” of 
commodities, the cultural field, libidinal packaging or cosmetic sheath that commodities are folded within. 
Commodity fetishism is not just that which “attaches” to products of social labour after they are produced. 
Fetishism is a continuous product of immaterial labour¾“products of the human brain”¾as such. In both cases, 
we lose sight of not only “material social relations” but also “material earth relations.” Materiality obfuscates itself 
in condensed objects of desire: the Apple laptop I type on tells me nothing of Congolese cobalt, particles of CO2 or 
Foxconn suicides contained in its production. This is why to cut through fetishism is it not just a matter of academic 
“unveiling” but also radical disassembly (an inverted “assemblage theory”). Even Deleuze and Guattari’s “desiring-
machines” (anti-fetishizers par excellence) do not capture this “negative material accumulation” leaking from 
flows, accumulation that have nothing to do with the “psychic accumulation” around poles of paranoia (Family, 
State, God, Commodity) but rather the material accumulation of debris, toxic excess and non-re-sublatable anti-
production. Against even figures such as Jean Baudrillard and Bifo’s re-deployment of his theory of simulacra, we 
cannot maintain the disappearance of the referent under “semiotic” or “desiring” flows but must rather assert a 
radical parasitism on the material substratum from all angles.     
37 Parikka, Anthrobscene, 5. 
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1.1 AN ECOLOGICAL DEFICIT: A NEW LOGOCENTRICISM OF THE DIGITAL 
 
 The concept of the “general intellect” is integral to Autonomist thought. It functions largely 
as a means to elaborate or make sense of capitalism’s epochal transition from the Keynesian-Fordist 
paradigm (characterized by features such as the welfare state, full employment and factory work) 
to the neoliberal and post-Fordist paradigm (characterized by features such as precarity, 
competition, financialization and immaterial labour), where production processes become more 
and more “informationalized,” “communicative” and “expressive.” It is also, importantly, a 
concept that is extracted from the notorious passages in Karl Marx’s Grundrisse called “Fragment 
on Machines.” For a myriad of Autonomist scholars, this text is the holy cipher that unlocks a 
constellation of referent points and hypotheses that make “cognitive capitalism” legible, that bring 
its paramount tendencies and constitutive elements into relief. One of the main reasons for the 
manifestation of this “ecological deficit” at the core of Autonomist thought, I want to argue, is the 
overvaluation of the “Fragment on Machines” in the Grundrisse and the seductive concept of the 
“general intellect” it contains. As Paolo Virno contends in “Notes on the ‘General Intellect,’” what 
“jumps to one’s attention now…is the full factual realization…of the tendencies described in the 
Grundrisse, without however, any emancipatory¾or even merely conflictual¾reversal.”38 Although 
he admits it has lost its revolutionary potential and optimistic energy, he still gracefully salvages the 
“Fragment” by christening it the “last chapter of a natural history of society” and “topographical 
map of the present.”39 Even though it has lost its prophetic value, it still retains its radiance as an 
exegetical prism of the present for Virno.     
 What does Marx presciently elaborate in the 1858 “Fragment”? Marx argues that abstract 
knowledge¾that is, primarily but not exclusively scientific knowledge¾tends to become the main 
driving force of production and therefore renders the monotonous, parcelized and repetitive labour 
of the assembly line and factory to a residual position.40 The proletarianization of the muscular 
system is progressively superseded by the proletarianization of the nervous system, brain and soul: 
the vital motor of production becomes the “development of the general powers of the human 
head,” “general social knowledge” and “the general productive forces of the social brain.”41 What 
                                                        
38 Virno, “Notes on the ‘General Intellect,’” 267. 
39 ibid., 267. 
40 ibid., 265.  
41 Marx, Grundrisse, 694. 
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Marx is referring to here is the technical-scientific knowledge objectified in fixed capital, that is, 
knowledge incarnate and embedded in an “automatic system of machinery” that consists of 
“numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that workers themselves are cast merely as its 
conscious linkages.”42 One of the implications of this is that labour time (that which determines the 
value of a commodity) no longer functions as the most adequate metric or dynamos for the 
production of value: rather, “science, information, linguistic communication, and knowledge in 
general¾rather than labor time¾are now the central pillars on which production and wealth 
rest.”43 What matters is the quality, intensity and power of cooperation of the social brain. 
Nevertheless, as Paolo Virno qualifies, labour time is the “unit of measure in force, but it is no longer 
the true unit.”44  
 What the power of the “general intellect” or “productive forces of the social brain” is 
capable of is expressed most centrally in the machinery, technology and infrastructure¾ “fixed 
capital”¾it brings into existence as ways to organize, connect, control and enhance social life: 
 
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules 
etc. They are products of human industry: natural material transformed into organs of the 
human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human 
brain, created by the human hand: the power of knowledge, objectified. The development 
of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force 
of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself 
have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance 
with it.45  
 
There are two kinds of technology that are of particular relevance to Marx because they best 
express the evolution, development and amplification of the “general intellect.” The first one is 
automated machinery that decreases or devalorizes the importance of “physical labour,” “labour-
time” and “variable-capital.” The worker’s physical operations can be replaced and automated by 
a machine. The other, as Dyer-Witheford points out, is the development of a vast global 
network¾a network of communication and transportation.46 These machinic networks function 
to connect, expand and integrate the world market and indicate the extent to which capitalist 
economies have successfully harnessed the general intellect, whereby the “accumulation of 
                                                        
42 ibid., 692. 
43 Virno, “Notes on the ‘General Intellect,’” 267. 
44 ibid., 268. 
45 Marx, Grundrisse, 706. 
46 Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx, 220.  
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knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the human brain, is…absorbed into 
capital.”47 The development of automated high-tech machines that eliminate the necessity of 
labour-time (human labour, “variable capital”) and spread over the entirety of the globe to expand 
markets, likewise, mark the extent to which the general intellect has evolved and pushed beyond 
traditional forms of wage labour and commodity production (formal subsumption) to a form of 
labour immanent to capitalism itself, “capital producing its own social and technological conditions 
without an ‘outside’ or any limitations” (real subsumption)48¾the shift from agricultural labour to 
factory machinery, from factory machinery to automation, from automation to sophisticated bio-
algorithms that will eventually be able to emulate the minutest swerves of the soul.49 As Caffentzis 
notes, the “epochal” shift from formal subsumption to real subsumption, according to Hardt and Negri, 
is managed by capitalism only on the basis of the “increasing employment of the ‘General Intellect’ 
and ‘immaterial labor’ in the production process and a regime of control over the reproduction 
process.”50  
 Subsumption refers both to capitalism’s genesis as a mode of production (e.g. primitive 
accumulation) and, what can be called, to use Nick Land’s phrase, a process of market 
immanentization¾that is, how in the expansion of the world market via disciplinary practices of neo-
imperialism capital internalizes its outside.51 Hardt and Negri illustrate the distinction between formal 
and real subsumption in the following manner:  
 
Marx uses the term ‘formal subsumption’ to name processes whereby capital incorporates 
under its own relations of production laboring practices that originated outside of its 
domain. The processes of formal subsumption are thus intrinsically related to the extension 
of the domain of capitalist production and capitalist markets. At a certain point, as capitalist 
expansion reaches its limit, the processes of formal subsumption can no longer play a 
central role.... Through the real subsumption, the integration of labor into capital becomes 
more intensive than extensive and society is ever more completely fashioned by capital.... 
In other words, the realization of the world market and the general equalization or at least 
management of rates of profit on a world scale cannot be the result simply of financial or 
monetary factors but must come about through a transformation of social and productive 
relations.52  
                                                        
47 Marx, Grundrisse, 694. 
48 Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital, 112.  
49 See Francis Sanzaro, Society Elsewhere. He argues that software algorithms will replace human decision making 
(consciousness, political governance), the vagaries of love (via more advanced dating apps) and even aesthetic 
prowess (machines that can¾already¾given enough data perfectly emulate Rembrandt’s style to produce a 
“new” Rembrandt painting).     
50 Caffentzis, “Immeasurable Value?: An Essay on Marx’s Legacy,” 113.  
51 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 254-255.  
52 ibid., 255. 
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For instance, the putting-out system characteristic of textile manufacture or share-cropping 
omnipresent in 17th Century western Europe is a nice example of the formal subsumption of labour 
by capital. With the putting-out system (the domestic or workshop system), merchant-employers 
would “put out” various raw material inputs to rural producers “who continued to work with 
archaic production techniques” and then “collect textile outputs to in turn sell them on the world 
market.”53 The merchants did not systematically engineer or tamper with the production process. 
The invention of the sewing machine (1846), however, changes this process¾as does Frederick W. 
Taylor’s “scientific management” (1882) and Henry Ford’s application of the “assembly line” 
(1913). Likewise, if we contrast these instances of proto-industrialization and the Industrial 
Revolution, the post-Fordist regime of accumulation surpasses their application of techno-scientific 
knowledge as a form of biopolitical domination and intensification in the workplace (real 
subsumption): as Caffentzis remarks, real subsumption is present in the ways “that human 
psychology (social and individual) can be used to make workers more productive and put the results 
to practice. Such managers never let the production process rest”¾or, moreover, the soul.54  
 To begin with, capital draws into its domain a labour process that pre-exists it¾including 
a series of existing techniques, markets, equipment and workers. This is formal subsumption. The 
labour process continues much as it did before, with the exception that capitalists privatize the 
means of production so that workers are cut off from their means of subsistence and thus compelled 
to subject themselves to the wage relation. There is “little effort made to increase the productivity 
of labour and so the productive (and reproductive) routines and techniques used are largely ‘as 
is’”55 A consequence of this, however, is that the primary way to increase surplus value extraction 
is through “absolute surplus value”¾in other words, by expanding the length of the working day. 
Due to the fact that there is “little investment in equipment, the organic composition (the ratio of 
constant capital to variable capital, i.e., investment in machines and plant with respect to the wage 
bill) is relatively low in most industries” and human labour functions as the primary input¾that is 
to say, surplus value relies heavily on how it applies, disciplines and exploits “labour-time.”  
                                                        
53 Caffentzis, “Immeasurable Value?: An Essay on Marx’s Legacy,” 113. 
54 ibid., 113.  
55 ibid., 119.  
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 As we know, however, capitalism cannot develop at the rate it needs to on the limited 
foundation of the pre-existing forces of production it happens upon. Capital needs to create a 
labour process isomorphic with itself. Therefore, it progressively transforms social life, subjectivity 
and modes of work until they are meticulously imbued with the essence and needs of capital¾until 
life and labour are really immanent to capital. With the process of real subsumption, the general 
intellect develops a greater role in the production process: “there is a ‘revolutionary’ application of 
science and technology to the production process making it possible to decrease the necessary part 
of the working day and to intensify its productive density (hence producing relative surplus value).”56 
Value, according to the Autonomist hypothesis, is created less by the “socially necessary labor-
time” that congeals in a commodity than by globally co-ordinated immaterial labour that 
communicates “across continents via informatic planning and is increasingly directed at 
biopolitical objectives.”57 
 The revolutionary ambivalence that flickers within the “Fragment,” then, lies in the fact 
that by “setting in motion the powers of scientific knowledge and social cooperation, capital 
ultimately undermines itself.”58 It does this because, through an advanced system of automated 
machinery and mode of social organization that utilizes it, the need for labour-power is significantly 
reduced. The “very basis of capitalism” is in turn up-ended; the fact that people have to sell their 
labour in order to reproduce their existence (which is one of the defining features of the capitalist 
mode of production) could become obsolete (due to technological advances that replace mundane 
productive tasks) radically upsets the “ontology” of capital.59 Private ownership and wage labour 
appear as fundamental impediments to the full development of techno-scientific achievements, 
achievements which rest upon an efflorescent intellectual and social community (the general 
intellect). Automation coupled with a vibrant expansion of socialization processes (education, free-
time for developing subjectivity, production of stimulating and shared common spaces, etc.) carry 
within them the ability to eliminate private control over the means of production and wage labour. 
This potential, however, has not come to fruition. What we see instead are mass unemployment, 
the creation of indebted subjects and new forms of exploitation that subsume a whole range of 
subjective processes¾language, habit, experience, knowledge, affect and desire. The emergence 
                                                        
56 ibid., 119.  
57 ibid., 113.  
58 Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx, 220.  
59 ibid., 220.  
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of a new regime of accumulation was spurred by a reaction on part of the capitalist class to the 
fiery amplification of proletarian struggle, mass abandonment from factories and the refusal to 
work that started in the 1960s and climaxed in 1977 in Italy. In response to these failed revolutions, 
the political economy of “post-Fordism, hinging as it does on the general intellect and the multitude, 
puts forth, in its own way, typical demands of communism (abolition of work, dissolution of the State, 
etc.). Post-Fordism is the communism of capital”¾the simulation of communistic elements par 
excellence.60  
 Paolo Virno, Christian Marazzi, Franco “Bifo” Berardi and Maurizio Lazzarato among 
countless others, take Marx’s concept of the general intellect one step further by redepositing it 
back into the radiant biological substratum of living labour as opposed to it just being concretized 
in the one-dimensional system of “fixed capital”: in “post-Fordism the general intellect is not fixed in 
machines, but in the bodies of workers.”61 It is proletarian, social and political, not merely a noetic, 
economic or techno-scientific phenomenon. The general intellect¾the relationship between 
knowledge and production, language and labour¾is not exhausted by and cannot be reduced to 
the life and whirring of machines. The general intellect as such makes profound changes to the 
development of the social fabric and subjectivity enmeshed within it as capitalism shifts from 
outside of the four walls of the Fordist assembly line to the dispersed post-Fordist “social factory,” 
from a disciplinary regime of repression (bodily subjugation, productive introversion, enclosure) to 
an ecstatic regime of expression (psychic stimulation, productive extroversion, connectivity):  
 
In the period of manufacture, and during the long apogee of Fordist labour, labour activity 
is mute. Who labours keeps quiet. Production is a silent chain, where only a mechanical 
and exterior relation between what precedes it and what follows it is allowed, whilst any 
interactive correlation between what is simultaneous to it is expunged. Living labour, an 
appendix of the system of machines, follows a natural causality in order to use its power…In 
the post-Fordist metropolis, on the other hand, the material labouring process can be 
empirically described as a complex of linguistic acts, a sequence of assertions, a symbolic 
interaction. This is partly due to the fact that now labour activity is performed aside the 
system of machines, with regulating, surveillance and coordinating duties; but also because 
the productive process uses knowledge, information, culture and social relations as its 
‘primary matter’.62 
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Linguistic activity becomes central to the new mode of production that valorizes a form of 
subjectivity that is linguistically competent, affectively versatile, socially interactive, expressive and 
cooperative: the “labourer is (and must be) loquacious.”63 Capitalism turns to the “sign” not just as 
a representational code or ideology (à la Žižek et al.) but as a productive unit and creative force (à 
la Virno et al.)¾as its “primary matter.” 
 Communicative action is distributed throughout the entire socius as an irrefutable 
economic imperative¾from Instagram posts to political decision making to data mined for 
financial speculation, communication is essential to generate value in either its subjective forms 
(“human capital”) or its monetary forms (“profit”). Virno will even go so far as to say that the 
“dialogical word is seated at the very heart of capitalistic production” and that in order to make 
sense of post-Fordist working conditions “it is necessary to turn more and more to Saussure and 
Wittgenstein.”64  
 Capitalism itself demands this new logocentricism as part of its renovated production 
process. However, this turn from “fixed capital”¾machinery¾in explanations of the general 
intellect to the interrogation of the semiotic flux of social labour is vitally important, however minor 
it appears, for the elision of ecological accounts of the post-Fordist epoch. It detaches immaterial 
labour from geology, spatiotemporal location, mediatic infrastructure, diverse forms of global 
labour stretched across supply chains and immanence (what we can ventriloquize Marx calling 
“human participation in nature”). This is why almost all of the machines in the Autonomist 
tradition are “abstract machines.”65 What cascades from this “minor” ethereal pivot are five¾to 
name just a few¾major paralogisms that eclipse a more radical engagement with ecology: (1) the 
hegemony of immaterial labour; (2) the stagist image of capitalist development; (3) primacy of the 
political subjectivity of the cognitariat; (4) the primacy of semiotic, affective and knowledge 
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production; (5) the negation of the heterogeneous forms of exploitation¾or, the “proletarian 
multiverse.”66 These critiques have been made before so it suffices to cover them briefly and 
synoptically before turning to the core arguments of this chapter.67  
 Although Hardt and Negri will claim that “all forms of labor are today socially productive” 
there is nonetheless “always one figure of labor that exerts hegemony over the others.”68 Therefore, 
the industrial configuration of labour that dominated the nineteenth and twentieth century loses 
“its hegemony and in its stead emerged ‘immaterial labor,’ that is, labor that creates immaterial 
products, such as knowledge, information, communication, a relationship, or an emotional 
response.”69 Responding to the critiques of “immaterial labour” and “cognitivist theories” that 
claimed that this kind of labour only comprised a minor segment of the global labour force, Hardt 
and Negri affirm that immaterial labour “constitutes a minority of global labor, and it is 
concentrated in some of the dominant regions of the globe” but that their claim is that “immaterial 
labour has become hegemonic in qualitative terms and has imposed a tendency on other forms of labor 
and society itself.”70 The problem with this “tendential” speculation is that it implies a teleological 
destiny with regard to the informatization of production rather than being posited as merely 
another addition within already existing forms of exploitation. It fails to specify different forms of 
exploitation and how they interrelate with one another in the global arena as heterogeneous sites 
for the extraction of surplus-value. As George Caffentzis makes viciously clear, in order for 
capitalism to counteract the falling rate of profit and stabilize profit throughout the whole capitalist 
system, the 
 
branches of industry that employ very little labor but a lot of machinery must be able to 
have the right to call on the pool of value that high-labor, low-tech branches create. If there 
were no such branches or no such right, then the average rate of profit would be so low in 
the high-tech, low-labor industries that all investment would stop and the system would 
terminate. Consequently, "new enclosures" in the countryside must accompany the rise of 
"automatic processes" in industry, the computer requires the sweat shop, and the cyborg's 
existence is premised on the slave.71  
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Computers, cyborgs and informational machines are not “always already there.” The “social 
machines” that enable semiocapitalism to run and that give the “cognitariat” its constitutive 
specificity necessarily rely on a larger material network of hyper-exploitation in the global South and 
hyper-appropriation of geological affordances.  
 This “tendential” reading, therefore, invites a “stagist image” of capitalist 
development¾obscuring the role that heterogenous forms of global exploitation play in the 
constitution of wealth, value and profit. This linear or stagist image of development extracts a 
previous historical tendency¾one concerning industrialization¾and projects it into the future: 
immaterial labour is “today in the same position that industrial labor was 150 years ago, when it 
accounted for only a small fraction of global production and was concentrated in a small part of 
the world but nonetheless exerted hegemony over all other forms of production” such that just as 
“in that phase all forms of labour and society itself had to industrialize, today labor and society 
have to informationalized, become intelligent, become communicative, become affective.”72 This 
stagist image is prevalent in a number of theoretical works that attempt to distill the nebulous 
contours of the present by imposing unilateral schemata of development (a “tendency”) rather than 
positing a more brutal co-existence, stratification or symbiosis in mechanisms of exploitation¾the 
shift from “disciplinary societies” to “control societies” (Deleuze, Lazzarato); the shift from 
“biopolitics” to “psychopolitics” (Han); the shift from “Fordism” to “post-Fordism” (Bifo, Virno, 
Marazzi); the shift from “industrial capitalism” to “cognitive capitalism” (Moulier-Boutang); the 
shift from the “modernization of production” to the “postmodernization of production” (Hardt, 
Negri). The discovery of a new particle does not replace the rest. It simply joins their ranks: on a 
global scale “agricultural labour remains the largest category, and the absolute number 
of…industrial workers has not shrunk.”73 Silvia Federici affirms this when she notes that 
globalization, rather than shrinking capital’s reliance on living labour through “increasing 
automation of work,” has actually expanded the labour market by “destroying subsistence 
economies...and making millions dependent on monetary incomes”¾adding, in the process, 
approximately two billion people “to the world labor market” in order to cut production costs on 
a global scale.74 
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 Lastly, what Bifo calls the “cognitariat” expresses the “social subjectivity of the general 
intellect.”75 The cognitariat is “the social corporeality of cognitive labour”¾labour that puts to work 
all of our linguistic, affective, libidinal and personal capabilities; or, as Bifo notes, labour that “is 
essentially a labor of communication, that is to say communication put to work.”76 The cognitariat 
for him expresses a fundamental problem of “de-corporealization” or “desensitization” because of 
the combined and uneven effects of the “acceleration of network technologies,” “cognitive 
electrocution,” “precariousness,” “competition between workers,” “demands of hyper-
productivity,” “cognitive stress” and “attention-demanding goods” that hyperbolically compress, 
disfigure and compact the “sphere of emotion and sensibility” leading to a dysfunctional relation 
to one’s own body and to the bodies of others¾furthering the problem of proletarian 
recomposition, collective struggle and solidarity.77 Bifo updates Jean Baudrillard’s theory of 
simulacra¾wherein the referent is cancelled beneath the sign¾and imbues it with a proletarian 
existentialism fit for life in the digital universe, the psycho-economic paradigm of semiocapitalism 
and the Prozac economy. What is cancelled beneath the sign, financial abstraction and exchange 
value for Bifo is the “body.” In this case, Bifo does not want to talk about alienation as it was 
previously understood¾as a symptom of reification. He wants to talk about “de-realization,” 
which refers to the “difficulties experienced by the animated body in reaching the animated body 
of the other: a pathogenic separation between cognitive functions and material sociality.”78  
 Thus, while he manages to expose a “phenomenological deficit” in Baudrillard and the 
psycho-economic paradigm of semiocapital, Bifo is unable to reinterpret the referent as anything 
other than flesh, body or sensibility. The cognitariat is still the tragic protagonist caught up in the 
“whirlpool of the sign” or “claustrophobia of the code.”79 Bifo fails to see that the machine is also 
“de-corporealized” beneath the imperialism of the sign because the machine (computer, smart-
phone, automated robotic factory) is coded within the context of the Grundrisse as a complex of 
“techno-scientific knowledge” and “fixed capital,” where machines are a product, conduit and 
vessel of the “general intellect” rather than a product of labour that traverses geographies, rare 
earths, supply chains and global factories. For Autonomists, the machine and sign are isotropic 
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partners in the subjugating application of modern power relations. The “sign” ¾much like it does 
in cyberspace¾saturates the whole theoretical and attentional field of Autonomism’s analysis: 
apparatuses of domination (sign as power), techno-linguistic machines (sign as fixed capital), the 
productive capacity of living labour (sign as potency) and the limit of the world (sign as possibility) 
all orbit around one valence of its magic. The “sign” detaches from its mooring and becomes an 
autonomous force in its own right¾in other words, a fetish. Hence, even the critique of the sign functions 
as its negative cheerleader. Critique aporetically merges with fetish.   
 
1.2 SPECTRAL MATERIALISM: THE GEOLOGY OF THE GENERAL INTELLECT 
 
 The machine is persistently rendered in Autonomist thought as a “linguistic machine”80: 
the general intellect within the era of networked production forms a closed circuit, an interfaced 
assemblage or feedback loop between the bio-psycho-linguistic flux of living labour (linguistic 
performances, cooperative interaction, symbolic expression, knowledge) and omnipresent linguistic 
machines (computers, smartphones, robotic machinery, information technologies) that can 
incarnate, grammatize or facilitate this fractal swarm of communicative labour in order for 
semiocapitalism to organize, control and extract surplus value from a myriad of different points, 
nodes or episodes in the process. Language is a continuous social assembly line of mouth, mind 
and machine.  
 As we have already noted above, Marx claims in the “Fragment” that “nature builds no 
machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. They are products of 
human industry: natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of 
human participation in nature.” I want to pause over this passage and de-emphasize the primacy 
that Marx imbues “human industry,” the “human brain,” and the “power of knowledge” with in 
order to reconsider the “natural material” that grounds the techno-organs of human will and 
anthropogenesis. I want to does this without, however, negating the obvious fact and important 
role that techno-scientific knowledge, chemistry, the geological sciences and media technologies 
play as epistemological frameworks that allow one to “perceive, simulate, design, and plan in terms 
of the environment and the climate.”81 The goal of this section is to elaborate the “transcendental 
geology” that is at work in semiocapitalism¾that is, how digital culture, technological machines 
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and the general intellect exploit, mobilize, deterritorialize and reterritorialize the earth in order to 
function as such. It is also a minor elaboration of “spectral materialism,” a materialism (contra the 
“enchanted” theories of new materialism) that emphasizes how media materiality, global labour 
and chemical toxicity upsets the imaginary surrounding digital culture, immaterial labour and the 
general intellect.  
 It is precisely these methodological prisms that enable Parikka to claim that computers “are 
a crystallization of the past two hundred years to three hundred years of scientific and technological 
development, geological insights, and geological affordances.”82 We could push this perspective 
even further as McKenzie Wark does: from the vantage point of the rocks themselves, “computers 
are a working out of the potentials of a vast array of elements and compounds that took billions of 
years to make but only decades to mine and commodify¾and discard.”83 Wark will also 
seductively claim that “history is a process in which collective human labor transforms nature into 
a second nature to inhabit.”84  This second nature lays the ground for the next imbrication, which 
is the “third nature” of informational strata that than feeds back into the second nature (historico-
geography of dwelling) and first nature (the biosphere), transforming all the other strata in complex, 
byzantine circuits of interaction, entanglement and symbiotic friction: there is “no information to 
circulate without a physics and a chemistry.”85 The goal, nevertheless, is not to lose sight of the 
labour, social totality, and mode of production that propels and mediates these processes.   
 What Parikka and Wark help catalyze or draw out is an epistemological framework that 
moves us outside of the endogenous categories, mise en scénes and critical approaches to post-
industrial social life and the mediasphere¾“sign” and “desire”¾into the conceptual domain of 
“strata.” It allows us to hijack the “geophilosophical” and “ecosophic” spirit of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus¾with its terrestrial lexicon of fossilized strata, geology of morals and 
sedimentations¾and bring it to bear in a more thematized manner on the “psychopolitical” and 
“libidinal” spirit of Anti-Oedipus and “Postscript on the Societies of Control” that still resonate and 
supersaturate the variegated analyses of Autonomist scholarship. It is impossible to read Empire, 
Multitude, Commonwealth, The Soul at Work, And: Phenomenology of the End, Experimental Politics and Signs 
and Machines without triggering the looming presence of the latter texts. Even the “rhizome” of A 
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Thousand Plateaus is de-vegetalized and electrified as it comes to represent the logic and form of 
networked systems and the revolutionary heterogeneity of the “multitude.” “Strata,” then, help us 
get out of the “libidinal,” “cognitive” and “linguistic” economies that have come to dominate the 
discourse around media without completely jettisoning their necessity and value.       
 The geontological notion of “strata” enables us to investigate how the material and 
temporalities of the earth are folded inside digital culture in order to constitute a vital operation of 
its grounding. Deleuze and Guattari will call strata “judgments of God” because they function as 
“acts of capture” that imprison, lock or fix the unstable matter of intensities, molecular life and 
singularities into regulated systems or “molar aggregates”¾that is, actualities, empirical objects or 
individuations. However, because they give ontological primacy to creative flux, 
deterritorialization and “permanent revolution,” they effectively “undermine” the auto-enriching 
features of mediation (“capture,” “form,” “strata”). There is at times an immense poverty in pure 
flux¾a slippery nomad devoid of qualities, cathexis or pause. Of course, their point is still well 
taken: the earth is not the ground beneath our feet. It is not the divine consistency or ultimate 
substratum that guarantees stability, equilibrium or homeostasis. As Iain Hamilton Grant 
illustrates,  
 
the earth is not an object containing its ground within itself, like the preformationists’ 
animal series; but rather a series or process of grounding with respect to its consequents. If 
geology, or the ‘mining process’, opens onto an ungroundedness at the core of any object, 
this is precisely because there is no ‘primal layer of the world’, no ‘ultimate substrate’ or 
substance on which everything ultimately rests. The lines of serial dependency, stratum 
upon stratum, that geology uncovers do not rest on anything at all, but are the records of 
actions antecedent in the production of consequents.86 
 
The process of grounding and ungroundedness reveals that a “transcendental geology” of media 
is more akin to a complex of shifting ungrounds, “serial dependency” and “dispersed geological 
actors”¾geological particles that end up in the computer hardware or computer particles that end 
up as fossils or sediment in the lithosphere. Semiocapitalism appears not merely as an socio-
economic paradigm that has subsumed the “soul” but a vast “geoengineering” or “terraforming” 
project that envelops the entire planetary system: a “century ago, or even half a century ago, less 
than 12 materials were in wide use: wood, brick, iron, copper, gold, silver, and a few plastics” but 
post-industrial production now requires a vast array of different substantial material to make its 
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products¾such that, a “modern computer chip, for example, employs more than 60 different 
elements. This use of materials is not a whim of the designer, but a carefully calculated effort to 
achieve increasingly high performance in products simple to complex.”87  
 Deleuze and Guattari will go so far as to say that there is “no biosphere or noosphere, but 
everywhere the same Mechanosphere. If one begins by considering the strata in themselves, it 
cannot be said that one is less organized than another.”88 The strata are “extremely mobile” and 
one “stratum is always capable of serving as the substratum of another, or of colliding with 
another.”89 The strata are thickenings and coagulations of the earth¾both made up of molecular 
and molar elements that combine dynamic material flows and sedimentations. However, despite 
claiming that there is no “real” distinction between what would constitute as the “biosphere” or 
“noosphere,” Deleuze and Guattari will distinguish three “major strata”¾physiochemical (matter, 
flows, particles), organic (biosphere, ecosphere, life forces) and anthropomorphic (culture, history, 
production).90 The geontological notion of “strata” deflates the hegemonic character that Hardt 
and Negri ascribe to immaterial labour, the cognitariat and the techno-social features of the general 
intellect. We cannot talk about the noosphere in isolation from the other imbricated frictions, 
collisions and co-dependences formed with the other strata.  
 Matteo Pasquinelli makes this clear in reference to concepts more intimate to Autonomist 
thought¾namely, “the common” or the sphere of knowledge and ideas that constitute the shared 
communicative space that the contemporary multitude produces. “Strata are the different matters 
that constitute the commons. From the most material to the most immaterial, the habitat of human 
civilization can be described in a schematic geology composed by energetic, biological, technological, 
linguistic, mythological strata.”91 The “commons” is often popularized under terms such as the 
“digital commons,” “immaterial commons” or “creative commons.” It also has more nuanced 
philosophical topologies already touched upon¾the “general intellect” (Marx), “cultural capital” 
(Bourdieu), “collective symbolic capital” (Harvey). Pasquinelli wants to situate the history of the 
common in terms of the dark subterranean currents of “surplus,” “living energy,” “biomorphic 
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excess” or the “energetic unconscious.” One way that he does this is by reinvigorating the 
“negative” and reading the commons in terms of conflict, friction and asymmetry.  
 The commons are always dependent or parasitic on the material strata they operate on and 
not smooth, harmonious spaces of interaction: a structural friction pervades the commons, one 
that always entails “an exchange, accumulation or dissipation of energy, in particular of surplus 
value.”92 One the one hand, we have the asymmetry of profit extraction. On the other, we have 
the asymmetry of political struggle and sabotage. “The stratification of matter and human activity 
is crossed by a living energy that is constantly accumulated, parasitized and sabotaged along 
asymmetrical forms and frictions.”93 Every stratum is parasitic on other strata. Every stratum draws 
from a surplus generated by the others¾all the way down. One is tempted to read Pasquinelli’s 
parasite in a Spinozist-Schleiermacherian vein: “consciousness is the absolute feeling of 
dependence on God.” God being the infinite causal network of imbricated strata. This is why it is 
somewhat disingenuous for Hardt and Negri to label global capitalism as a macro-parasite that 
only siphons from the illustrious immanence of the general intellect, living labour or the multitude 
without fully addressing the parasitic relation that the multitude, living labour and general intellect 
have with ecology, the global South and mediatic infrastructure’s reliance on geology at large.  
 To think the geology of the general intellect in terms of strata, then, is to think of it from 
the vantage point of media materiality¾a pivotal intersection of earth material, labour and 
communication: according to a 2008 study, “the proportion of the world’s metals going into media 
technologies was 36 percent of all tin, 25 percent of cobalt, 15 percent of palladium, 15 percent 
silver, 9 percent of gold, 2 percent of copper, and 1 percent of aluminum.”94 These metals traverse 
supply chains that are “complicated by a globally diffuse informal sector¾which consists of 
artisanal and small-scale mining,” a “notoriously harsh, low-tech, poverty-driven sector” that is 
primarily concentrated in “Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where about a million children labor 
in mines”¾the majority of which, in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, labour 
under the threat of mercenaries and soldiers who enslave them using intimidation tactics such as 
rape, violence and murder.95 These metals and minerals (for instance, coltan) are then either 
refined in Chinese-owned plants that reside in the Congo or exported back to China to be smelted 
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there. The processed ore is then sold on the international market as tantalum, “a core component 
in capacitors that end up in phones, computers, games, and media-production equipment.”96  
 All of this amounts to nothing less than a form of geological racism or environmental 
colonialism that reifies¾makes real¾the antiquated philosophical dualism of “mind” and “body.” 
“The late-twentieth century system assigned poor regions to make the ‘low-value’ constellation of 
pieces and parts of a device, whereas richer regions were given ‘high-value’ research, development 
and marketing.”97 But the metaphysics of metals continues.  
 Dyer-Witheford gives an adequate account of semiocapital’s complicated process of 
“strata” imbrication by tracing the production processes of mobile phones. He delineates fives 
central phases: “extraction, assembly, sale, service and disassembly.”98 The extraction process, as 
I have already touched upon, involves the violent deterritorialization of the earth (the infamous 
blood mineral, coltan, for instance) in places such as the Congo.99 The conflict-ridden mineral 
came to public notoriety in the global North when the 2000 Christmas release of the PlayStation 
was delayed due to supply shortages; however, as Dyer-Witheford notes, though “game consoles 
broke the coltan story, since 2000 cell phones have been the ‘main attractor’ for the mineral.”100 
Extractive economies are essential to semiocapitalism:   
   
South Africa’s infamous Marikana mine, where in 2012 34 striking miners were killed by 
security forces, produced platinum, a mineral of which more than a third of the world’s 
output is used in computer hard-drives. In Bolivia, mines producing the lithium used in 
batteries for mobiles and computers have seen recurrent disputes over both lithium miners’ 
wages and conditions and indigenous people’s rights to control of resources. China’s mines 
for rare earths vital to smartphones are highly toxic. Mobile’s mineral components emerge 
out of such contexts.101  
 
 These minerals are then sold and moved to sites of assembly and manufacture. At times we 
are seduced by the “tendential” argument laid out by Autonomists that would have us believe that 
the “factory” has disappeared. This could be further from the truth; rather, what we have is an 
exported “spectral geomaterialism” or “peripheral Fordism.” As Richard Maxwell and Toby 
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Miller remind us, ethereal concepts such as “knowledge worker, immaterial labour, creative 
industries, and cognitariat are of little use to explain the situation in Foxconn’s Shenzhen factory,” 
given that it is a place “where wages where at the minimum allowable by law before the suicides, 
overtime exceeds legal limits and is often not paid, a totalitarian polity and company controls 
everyday life.”102  
 The analysis of semiocapitalism often talks about the complete co-linearization of life-time 
with work-time (real subsumption). Unlike the compartmentalized blocks of time (the nine-to-five 
shift) in the Fordism regime, the creative activity of the cognitariat stretches out into an 
indeterminable amorphous temporal flow of productivity, learning, research, experience and 
epiphanic stimulation. The brain-computer never fully shuts off¾recording and condensing life 
experiences into quasi-eternal crystals of time (inorganic memory) that could then find themselves 
being integrated into a “project,” “human capital” or the “firm.” It should be noted, moreover, 
that during the production of the first iPads Chinese workers were under such pressure “that shifts 
were twelve hours a day/seven days a week for six months with a rest day every thirteen days an 
no weekend overtime premium.”103 This is not even to mention the “deep time” of the earth being 
condensed into a form of “proletarianization”¾that is, “deep time” being put to work for profit. 
 The next two stages¾ “strata”¾that Dyer-Witheford outlines are “sales” and “support.” 
I want to side-step his discussion on these processes and turn to a larger critical discussion of 
“immaterial labour” and “machinic subjectivity” and the role they play in the “production of 
desire.” Here desiring producing work is what Lazzarato defines as “the labor that produces the 
informational and cultural content of the commodity,” that incorporates a panoply of activities 
“involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, 
and more strategically, public opinion.”104 But more importantly, though in conjunction with 
immaterial labour, what is critiqued is the “connectivist” and “hydraulic” assumptions grounding 
mediatic life, the multitude and process ontology (à la Deleuze and Negri).   
 
1.3 DARK VITALISM: THE GEOPSYCHOPOLITICS OF EXHAUSTION
 Deleuze and Guattari claim that “we always make love with worlds.”105 I want to take 
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this claim seriously and push it to its conceptual breaking-point. The world is the nebulous 
structure of connections engineered by “desiring-machines,” which are defined precisely in terms 
of their non-judgmental “capacity for an unlimited number of connections, in every sense, and in 
all directions.”106 Desire is the capacity for continual auto-expansion (production) in the 
determinate conditions of the assemblage it is immanent to or circulating within. The world is the 
residual (phenomenal, empirical, phantasmal) emanation that stems from desiring-production 
and the connections or disconnections it makes. Desire is neither lack (innate subjective 
frustration or an imaginary projective system of object substitution that ensues due to a 
primordial deficiency or split in the heart of a being that cannot get what it wants), nor synonymous 
with pleasure (seeking teleological and homeostatic relief in anticipated expenditure or orgasm) nor 
pure undifferentiated chaotic energy that needs to be tamed, formed or controlled. Lazzarato expounds this 
notion of desire most lucidly in his critique of Bernard Stiegler’s model of sublimation, which 
renders desire a drive-based chaos and naturalistic instinct in need of mediation by the public 
power of culture:  
 
Desire is not centered around individuals and does not result from the simple interaction 
of drives or individual “conatuses” (intersubjectivity). Desire does not come from the inside 
of the subject. It is always born from the outside, from an encounter, a coupling or an 
assemblage. The classical conception of desire is abstract, since it is extracted from the 
assemblage of a desiring subject and a supposedly desired object, while we never desire a 
single someone or something, but always a person or a thing in an ensemble constituted of 
a multiplicity of objects, relations, machines, humans and signs. It is the assemblage and 
not the individuated subject that make someone or something desirable. We never desire a 
someone alone or something alone but worlds and possibles.107 
 
Desire is the immanent force of a radical constructivism that refuses all forms of mediation. It is 
not natural but “artificial,” “social” and “cyborg.” “Desiring machines are not in our heads, in our 
imagination, they are inside our social and technical machines themselves.”108 Desire forms a 
precarious circuit of animation that is transmitted throughout all of its corresponding parts, 
relations, breaks and mutations: “the desiring machine is nothing other than a multiplicity of 
distinct elements or simple forms that are bound together on the full body of society.”109 
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 Stiegler’s vision of desire (essentially, desire as culturally structured to care for its object and 
drive as raw consumption and destruction of objects, where capitalism has eroded desire to such an 
extent that it reverts back to pure-drive based instinct) for Lazzarato is nothing other than an 
elaborate and crypto-Hobbesian model of desire that renders desire as “state of nature”¾war of 
all against all. Desire is reduced to a flow that needs to be disciplined: a mediator is always required, 
“a sovereign, a state that makes possible the passage from nature to culture, from war to peace, 
from savageness to civilization.”110 This is nothing other than libidinal hylomorphism: the raw flux 
of desire is set against a symbolic order that structures it. Stiegler privileges cultural sublimation 
and auto-enriching mediation. Deleuze and Guattari privilege radical constructivism and 
productivism. Stiegler privileges democratic universalism. Deleuze and Guattari privilege 
revolutionary rupture.  
 Despite Lazzarato’s wonderfully clear expositions of desire and critique of Stiegler, desire 
is not rendered immanent enough but read under the presupposition of a “revolutionary 
definition” that preinstalls revolutionary spontaneity, telos and vocation into the hydraulics of 
desire. Desire is never allowed the positive brutality of its indifference. What does this definition of 
desire mean in relation to the geomaterialism of the general intellect and the Anthropocene in 
general? What does desire rupture or break down in pursuit of its productive circulation? Anti-
Oedipus is only able to deploy a critique that undermines moral limits (as Lazzarato’s essay 
paradigmatically shows) but it is unable to undermine material limits that expose the ecological 
shortcomings of a theory of desire isomorphic with Spinozistic “divine auto-causality” or the 
“autoproduction of the real” (for to talk about limits is not to incarnate the eroticism of the cop, 
endorse conservativism or posit essences¾rather, it is to inject the dystopia of entropy, precarity 
and ruin into the vitalistic discourse of desire).111 To speak of material limits is to desuture “rupture” 
from exclusively meaning “revolution.” Desire is often treated as an intoxicated mode of 
production, connection, animation and power.112 These next sections attempt to read desire¾as 
a critical supplement to the new materialist theories of “enchantment” and neo-Spinozist theories 
that fetishize only the enhancing features of “affect” and “power”¾as a mode of destruction, 
subtraction, detachment and extraction. This not to say that Lazzarato’s reading is incorrect. I 
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very much subscribe to it. However, it unfairly emphasizes desire as a mode of production without 
addressing it simultaneously as a mode of destruction. This asymmetry in emphasis occurs because 
Lazzarato reads “rupture” (negativity) only as a form of passage (to revolutionary possibility) rather 
than a cruel process of ruination (dark vitalism) silently interlaced across the whole movement of 
desiring-production.113 There is rarely any talk of detritus in the discourse of desire. The 
commodity and consumption are also conspicuously absent in Deleuzean accounts. Even media 
study theorists consistently present desire as a contagious virus that spreads out along the digital 
surface as a horizontal network of assimilating flows.  
 Because I will talk about e-waste, rudology and toxic accumulation in the next chapter, it 
will suffice here to expand on concepts of “dark vitalism” and the “libidinal parasite” (Pasquinelli) 
in relation to the geomaterial state of affairs concerning “immaterial labour” or the strata of the 
“noosphere”¾that is, to be more specific, how, when we make love with worlds, we always have 
that capacity to exhaust them; or, to be even more specific, in the context of what has already 
largely been mapped out in relation to geology, I want to explore the “way the bourgeois fucks the 
proletariat.”114 This is perhaps one of the most fruitful ways to understand what Deleuze and 
Guattari mean when they say “we always make love with worlds.”  
 One of the key functions of “immaterial labour” is to produce the force of desire (i.e. the 
process of valorization) that envelops and circulates the commodity world: it “gives form to and 
materializes needs, the imaginary, consumer tastes and so forth, and these products in turn 
becomes powerful producers of needs, images and tastes.”115 The “meta-commodity”¾given that 
its use value is the informational, symbolic, libidinal and cultural content of the commodity¾that 
immaterial labour produces is not destroyed in the process of consumption but rather “it enlarges, 
                                                        
113 In Forget Foucault, Baudrillard will go so far as to say that desire replicates the exact logic of capital: the 
“compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the 
body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point 
must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly in 
every direction. This is the form itself which the current realization of value takes. It is the form of capital, and 
sexuality as a catchword and a model is the way it appears at the level of bodies.” (39-40). Capital always has to 
circulate (extractively) through a multiplicity of commodities in order to realize itself. Likewise, desire always has to 
circulate (extractively) through a multiplicity of objects in order to realize itself. The real problem, then, lies in not 
viewing desiring-production as a form of idealism¾a neo-Spinozist hydraulic idealism of flows. Idealism can be 
identified here in the fact that the finite (object, part, material, sign, human, machine) has no veritable being in 
relation to the auto-production of desire itself. Creating flux trumps the creaturely form it passes through.  
114 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 293.  
115 Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labor,” 137 
 35 
transforms, and creates the ‘ideological’ and cultural environment of the consumer.”116 It produces the 
social relations and subjectivity required by capitalism through the constant formation and 
reformation of its primary matter¾the spiritual metabolism of the individual person. It does not 
reproduce the muscular, corporeal or physical aspects of labour power. It reproduces the 
inclinations of the soul (thoughts, affects, language, appetites) through the production of things like 
audiovisual content, advertising, media and fashion in a gigantic feedback loop that is hooked up 
to both the “consumer-communicator” and the “immaterial workers” who satisfy the desires of 
consumers while at the same time stimulating them (all of which is made possible by the social 
process of communication, information and an expansive sales network that releases highly 
differentiated product lines). Thus, consumerism is no longer just about the destruction of the 
commodity in the act of consumption; on the contrary, “the consumer is inscribed in the 
manufacturing of the product from its conception.”117      
 Sean Cubitt zooms out even further and puts immaterial labour and the cultural 
environment of the consumer into the even larger perspective of capitalism’s reproduction of itself as a 
global system by analyzing, with an almost cerebral cold-bloodedness, the “geography of this new 
division of labor” that continues to increase the “spatial divorce” between industrial work and 
consumptive work:  
 
Consumption becomes work when…it is not undertaken for the fulfilment of needs or the 
realizations of aspirations, but as a disciplined function required by capital to remove excess 
product manufactured in the pursuit of expanded accumulation and growth. For capital to 
continue to grow, the working class of the wealthy nations now has as its chief function not 
mass production but the mass consumption of excess product…. Consumer discipline, 
unlike factory discipline, instructs us not how to operate socially but how to operate 
antisocially: from mode of production to mode of destruction.118 
 
Dark vitalism is the unconscious of semiocapitalism and metropolitan consumerism. We tend to 
think of the consumer in isolated terms of a bourgeois, egocentric subject who lavishly spends their 
wages. Following a thinker like Bataille, however, we have to say that everything is a decadent metabolic 
engine. Desiring-machines do not only produce. They also inherently consume, waste and 
destroy¾and this consumption has nothing to do with the “shopaholic.” The Swedish 
conglomerate, Ikea, for instance, alone consumes 1% of the globe’s wood annually, a majority of 
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which is not sustainably harvested.119 The “productive circuits” and “capillaries” of desire that 
surge throughout the global North are not identical to the ones “surging” throughout the global 
South¾and yet they are irreversibly connected because the whole material infrastructure of 
semiocapital depends on their withdrawn, spectral presence as producers. Semiocapitalism, 
instead, purports that it derives its wealth from “handling symbols” in two primary sectors: one is 
through the “international regimes of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and designs” and the other 
is through “finance and computerized algorithmic (‘algo’) trading.”120 Those who are not fortunate 
enough to levitate at the center of the general intellect and financial capitalism either work to 
“produce a diminishing amount of the exchange value in each commodity” or are reduced to the 
ontological wayside as “supernumerary, unregarded, a repressed that returns only momentarily as 
a news item.”121  
 The construction of an energetic or geological interpretation of semiocapitalism means 
articulating the dense points of intersections where the fluid and turbulent “semiotic” and 
“desiring” fluxes come into contact with their “outsides.” Thus, what defines any system is not the 
pure functioning of their internal parts but rather the external accessibility to energy they have that 
enables them to run. Without talking about the external surpluses that operate any particular 
aspect of semiocapitalism, we risk that desiring “[f]low becomes¾like code¾an endless and 
abstract space of linear expansion; it is a cheap form of Spinozian ontology.”122 To talk about dark 
vitalism, then, is to talk about what desire exploits, mobilizes, breaks down, exhausts and assimilates 
in its passionate circuits, expansion and assemblage lines. Ian Buchanan, unwittingly confirming 
Baudrillard’s critique in Forget Foucault that desire replicates the structure of capital at the libidinal 
level, affirms the exploitative and exhaustive nature of desire (without, however, problematizing it) 
in his revealing analogy: “the synthesis of connection is the process whereby desire exploits the body to 
its own ends. In this scenario, desire is the equivalent of capital: it owns the means of production, but lacks 
the labourers needed to realize its potential.”123 
  Dark vitalism is about the geopsychopolitics of desire’s “hardware,” the material 
heterogeneity of the commodity as a “dark attractor” of the exploited labor and earth, as well as 
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spatial divides inherent within global production. Hardt and Negri’s notion about the “hegemony 
of immaterial labour” and the biopolitical potentialities of a multitude that “self-valorizes” itself 
and produces social life from within its own immanent power by engineering purely cooperative 
relations, then, falls short:  
Electricity turns to data, data to communication, communication to desire, desire to 
money, money to knowledge, knowledge to technology, and so on. The media economy is 
a symbiosis of different strata, a continuum of horizontal and vertical exchanges, but it is 
certainly not a flat market based on purely cooperative exchanges.124 
Dark vitalism means that there is always an element of parasitism when desire performs its 
operations of “coupling” and “connectivity.” What is left out of explications of “desiring-machines” 
is a detailed map of their “metabolic exchanges” or “entropic features.” At times there seems to be 
no earth in Deleuze and Guattari, only process ontology¾a philosophical category (“becoming”) that 
cannot be exhausted as such.   
 If the existence of the cyborg is predicated on the slave, we need to critique the giddy 
hermeneutics that underpin “desiring-machines” and “machinic subjectivity.” This is apparent in 
the abstract (i.e. non-dialectical and non-problematic) mediatic connectivism that underlies the 
basic assumption of the multitude, cyborgs and machinic assemblages championed by figures like 
Negri, Deleuze, Lazzarato and Haraway. The geological and metabolic are repressed when it 
comes to talking about machines and technicity. We see symptoms of this repression in Hardt and 
Negri’s explication of machinic subjectivity in Assembly (2017) despite the acknowledgement of 
“nonhuman” and “other beings” as components within the assemblage:  
  
A machinic assemblage...is a dynamic composition of heterogenous elements that eschew 
identity but nonetheless function together, subjectively, socially, in cooperation. It thus 
shares characteristics with our concept of the multitude, which attempts to pose political 
subjectivities as composed of heterogenous singularities¾one significant difference being 
that whereas we usually pose the multitude exclusively in terms of human singularities, a 
machinic assemblage is composed of a wider range of beings, human and nonhuman. 
Donna Haraway’s conception of the cyborg and her various efforts to combat identity and 
essentialized subjects lead her further in this direction, recognizing the breach in our 
standard divisions between humans and machines and between humans and other animals. 
But machinic assemblages extend the elements of subjective compositions even further to 
include all beings or elements that reside on the plane of immanence. All of this is based on 
the ontological claim that places humans, machines, and (now) other beings on the same 
ontological plane.125 
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Putting aside the fact that Hardt and Negri dilute the machinic by relapsing back into concerns 
with “anthropogenetic production,” “social cooperation” and “fixed capital,”126 they fail to 
consider that because the heterogeneous components that make up the assemblage have no “fixed 
identity” neither do they have frictional non-identity (everything just kind of “works together”). The 
connectivism of beings on the “same ontological plane” negates the specificity of the multiform 
(unequal, antagonistic) relations operative between the “anthropogenic strata” (humans), the 
“technical strata” (machines) and “geological strata” (other beings). The power to move¾to 
energize¾always falls back on “capital” or “labour,” “signs” or “desires,” without an adequate 
figuration about how both are parasitic on geological and non-human energetic surpluses.   
 Powering semiocapitalism, the immaterial economy and the mediasphere, however, is a 
dirty business. In order for desire to reproduce itself in its abstract mobility, in order for it to pursue 
the expansion of the material, techno-cultural and machinic environment of the privileged 
“consumer-communicator,” it requires a larger infrastructure of energy production to be in 
place¾especially one that is increasingly reliant on electricity and petro-capitalism. In 2006, 
“Google’s server warehouse in Oregon was using the same amount of power as a city of 200,000 
people, even though Google is considered more efficient than the bulk of the data center 
industry.”127 In 2011, “upwards of ten billion devices needed external power supplies, including 
two billion TV sets, a billion personal computers, and cell phones.”128 If global media usage 
continues at the pace that it is, the International Energy Agency “estimates that electricity 
consumption by electronic equipment will rise to 30 percent of global demand by 2022, and 45 
percent by 2030, ” which is problematic since the electrical industry still largely runs on fossil fuels 
(coal, natural gas, petroleum).129   
 Parikka, like Pasquinelli, reminds us that, contra Bifo, semiocapitalism does not just 
systematically exhaust the internal equipment and psycho-semiotic resources of the soul¾the 
“infinite creative powers of the human” or, rather, the “still privileged informational workers” of 
the global North:  
 
digital culture is also sustained by the rather exhausting physical work in mining, factory 
production lines, and other jobs that are not directly counted as part of “cognitive 
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capitalism”—and the machines themselves grow obsolescent and die, their remains leftover 
media-junk…and ecological resources are exhausted as well, part of the increasing demand 
for minerals and other materials for advanced technology industries.130  
 
The desires flowing in digital culture cannot be reduced to psychology or the intersubjective. If 
“dark vitalism” exposes desire as a horizontal process of ruination or detachment that exhausts or 
abandons its internal parts, relations, machines and objects in order to joyously function, “libidinal 
parasitism,” similarly, exposes desire as a vertical-diagonal process of asymmetrical relations that exhaust 
or siphon “energetic surpluses” from other strata implicated within its expanding proximity. Both 
aspects of desire bring into relief the problem of “connectivity” as potentially exploitative rather 
than as a purely giddy, felicitous and joyous relation of (mutual or symmetrical) empowerment or 
modal networking.   
     
1.4 LIBIDINAL PARASITES: THE USES AND ABUSES OF PURE DESIRE 
 
 The goal of this section is to get us outside the impasse of desire: desire either as a finite 
resource or an infinite flux. Rather than get stuck in this artificial “either-or,” I want to propose 
that, as a dénouement to this chapter, an “uneven ontology of desire” is operative within 
semiocapitalism’s mediatic and geological regimes¾one that, although already largely contoured, 
takes us back full circle to notions of “strata” and “transcendental geology,” allowing us to 
reconfigure the “transcendental” not merely as an “apriori set of invariable cognitive conditions” 
regulating the sensible (Kant) or “virtual multiplicity of genetic powers” giving birth to the actual 
(Deleuze), but rather as an “asymmetrical relation of dependence,” unequal exchange and 
exhaustion (the “transcendental,” given its relativism in relation to any system or object, is subject 
to finitude, time, glitches, spasms, regeneration and ruin, becoming, almost, akin to “fuel”). It also 
enables us to see that desire is not an infinite flux that is everywhere lingering with ontological 
exuberance, that desire is not everywhere oozing with the same potentialities, intensity and power. 
Desire is subject to distributions, concentrations, frackings and blockages (all of which can be given 
a positive or negative valence on the basis of the context, assemblage, conditions etc.). This notion 
of the “uneven ontology of desire” is best encapsulated in Pasquinelli’s notion of the “parasite,” a 
rich concept that he hijacks from Michel Serres and uses it to undermine vogue French vitalism.  
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 Pasquinelli, like Parikka, is suspicious of the widespread belief that the digital realm is a 
redemptive subtraction or immaterial haven (sublimation) that lifts humanity from the gritty 
surpluses of material life. He argues, instead, that “semiocapitalism,” “cognitive capitalism,” the 
“information economy,” or whatever neologism or title one would like to give it, is fundamentally 
parasitic on a material economy of “surpluses.” Surplus defines any system, machine or object “by 
the excess of energy operating it.”131 The relation surplus has with its corresponding system is rarely 
(if ever) mutual and always implies a relation of “asymmetry, friction and conflict.”132 Thus, 
“surpluses” are often negated by the “system” and disregarded because they simultaneously work 
to make the system operate smoothly and function outside of the parameters of visibility¾or, are 
insidiously kept outside of our critical-perceptive purview. These energy surpluses or 
sources¾whether laborious, proletarian, financial, informational, geological, libidinal, electrical 
or atmospheric¾are what make possible any system. Surpluses, moreover, are not only about 
energy but also about its accumulation: machines are “systems that both accumulate energy 
surpluses and consume, transform or dissipate it.”133 Parikka will also echo Pasquinelli here: the 
“digital is a regime of energies: human energy and the energy needed for technological 
machines.”134 Surpluses disrupt the smooth functionality that the system (i.e. neoliberalism or 
semiocapitalism) fantasizes for itself as ontologically complete, sealed off or whole. But the same 
goes for the ontology of cyberspace and desire:  
 
Contrary to the notion of flow, the concept of surplus can never be separated from its 
consumption, accumulation or sacrifice. Surplus includes its negative, rather than being an 
isolated positive process. A surplus of energy does not flow eternally¾it is temporary like 
life, it breaks. If the academic interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of desire 
is still used to idealize network society as a space of endless flows, it is absolutely necessary 
today to illuminate the dystopian reality of this energy surplus.135 
 
 So, what then is a parasite, the creature who siphons off the surplus? Serres describes the 
parasite in terms of an unequal exchange of energy, the way in which one organism extracts more 
energy, labour or time from another organism than it gives back in return, the way one stratum 
extracts more from layers beneath or beside. Serres explains how organisms are always stealing 
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energy from each other. From this simple thesis, Serres develops a “universal economy of unequal 
exchange”:  
 
The parasitic relation is intersubjective. It is the atomic form of our relations.136 
 
Man is a louse for other men. Thus man is a host for other men. The flow goes one way, 
never the other. I call this semiconduction, this valve, this single arrow, this relation without 
a reversal of direction, “parasitic.”137 
 
To parasite means to eat next to...The country rat is invited by his colleague from town, 
who offers him supper. One would think that what is essential is their relation of 
resemblance or difference. But that is not enough; it never was. The relation of the guest is 
no longer simple...There is no exchange, nor will there be one. Abuse appears before use.138 
 
We parasite each other and live amidst parasites. Which is more or less a way of saying that 
they constitute our environment.139 
 
Pasquinelli gives the parasite a Marxian inflection and picks up on the aprioristic feature of “abuse” 
and “exploitation.” Before there is use-value or exchange-value there is abuse-value (i.e. primitive 
accumulation, enclosure and proletarianization). Capital requires a surplus in order to reproduce 
itself¾living labour, ecosystems, and “externalities” of all sorts. In terms of tracking asymmetrical 
tensions and arrows cutting across, dividing and splitting the semiotic-libidinal domain of the 
mediasphere, we have to constantly throw ourselves into the energetic surplus of the offline in order 
to account for exploitative absorptions that pass through a continuum of organisms, strata and 
workers. The mediasphere is an energy system constituted by a complex of non-mediatic 
“outsides.” As a kind of caveat, Pasquinelli will also make clear that the “parasite” is not one-
dimensional. The parasite does not want its host to die but generates a symbiotic relationship with 
it and is not simply an insidious leech (although, keeping the host alive can, at times, be all the 
more sinister); there are moments of alliance and non-hostility immanent to the parasitic relation 
that exceed direct exploitation and extortion.140 Parasitism is not a moralism. Rather, it flickers 
between two determinations or poles¾cruel exploiter and friendly symbiont.  
 What the “libidinal parasite” opens up in terms of an “uneven ontology of desire,” then, 
rather than regarding desire as “a boundless positive energy” or a force that can “endlessly erode 
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all structures of control” (as the relentless Spinozisms of Deleuze and Negri do), is a more radical 
understanding of how semiocapitalism and neoliberalism divide, cut up, structure, accumulate and 
siphon flows of desire.141 With the parasite, we supplement the “enchanted universe of production” 
(Spinoza, Negri, Deleuze, Virno) for the “dark universe of consumption” (Serres, Bataille, 
Pasquinelli, Parrika).  
 Pasquinelli uses mediatic phenomena such as Internet porn videos, the simulacra of pop 
icons and other spectacular machines to explain the function of libidinal parasites as seductive 
gravitational attractors that “channel and accumulate our libido in a highly physical way. Media 
parasites absorb our libidinal energies as a surplus and condense it in the form of attention and 
fetishism towards brands, technology, material and immaterial commodities.”142 But there are 
other, more complicated forms of libidinal surplus value at work within the geology of media and 
the planetary divides of global labour that subtract our libidinal bandwidth away from secluded 
processes of how “desire” is manufactured in the first place. Take, for instance, “the residue 
products from the processes of fabrication, like the minuscule aluminum dust residue released from 
polishing iPad cases to be desirably shiny for the consumer market.”143 Or, even, how immaterial 
labour functions on the international stage: “in Vietnam or Thailand a famous designer buys for 
three dollars a shirt conceived in Paris or Zurich. The shirt will be sold in the West for forty-five 
dollars in the name of the ‘immaterial designer’” and thanks “to patents, trademarks and 
intellectual property¾that is, to the much higher remuneration commanded by knowledge with 
respect to material-applied labor¾wealth is in fact redistributed to the North.”144 Creativity is 
ontologically, fetishistically and economically restricted to the commons of the global North. It 
belongs (legally) to the intellectual and aesthetic consciousness of the cognitariat. 
 We do not often talk of desire in strictly material or “corporate” terms (businesses desire 
profit and deterritorialize enormous parts of the earth in order to make commodities¾from 
computers to Ikea furniture¾so they can realize that desire). Desire typically has a phantasmagoric 
texture, egocentric connotation and anthropogenic locus. It seems to be an immensely polished, 
exfoliated and diaphanous subjective revelation, intersubjective relation or even machinic relationality¾a 
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cupidinous arrow, machinic coupling or personal inner movement exorcised from all molecular 
negativity, grit or material support.145 We forget that desire has to traverse supply chains before it 
gets to the consumer or enters the “psychosphere” in the form of an “abstract” object of enjoyment. 
When speaking about “desiring-machines,” it is better move away from the “residual consumer” 
or “larval subject” (and its nomadic and ephemeral identity) found in Anti-Oedipus and emphasize 
the machine in “desiring-machines,” insofar as it enables us (without denying the “dynamic 
composition of heterogenous elements” or “transversal relationality”) to think about how corporate 
technicity (i.e. factories, data centers, fixed capital, financial computation) operates as a major force 
of geological exhaustion, extortion and destruction.  
 Even beyond the desire to produce surplus value, in so far as a desiring flow functions to 
disrupt a molar or arborescent configuration of the socius (e.g. centralized financial systems) but 
plugs into a technological infrastructure that gives it a cyborg dimension it becomes problematic: 
the “cryptocurrency Bitcoin, which is intended to disrupt hierarchical and centralised financial 
systems, requires the energy of nine US homes to perform a single transaction; and if its growth 
continues, by 2019 it will require the annual power output of the entire United states to sustain 
itself.”146 As Cubitt viciously demystifies for us, the “[f]antasy cyborgs look like human beings with 
technological implants,” whereas “[a]ctually existing cyborgs are huge agglomerations of 
technologies with human implants. Corporations like Enron and FirstEnergy are such cyborgs, 
composed of non-human actors with human biochips embedded to carry out specialist tasks” (like 
public relations and human resource management), and whose sprawling machinic agency has at 
is disposable “electrical grids connecting aggressively active users (who can scarcely be caught in 
the term consumers), the unmanaged turbulence of deregulated and automated markets, and the 
inhuman drive for corporate profit.”147  
 Again, it seems necessary to turn to the provocative formula of Anti-Oedipus and read it in 
geological and corporate terms: “we always make love with worlds.” How does capitalism produce 
desire, insofar as the desire for surplus profit demands immense material consumption, a 
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consumption that has nothing to do with the “individual”? What material elements does it use, 
abuse and discard of in the process of “desiring-production”? Desire has a constellation of material 
traces, minerals and chemicals (from psychopharmaceutic SSRIs to aluminum dust used for 
polishing Ipads, from serotonin to silicon) grafted onto its quasi-spiritual stomach lining: “plagued 
by worker suicides, and indexical of the wider health issues having to do with aluminum dust that 
is a side product of ensuring our iPads are shiny and properly polished, such places are the murky 
unconscious of gadget culture.”148 Parikka continues the link between desire and materiality: 
aluminum “itself is one of the primary chemical and metals of technological modernity: its fetishlike 
shininess defines Italian futurism as much as post-World War II automobile culture” and exposes 
a paradox in that “the residue of the utopian promise is registered in the soft tissue of a globally 
distributed cheap labor force.”149 This is an “entanglement” between structured regimes of desire 
and the materiality of technology that new materialists and cyborgs brutally shy away from. Desire 
is a complicated parasite that is forever predicated on unequal exchanges. It passes through objects 
(relations, machines, parts and people) in order to realize and express itself¾at the same time 
things pass through it, supporting or sabotaging it to varying proportions. The extent to which this 
relationship is extortive or enrichening, of course, depends on the material honesty of our social 
relations.  
 The geontology of strata, parasites and a mortal transcendental unit or complex (of 
conditioning “outsides”) calls into question the fashionable obsession with the main tenets 
circulating within contemporary ecological discourse (especially with figures such as Bruno Latour, 
new materialists and neo-Spinozists)¾ “entanglement,” “nature as indefinite process,” “everything 
is interconnected,” “everything is constructible.” There is a certain giddiness and naivete rampant 
in these theories that utilize the intricate philosophies of “flux” and “becoming” to break down all 
distinctions (the great divides between “culture-nature,” “human-nonhuman”) for the sake of a 
universal “entanglement” and “limitless artificialism.”150 What Frédéric Neyrat also calls the 
“fantasy of fusion” in his critique of ecological constructivism: the “illusion of the ‘end’ of the great 
divides...is nothing but the reinforcement of the movement initiated by the techno-humanistic 
colonization of modern times,” one that can be seen in the industrious operations of “climate 
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149 ibid., 89.  
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Storm for a virulent critique of new materialism, ecological hybridism and constructivism.   
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geoengineering.”151 We need to be able to think, against compulsory attachments and an excess of 
pure relationality, negative and asymmetrical relations of indecomposable “detachment,” 
“distance” and “dependence.”  
 Strata are promiscuously interconnected but in asymmetrical ways, scraping up against one 
another, stealing from one another and generating frictions. Parasites leap from site to site, sucking 
energy from multiple sources, libidinal deposits of all sorts. Sometimes desire is exploited (i.e. libidinal 
energies are violently directed toward profit). Sometimes desire is exploiting (i.e. libidinal energies 
“capture” geological entities, labourers and machines in order to extract their powers to act or 
produce). It depends on the assemblage at work. Nevertheless, there is always a gap, a lacuna, a 
minimal distance that institutes a material (and ontological) limit as the subterranean underbelly 
of every “desirous relation” in order to establish a non-identity between desiring subjects or regimes. 
Desire is neither a finite resource (Bifo) nor an infinite flux (Deleuze). Nor is it a frictionless network 
of contagion. Desiring machines function only because they continually “break-down”¾where 
this break-down can be read in the ambivalent catabolic sense of “exhaust” rather than merely as 
dysfunction or detachment. Desire is an “anorganic energy” (a machinic coupling), “parasitic 
relation” (an asymmetrical consumption) and “material excess” (exploitable resource) that 
perpetually negotiates a plastic, vibratory or nomadic limit, a limit that circumscribes its locality, 
its ability to exhaust or be exhausted, a limit that comes into contact with materialities, edges, 
alterities, strata and outsides of all sorts. The limit is not pre-existing but a kind of negative miracle 
that spontaneously asserts itself in the advent of any production, construction or connection. It is 
continuously produced, re-produced and manipulated according to the material affordances that 
constitute or deplete it. 
 To say that “desiring-assemblages” articulate a limit, is not to re-inscribe within them a 
fixed essence or identity¾as if this limit was a cop or immunological border protecting a pre-
programmed order. It is merely to say that desire is not universally consistent. Its flows are not 
everywhere the same. It is to stress the (geologically specific) material over the (philosophically) Real. 
In line with Deleuze and Guattari’s “functionalism,” it is not matter of relapsing back into the 
question of asking what an entity is, what it means, or what it represents. But it is also more than what 
an entity can do¾that is, what potentiality of connections linger in its virtual horizon: “[o]nly 
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desiring machines produce connections according to which they function, and function by 
improvising and forming the connections.”152 Geophilosophy, however, only ambivalently affirms 
the “connectivism” and “productivism” of desiring-machines.153 It asks, instead, more vital 
questions of locality: where? which desiring-machine? in what direction do these particular flows of desire run? 
In the epoch of anthropogenic global warming, we cannot affirm the dissolution of alterity or 
decompose the friction of non-identity into the schizophrenic’s cosmic delirium (a delirium that 
inversely replicates the “absorptive-sublative” nature of the Hegelian Absolute Subject, except 
rather than “auto-determining rationality” being the operative agent it is “experimental 
amorphous production”):  
 
There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one 
within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-
machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, 
outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever.154  
 
This is not to say that the “self” and “non-self” are absolutely distinct substances immune to a 
“schizophrenic” process of interaction: homo natura. Rather, it is to affirm the non-synchronicity between 
strata¾that, however contingently it may happen, each stratum (anthropological, technological, 
geological) accumulates history according to its own particular logic, its own plane of immanence, 
its own technique of (re)production. It is only on the basis of this fundamental non-synchronicity, 
diagonality or asymmetry that the “parasite” emerges or makes sense, where the technosphere eats 
minerals and the geosphere eats media. Each stratum has a different dietary regime. 
 The problem with Deleuze’s neo-Spinozist ontology of desire and affects¾where “the 
plane of immanence, the plane of Nature that distributes affects, does not make any distinction at 
all between things that might be called natural and things that might be called artificial”¾is that 
the non-philosophical concept of nature is effectively rendered useless.155 Ecology just becomes an alibi for the 
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ontology of digital networks, where “everything is interconnected”¾where it is impossible to think 
the “non-relation” or the “non-identity” between different sets of relations (e.g. anthropological, 
technological, geological). This deletion of non-identity leads to what Pasquinelli calls digitalism:  
 
Ontologically, the techno-paradigm of digitalism believes that the semiotic and biologic 
domains are positioned in parallel or specular to each other. As a consequence, the digital 
can easily render the offline world as a sort of Google-like utopia of universal digitalization. 
A material event can be translated and mapped onto the immaterial plane, and conversely, 
the immaterial can easily be embodied in materiality.156 
 
The negativity of friction between strata (as well as the autonomy of the earth itself) attempts to be 
exfoliated by processes of technological immersionism (e.g. the cyborg, geo-engineering, planetary 
computation). The “Earth is opaque”¾a “traject, a long-term trajectory originating from out of the 
depths of time and destined for extinction.”157 Although nature is revealed through thought or 
computation to human beings, nature is not exhausted or “negated”¾to use Hegelian 
terminology¾by consciousness. Nor is it already a quasi-cyborgic hypersubject as in neo-Spinozist 
renderings. If nature is merely an abstract process of infinite becoming, then, as Neyrat declares, 
the “promise of a Spinozist ecology turns into a nightmare.”158     
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ABSTRACT MACHINES: GEOLOGY AND REPRODUCTION 
 
Can one imagine an archive without foundation, without substrate,  
without substance, without subjectile? And if it were impossible,  
what of the history of substrates?....there is no limit to this  
problematic of the impression, that is, of the inscription, which leaves  
a mark right on the substrate.  
                                 ¾Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever 
 
   The Stack terraforms the host planet by drinking and vomiting its  
   elemental juices and spitting up mobile phones. After its short  
   career as a little computing brick within a larger megamachine, 
   its fate at the dying end of the electronics component life cycle is just  
   as sad.  
                          ¾Benjamin H. Bratton, The Stack 
 
   In a post to Google’s official blog, Urs Hölzle proposed a figure of  
   0.0003 kWh of energy per search, equivalent to about 0.2 grams of 
   CO2....Multiplied by the billions of search queries entered daily,  
   that is already a vast amount of power.  
                      ¾Sean Cubitt, Finite Media 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION: NOTES ON THE PROLETARIANIZATION OF GEOLOGY 
 
 Semiocapitalism is a geological operator: it puts nature to work. To put communication to 
work¾at this juncture of historical development and techno-capitalism¾is automatically to put 
nature to work. The example that Cubitt gives of the CO2 emissions that are produced from a 
single Google search is just a minor illustration of this point. While we have established 
semiocapitalism’s dependence on the geological (i.e. an “ecological deficit” in Autonomist thought), 
we have as of yet neither sufficiently translated this dependency (or parasitism) into concrete 
Marxian terms (i.e. a theory of value) that specify the governing logic behind capitalism’s ecological 
regimes nor developed a robust enough theory of a “transcendental geology” (i.e. the earth as a 
condition of possibility for thought). It is for this reason, in our progressive critique of central tenets 
of Autonomist thought and semiocapitalism, we turn to both Silvia Federici and Jason W. Moore 
in order to reconsider the question of “reproduction” on a planetary scale and short-circuit both 
“the continuing love affair with the famous ‘Fragment on Machines’ in the Grundrisse” and the value 
theory proposed by orthodox Marxists and cognitivists (Negri et al.).159 In other words, it is a 
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question of how the general intellect (i.e. the “social brain,” “big data”) reproduces itself through the 
appropriation of geological flows (i.e. the unpaid work of nature) as a socio-ecological regime of 
capital accumulation.  
 But this also leads to more speculative investigations that we have only begun to contour: 
we still must think the co-origination of the cognitariat (i.e. consciousness, thought, subjectivity), 
the machine or technical object (i.e. general intellect, communication networks, computation, data 
centers) and the earth (i.e. telluric flows of minerals, the atmospheric commons) as that which 
amounts to what Michael Lewis calls in his exegesis of Bernard Stiegler “a mutual contamination 
of the empirical and the transcendental.”160 The subject’s animating circuit of self-relation (whether 
cognitive, temporal or affective), which conditions the possibility of its experience-existence, cannot 
take place unless it encloses¾folds¾within this circle of auto-relationality an “exterior field of 
processes,” “historicity,” “empirical objects.”161 This is just to say, as we continue to emphasize, 
contra Virno, Negri and Marazzi, semiotic fluxes, social cooperation and knowledge do not 
circulate on their own in a process of techno-telepathic autopoiesis (i.e. intersubjectively). 
Subjectivity is unable to be formed without a process of linguistic-reification that brings into the 
shared space of the public sphere empirical “objects of thought” (Virno). Subjectivity is unable to 
be formed without the “empirico-historical technical object” that functions as external memory 
and horizon of anthropogenesis (Stiegler). Subjectivity is unable to be formed without the 
“pneumatic envelopment of an atmosphere” that establishes a “pact between the giver and taker 
of breath” (Sloterdijk).162 In all of these instances a process of exteriorization proceeds, exceeds and conditions 
the process of interiorization. Starting from this thesis of contamination allows us to salvage parts that 
contribute more fully to a “transcendental geology” (of the general intellect)¾and, consequently, 
a “transcendental geology of value” (à la Moore). 
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 We have to continue to think against what Bifo calls “the emancipation of the sign,” “the 
autonomization of value production” and the “pathologies of hyper-expression” when thinking 
about semiocapitalism’s process of value extraction-creation:  
 
Financial capitalism is based on the autonomization of the dynamics of money, but more 
deeply, on the autonomization of value production from the physical interaction of 
things.... The passage from the industrial abstraction of work to the digital abstraction of 
the world implies an immaterialization of the labor process.163  
 
Instead, we have to map the complex ways in which semiotic flows (knowledge, language, 
communication, data) are “incarnated,” “stored” and “mediated.” We have to splice Autonomist 
thought with other thematics like “archive fever,” the “history of substrates” and “the problematic 
of impression” (à la Derridean and Stieglerian grammatology) as they enable us to make sense of 
how language, communication and knowledge (and their means of transmission, circulation, 
distribution) reproduce themselves not only in material apparatuses but also in a warming world (e.g. 
the printing press and data center¾both of which are entangled in a history petro-capitalism and 
atmospheric pollution). Oil, quite literally, becomes the lubricant of Enlightenment. Financial 
capitalism, likewise, does not exist without the computational powers enabled by data centers. The 
Anthropocene, or Capitalocene, forces us to reconsider the process of valorization not only outside 
of the industrial model of “abstract labour-time” (Marx) as Autonomists argue but also outside of 
the “social factory” or metropolitan model of “biopolitical production,” “real subsumption” and 
“knowledge value” (Negri et al.).  
 Autonomist thought¾especially those parts of it that align with Negri¾suffers from a 
political ontology that has an inexorable tendency to fetishize productivity and socio-anthropological 
relations of labour (“biopower,” “social production,” “the general intellect”  and “commodified 
labour-power”) over re-production and socio-ecological relations of the earth (“unpaid work of nature,” 
“atmospheric relations,” “geo-material conditions,” “deep-time” and the “re-production of non-
human life”). By subsuming “the great whale of life” under the enchanted prism of production or 
“biopower,” important distinctions between production and re-production, biopower and necropower, the 
social and the geological, and how they contribute to value-creation and social life as such are 
deleteriously blurred:  
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Biopower is another name for the real subsumption of society under capital, and both are 
synonymous with the globalized productive order. Production fills the surfaces of Empire.... 
Intelligence and affect (or really the brain coextensive with the body), just when they 
become the primary productive powers, make production and life coincide across the 
terrain on which they operate, because life is nothing other than the production and 
reproduction of the set of bodies and brains.... Life is no longer produced in the cycles of 
reproduction that are subordinated to the working day; on the contrary, life is what infuses 
and dominates all production. In fact, the value of labor and production is determined deep 
in the viscera of life. Industry produces no surplus except what is generated by social 
activity.164   
 
We have to follow Federici in her insistence “to maintain, against postmodern trends, the 
separation between production and reproduction.”165 Affective labour, likewise, is highly limited 
as both a concept and phenomenon in its ability to explain the expansive relations of reproduction 
that are carried out in order to reproduce human and social life.166 As I will demonstrate 
throughout this chapter, the “forces of production” (i.e. globalized industrial cycles, the powers of 
the general intellect) and the “forces of re-production” (i.e. biogeophysical processes) exist in a 
frictional, contradictory and asymmetrical relation with one another¾and that this becomes 
problematic for regimes of accumulation.   
 As James Bridle notes in regard to the information and communication technologies (ICT) 
of the supposedly insulated postmodern world of hyperreal simulacra, the “systems we have built 
to collapse time and space are being attacked by time and space.”167 Even something as ethereal 
as wireless communication becomes an object of malfunction in the warming world: for instance, 
in the “electromagnetic spectrum, the strength and efficacy of wireless transmission will be reduced 
as temperatures rise....Wi-Fi, in short, will get worse, not better.”168 Cognitive infrastructures of 
computation are in an ongoing conflict with the climate. The planetary system (even if it will 
require more “prosthetic support” in terms of geoengineering) is still responsible for doing the work 
of re-production that replenishes the conditions of possibility that make productive life in the 
metropolis and digital culture run smoothly in the first place¾run as such. As I will flesh out in 
more robust examples, computation (i.e. a key aspect of the “general intellect”) cannot be solely 
regarded as a techno-scientific form of control mastering its material conditions (à la the Hegelian 
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Absolute Subject) but also increasingly open to fluctuating forms of material receptivity and geological 
encounters that structure, inflect and change the very nature of the “cognitive” in the warming world. 
It is not just that “[i]deas of nature are fundamental to earth-moving” (cartography, mathematics, 
agronomy, meteorology, economic botany, climate computation) but that “Society” or the 
“Subject” (in the Hegelian-Marxist sense) itself is not an autonomous force producing changes in 
the “web of life” (“for-itself”) but also a “product” of these changes.169   
 The majority of Autonomist thought that focuses on the mythic productivism of labour 
power has to be challenged, especially if this productivity is re-formatted as immaterial (an expression 
of the general intellect), post-industrial (a new regime of value-production that integrates the entire 
domain of social activity) or immeasurable (an ontological feature of the multitude), because these 
inflections all imply “machinic subjectivity,” “cyborgism” and increasing use of ICT for 
“productive knowledge.” Likewise, haunting the productive dynamism of labour power and the 
cognitariat (i.e. exploitation) is always a larger spectral network of material-energetic 
“appropriation.” Insofar as capitalism seeks to appropriate sources and flows of unpaid work/energy 
without exploiting (i.e. commodifying) them, “without immediately capitalizing these sources” to keep the 
cost of production low and rate of profit high, the hegemony of immaterial labour will never 
occur¾that is, the “commodification” or “informationalization” of everything is an inaccurate 
assessment of capital’s logic of accumulation.170 The metropolis functions precisely because not 
everything is drawn into the immanence of the social factory or biopower (i.e. real subsumption). 
As Jason W. Moore illuminatingly points out, if we take as our starting point the “nexus of 
paid/unpaid work,” “capitalism and value relations cannot be reduced to the relation between the 
owners of capital and the possessors of labor-power. The historical condition of socially necessary labor-
time is socially necessary unpaid work”¾that is, “unpaid work” that does not spring from commodified 
labour or the privileged “creative human capacities of the social commons.”171 As Wark explains, 
capital “appropriates nature to itself, including the unpaid work of women and slaves, which from 
the point of view of capital are not human capacities, but just other parts of nature.”172 
  We need to maneuver past a deep-rooted “ethereal tendency” in Autonomist 
thought¾and Western metaphysics¾that represses the geological conditions of possibility that 
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enable cognition, productivity and value, especially in the epoch of the Anthropocene. This 
tendency manufactures a series of limited abstractions: we get abstract machines (technological 
innovation as the pure expression of the general intellect), abstract temporality (the conflation of 
labour-time with life-time for value creation) and abstract productivity (a latent form of Spinozistic 
Prometheanism that infects everything with the “eros of production,” or, in Negri’s terms, 
“biopower,” “biopolitical production” and “potenza”).173 Thus, to reiterate, this chapter argues 
that, at the current level of capitalism and historical techno-development, to put communication to work 
is automatically to put nature to work. If we imbue geological actors with a quasi-proletarian dimension, 
we not only extend the notion of the multitude to include forms of non-human work and struggle 
but also distil three disenchantments regarding our semio-technological future: (1) value-producing 
labour in semiocapitalism is a priori entangled with “unpaid” ecological processes of re-productive, 
non-commodified “work” (a re-productivism that becomes all the more complicated in the 
Anthropocene); (2) the ontology of the sign has to shift from solely one of expression to one of 
impression, where the emphasis falls on how energetic regimes underlie, mediate and interlace epistemic 
regimes, which means that value-creating “semiotic fluxes of information” require as their condition 
of possibility to be spatialized and incarnate geo-material objects, processes and substrata¾an 
imbrication that is exemplified in the phenomenon of data centers; (3) lastly, productivism does not 
exist without anti-production, constructivism does not exist without destructivism (e.g. e-waste, 
exhaustion, ruination)¾that is, it is (currently) impossible to imagine a cyber-progressive, hi-tech 
and automated modernity without the co-existence of immense attritional stress on the “material 
conditions” (necessary for the transition to “automated luxury communism”) and what Jussi 
Parikka calls “zombie media” or “future fossils.”   
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2.1 AGAINST PRODUCTIVISM: AN ECOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF VALUE 
 
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue in Empire that Marx’s theory of value remains 
caught within a Western metaphysical tradition that “has always abhorred the immeasurable.”174 
Hardt and Negri see that Marx’s “theory of value is really a theory of the measure of value” that 
reduces value to a quantification of homogeneous units of labour-time, a quantification of 
exploitation that is paradigmatically localized within the determinate spatio-temporal context of 
the factory and working day:  
 
Marx poses the relation between labor and value in terms of corresponding quantities: a 
certain quantity of time of abstract labor equals a quantity of value. According to this law 
of value, which defines capitalist production, value is expressed in measurable, homogenous 
units of labor time. Marx eventually links this notion to his analysis of the working day and 
surplus value.175   
 
As Melinda Cooper elaborates, the “law of value...defines exploitation as a measurable quantity, 
locating it in the extortion of a surplus of labor above and beyond the expenditure of force 
necessary for the reproduction of the worker’s body.”176 Exploitation, although structural, is not 
merely a socio-economic but antagonistic phenomenon¾a phenomenon that Marx fleshes out in his 
distinction between necessary and surplus labour. Necessary labour time is located in the quanta of 
abstract labour needed for the worker to reproduce themselves (i.e. meet their needs through a 
wage). Surplus labour time, on the other hand, is located in the quanta of time the worker works 
above and beyond that (i.e. where the capitalist exploits labour power for free to generate profit). 
Thus, the “working class struggles against exploitation, that is, against the imposition of ever more 
surplus labour.”177   
 The traditional Marxist interpretation of value¾or “theory of value”¾regards value-
creation as that which comes into being during the act of commodity production: as Moore reiterates, 
value “is abstract social labour...and it is determined by socially necessary labor-time: the average 
labor-time embodied in the average commodity.”178 Marx elaborates the notion of the value form 
in terms of measurement in order to establish an equivalence between three different socio-
economic entities: abstract labor, the commodity form and exchange value. Value is generated in the 
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process of production that uses labour power to make commodities. It is realized, however, during 
market exchange. This is just to say that value is not generated by the market; however, it cannot be 
realized without market exchange (without commodities being bought and sold). The “abstract” 
aspect is also important here. Ricardo developed a theory of value that was predicated on “concrete 
labour” (i.e. the physical quanta of labour) measured in the simple expenditure of labour time, 
where the commodity is merely the expression of the labour time expended to produce it. Marx’s 
theory of value, on the contrary, was predicated on “abstract labour” (i.e. socially necessary labour 
time, a necessity that can only be revealed, tested or determined by the market and under certain 
conditions of production at a particular juncture of techno-historical development). The fact that 
labour has to be sold on the market as a commodity in the first place is also crucial. 
 The fact that human labour power becomes a commodity¾something to be sold on the 
market¾is the result of “primitive accumulation.” Primitive accumulation is the production of the 
working class through the privatization of the means of production so that the working class cannot 
reproduce its existence except through the market¾or, more precisely, through a wage. This is 
one of the defining characteristics of the capitalist mode of production. Only when the worker is 
stripped of the means to reproduce their existence and left with no other choice but to sell their 
labour-power does the employment relation take hold as an omnipresent form of capitalist 
domination. Like all other commodities, then, labour embodies two properties: it is simultaneously 
“concrete labour” and “abstract labour.” Useful or concrete labour is an activity that produces 
tangible goods, services or use-values. Abstract labour, on the other hand, is a socio-economic or 
strictly “value-forming” activity that only occurs under the historical conditions of capitalism, 
where if commodified labor-power is strategically deployed by the capitalist can produce excess 
value (i.e. profit). This is one of the advantages of Marx’s theory of value. It exposes the structural 
features of exploitation at the heart of the capitalist mode of production¾unlike Ricardo’s or Smith’s theories 
of value. It is precisely because labour is a commodity that is can produce value and be exploited 
as such. The worker produces, in any given period of time, more value than they are paid for in 
the wage equivalent. Surplus value is generated in excess of what the capitalist pays for labour-
power. 
  Marx’s quantitative theory of value¾because it defines exploitation according to a 
“factoryist model,” as that which can be measured in temporal units during the working day¾no 
longer furnishes us with an adequate account of how capitalism exploits labour in post-Fordist 
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regime of accumulation according to the Autonomist interpretation. Negri explicitly claims that 
Marx’s value theory is tied to the Industrial Revolution¾the “historical limits” of Marx’s value 
theory are “the limits of its validity.”179 According to the Autonomist interpretation, due to the fact 
that in semiocapitalism “labor is immediately a social force animated by the powers of knowledge, 
affect, science and language,” it is impossible to quantify exploitation in terms of the spatialized 
temporal metrics of the factory.180 This does not mean that exploitation is obsolete; rather, the 
whole of society is subsumed under the aegis of production-exploitation: the “time of production is 
the time of life” and even “if in postmodern capitalism there is no longer a fixed scale that measures 
value, value nonetheless is still powerful and ubiquitous,” a fact that is “demonstrated...by the 
persistence of exploitation, and...by the fact that productive innovation and the creation of wealth 
continue tirelessly¾in fact, they mobilize labor in every interstice of the world.”181 The problem 
with this interpretation, however, is that “concrete labour” and “abstract labour” are wildly 
conflated, making all use-values (social wealth) appear a priori as exchange-values (objects able to 
be commodified and exploited).182 
 But, more than this, to follow the feminist Marxist line of critique, the social powers of 
“knowledge, affect, science and language” cannot in and of themselves reproduce the lauded 
substance of value¾living labour or the workforce. Unlike the poets say, language is not bread. 
Federici also critiques Marx’s labour theory of value but comes to much different conclusion than 
Hardt and Negri: while Marx 
 
meticulously explored the dynamics of yarn production and capitalist valorization, he was 
succinct when tackling the question of reproductive work, reducing it to the workers’ 
consumption of the commodities their wages can buy and the work the production of these 
commodities requires. In other words, as in the neoliberal scheme, in Marx’s account too, 
all that is needed to (re)produce labor power is commodity production and the market. No 
other work intervenes to prepare the goods the workers consume or to restore physically 
and emotionally their capacity to work. No difference is made between commodity 
production and the production of the workforce. One assembly line produces both. 
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Accordingly, the value of labor power is measured by the value of the commodities (food, 
clothing, housing) that have to be supplied to the worker, to “the man, so that he can renew 
his life-process,” that is, they are measured on the labor time socially necessary for their 
production.183 
 
What orthodox Marxist and cognitivists (Negri et al.) fail to properly thematize is that what the 
labour theory of value depends upon is a radical suppression, repression and devalorization¾in 
practico-ideological, theoretical and economic terms¾of the “reproductive activities” that 
function to “cut the cost of labor power.”184 The assembly line of the factory and the assemblage 
line of the network both operate as Marxist “quasi-causes”¾everything clings to their power, they 
appear as if they exclusively produce the objective world, while nevertheless eclipsing their 
conditions of possibility or vital dependencies. As Moore puts it, value “does not work unless most 
work is not valued.”185   
  The traditional Autonomist interpretation of value, instead, considers value as an ontological 
phenomenon¾that is, as an immeasurable excess that stems from the powers of the multitude. Value 
is not merely a social-economic phenomenon generated in the labour process. It is labour itself as 
a transcendental element. As Negri argues, the “form of value is instead the transcendental material of 
a determinate society¾it has, then, a higher ontological intensity than the simple mode of 
production.”186  
 This “ontological turn” enables Negri and other Autonomist thinkers to re-politicize value 
and free it from the straitjacket of economic determinism. Value is not isomorphic with the 
exploitation of commodified labour-power. The ontological powers of the multitude flicker 
between two determinations or tendencies¾either the ontological productive excess is rendered as 
“variable capital” (i.e. captured by the capitalist class as an object of exploitation used to generate 
surplus value) or “constituent power” (i.e. expressed as an expansion of power lived through 
revolutionary practice). This antagonism at the heart of the form of value is due to the fact that in 
Autonomist thought resistance is ontologically primary and creativity is exclusive to living labour; hence, 
capitalism functions as a macro-parasite or apparatus of capture that “directs the energy of living 
labor into the production and reproduction of capitalist forms.”187 This means that labour and its 
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power of valorization are always already outside of capitalist domination and control. Labour is not 
split between “concrete” and “abstract” properties (as in Marx’s account in Capital) but is instead 
generalized into a Spinozistic category¾that is, as the “power to act” (a power that can be siphoned 
by capital or directed toward revolutionary forms).188 Value is an expression of labour, and labour 
is the pure ontological generativity capable of producing social life: “[i]f the power to act constructs 
value from below, if it transforms value according to the rhythm of what is common, and if it 
appropriates constitutively the material conditions of its own realization, then it is obvious that in 
it resides an expansive force beyond measure.”189  
 The emphasis between (anthropocentric) productivism and value-creation, however, is still 
carried over from Marx’s formulations (and reified to an even greater intensity in the affirmation 
of the multitude). The crisis of the law of value that Negri outlines undermines the industrial model 
of exploitation that reduces value to an objective measure (of labour-time) but fails to call into 
question the role of labour in value-creation itself¾that living labour as the substance of value itself is a 
limited matrix, not just homogenous abstract temporality. As Sara Nelson neatly summarizes, for 
Autonomist thinkers  
 
human labor power is characterized by an ontological excess, a surplus productivity and 
creativity that cannot be exhausted through its capture as surplus value. Living labor is this 
embodied potentiality, and the struggle against exploitation takes the form of a struggle 
over the conditions of labor’s actualization. But this ontological productivity does not 
extend to the non-human world. Instead, autonomists have consistently contrasted the 
excessive productivity of the ‘social common’¾the field of communicative and affective 
relations from which capital extracts value¾with a notion of the ecological common 
characterized by material limit. Autonomist thinkers therefore repeat and intensify what 
some eco-Marxist critics have described as Marx’s lack of attention to the role of non-
human natures in the production process, and fail to account for the role of non-human 
natures in prompting capitalist ‘innovations.’190 
  
One can even argue that the neo-Spinozist ontology of the multitude internalizes the metaphysical 
principle of bourgeois political economy: the human subject must be transformed into a transhistorical 
mode of infinite productivity. 
 Jean Baudrillard in his underappreciated The Mirror of Production (1975) is absolutely crucial 
on this point¾this surreptitious “internalization” of political economy: “the system of political 
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economy does not produce only the individual as labour power that is sold and exchanged: it 
produces the very conception of labor power as the fundamental human potential.”191 While 
Marx’s development of abstract social labour (labour amenable to exchange value) functions as a 
critical apparatus that shows how labour is exploited and objectified in the production process, 
Marxist theory has the tendency to leave unchallenged the Promethean interpretation of human 
labour (whether in its energetic, physiological or intellectual capacity), an interpretation that 
regards productivity as the essence of each being. This is especially the case with Hardt and Negri 
and Autonomist theorists who borrow from Spinoza’s ontology to situate their politics: as 
Baudrillard polemically evinces, “Marxism assists the cunning of capital. It convinces men that 
they are alienated by the sale of their labor power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis 
that they might be alienated as labor power, as the ‘inalienable’ power of creating value by their 
labor.”192 It is for this reason that feminist Marxists and eco-Marxists turn away from the 
Prometheanism of hypostasized Marxist anthropology (the primacy of labour power in the 
formulations of value-creation and the male proletariat in revolutionary praxis) and toward the 
constitutive relations of reproduction underlying the workforce.   
 Value, however, is the incorporation of more than just labour¾whether this manifests in 
the exploitation of “abstract social labour” (i.e. the industrial working class à la Marx) or the 
“biopolitical exuberance of immaterial labour” (i.e. the cognitariat à la Negri et al.). For Moore, 
the “law of value” (i.e. the “theory of value” instantiated in its concrete historical unfolding) is a 
“law of Cheap Nature.”193 He attempts to transcend the notion of work made isomorphic with 
wage-labour and represented in the “ideo-typical figure of the proletariat”: 
 
Labor productivity is understood in terms of the rate of exploitation and the production of 
surplus value. The usual Marxist model turns on the relation of machinery and labor-
power: more powerful machines allow the average worker to produce more average 
commodities.... Alternatively, exploitation may advance when the worker produces a static 
mass of value, so long as wages decrease. Thus, accumulation may advance on the basis of 
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rising wages and rapidly increasing productivity, as during Fordism, or on the basis of 
falling (or static) wages and very slow productivity growth, as during the neoliberal era.194  
 
Like Federici, for Moore capitalism is not reducible to the commodity realm, the world market, 
the technological innovation of the general intellect or the productive powers of wage-labour. 
Cheap Nature is a project of capitalist power, science and technics¾that is, of “appropriating 
uncapitalized nature as the pedestal of labor productivity,” a regime of appropriation that in turn 
enables or fuels this very regime of capitalist power, science and machinery.195  
 Work in Moore’s conception also changes so that productivity is not reducible to human 
labour-power but closer to a Deleuzean “flow”: “work” becomes a universal operation of energy 
production and expenditure that cannot be limited to an anthropogenic social form (a subject operating 
“for-itself”) being applied to natural material (an object operating “in-itself”). Labour is not simply 
the Marxist-Hegelian “form-giving fire.” Flows of matter generate a myriad of energetic 
“surpluses” that capitalism parasitically cuts into, exhausts and appropriates in order to sustain 
“fixed capital” and “variable capital.” The renown eco-Marxists John Bellamy Foster and Paul 
Burkett complain that in Moore’s view now labour’s “contribution to the production of value is 
viewed as epiphenomenal, largely determined by the wider appropriation of ‘work’ or energy, in 
the sense of physics, carried out by the web of life as a whole” and “the labor theory of value is 
relegated to a ghostlike existence, an ethereal substance.”196 But this is an unfair assessment. Moore 
himself is clear that “value isn’t everything”: the “law of value¾not a theory of value, but its actual 
historical operation¾is anthropocentric in a very specific sense. Only human labor-power directly 
produces value. A tree, or a horse, or a geological vent cannot be paid” and yet “commodified 
labor-power cannot produce anything without the unpaid work of the horse or the tree. Socially 
unpaid work is the pedestal of socially necessary labor-time.”197 
 Value for Moore, then, operates through a negative dialectic of “exploitation and 
appropriation”¾where “relations of exploitation produce abstract social labor” and “relations of 
appropriation” produce an “abstract social nature” that enables “the expanded accumulation of 
abstract social labor.”198 Appropriation is non-identical to exploitation. Exploitation pivots on 
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commodified wage-labour (“value-form”). Appropriation pivots on an even wider sphere of unpaid 
labour and cheap nature that functions as a transcendental element for exploitation (“value-
relations”). Appropriation co-constitutes exploitation as its condition of possibility: “[e]very act of 
exploitation (of commodified labor-power) therefore depends on an even greater act of 
appropriation (of unpaid work/energy).”199 Appropriation, furthermore, “names those extra-
economic processes that identify, secure and channel unpaid work outside of the commodity system 
into the circuit of capital.”200 Appropriation, then, as a major capitalist technique forces us to 
reconsider our thinking of primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation is not merely a process 
of proletarianization (i.e. making the worker become a commodity); it is also, of equal importance, 
about restructuring “the relations of reproduction¾human and extra-human alike¾so as to allow the renewed 
and expanded flow of Cheap labor, food, energy, and raw materials into the commodity system.”201 The question 
of value, labour and exploitation all orbit around the question of the expansive conditions of 
reproduction, conditions that while outside of the commodity system are necessary for its 
generalization, actualization and maintenance. Reproduction functions in Moore as the 
“transcendental geology of value”: “unpaid work not only makes possible the production of 
potential¾or the reproduction of actual¾labor-power as ‘cheap’ labor; it also involves the work 
of extra-human natures. In this domain of reproduction, the appropriation of unpaid work is 
central.”202   
 Foster and Burkett will claim¾as I have done with Negri¾that there is a conflation of 
concrete-labour (social wealth of the commons) and abstract-labour (the social construct of homogenous 
labour-time) in Moore’s theory of valorization. For Marx, they reiterate, abstract-labour is the basis 
of value, not concrete-labour. This post-human conflation, then, according to Foster and Burkett, 
has  
 
occurred through the promotion of two closely connected arguments: (1) deconstruction of 
social labor as the basis of value, to be replaced by what is seen as a more “inclusive” 
physiological or energetic theory of value; and (2) subsumption of the entire web of life, in 
all of its aspects, under the law of value of the world commodity economy. The object of 
such analyses is the “destabilization of value as an ‘economic’ category,” on which the 
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classical Marxian critique of capitalism, with its focus on the twofold alienation of labor 
and nature, ultimately depends.203   
 
This subsumption is not totalizing, though. The “economic aspect of value” (exploitation) is not 
abolished. It is merely a question of its conditions of possibility (appropriation). It is generated 
through a differential of strata and asymmetrical dependencies that are non-identical to wage-
labour. As Federici reminds us, Burkett has completely de-emphasized the role of reproduction in 
his accounts of Marx’s labour theory of value.204 
 The reason why “the unpaid work of nature,” “value-relations,” “the expansive sphere of 
reproduction” and “appropriation” function as a constellation of transcendental elements for the 
commodity realm and commodified labour-power is simple and elegant:  
 
The law of value, far from reducible to abstract social labor, finds its necessary conditions 
of self-expansion through the creation and subsequent appropriation of Cheap 
Natures....In sum, deliver labor, food, energy, and raw materials...faster than the 
accumulating mass of surplus capital derived from the exploitation of labor-power. Why? 
Because the rate of exploitation of labor-power (within the commodity system) tends to 
exhaust the life-making capacities that enter into the immediate production of value.205 
  
Exploitation a priori implies the exhaustion of the earth’s and labour-power’s vital forces. This 
exhaustion, while necessary or inevitable, is also historically specific and relational (e.g. class 
struggle, depression, biophysical change, geographical inertia): exhaustion “occurs when particular 
natures¾crystallized in specific reproduction complexes¾can no longer deliver more and more 
work/energy.”206 In other words, exhaustion has the tendency to make reproduction complexes 
“expensive” to maintain. It “signals a rising value composition of capital.”207 The pressure put on 
capital’s rate of profit forces capitalists to find or develop new inputs of cheap nature.  
 Moore names this perennial crisis of exhaustion the tendency of the ecological surplus to 
fall. Crisis unfolds between the domain of commodification and the domain of reproduction. Crisis-
formation, then, takes on another dimension outside of the traditional Marxist forms that relegate 
crisis exclusively to the realm of commodification: there is either, the problem of overproduction¾ “too 
many factories produce too many cars, or refrigerators, or computers that cannot be purchased in 
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sufficient volumes to maintain the rate of profit”; or, the problem of overaccumulation¾“the rate of 
profit in existing investment lines begin to fall, and new, more profitable investment opportunities 
have not emerged” to put capital to work effectively.208 Expansions in labour productivity and 
technological infrastructure, however, necessarily require expanding zones of ecological surplus. 
Thus, as Wark explains, the “crisis of capital is related to energy returned on capital invested.”209 
This manifests explicitly in the problem of underproduction.  
 Crisis is not just about problems selling commodities that issue from sites of manufacture 
or opening up profitable markets to increase returns on invested capital: it is also about getting 
“cheap inputs to the factory gates.”210 Underproduction is the “insufficient flow of labour, food, 
energy, and materials relative to the demands of value production.”211 Machinery (i.e. fixed 
capital), likewise, in “industrial production tends to ‘run ahead’ of the raw materials section” and 
therefore “the ‘overproduction of machinery...finds its dialectical antagonism in the 
‘underproduction’ of raw materials (circulating capital).”212 In other words, shortages in cheap 
flows of raw material occur due to capital’s consistent failure to invest in the domain of 
reproduction¾precisely because the zone of reproduction is where capital externalizes its costs.  
 As capitalist domains of exploitation and technological infrastructures continue to expand 
due to the demand for “cheap information” streaming from the general intellect, automation and 
the data needing to be stored by users and financial markets around the globe, the “ecological 
surplus” will increasingly contract. The zone of commodification and zone of accelerating 
technological innovation and information “overload” that produces unfathomable tonnes of waste 
(in terms of “e-waste” and “carbon emissions”) has the “problem of running out of space within its 
own circuits.”213 For instance, polluting the atmosphere to externalize costs forces capitalism to 
“internalize space” (i.e. put the atmosphere to work) but this, as Bridle has shown, eventually (in 
the long run) makes the network more expensive to run because in a warming world digital 
infrastructures are more difficult to maintain.214 In other words, after centuries of industrial 
pollution, the “work/energy” of the climate becomes “exhausted.” As Federici points out in her 
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critique of Marxian Prometheanism, “five centuries of capitalist development have depleted the 
resources of the planet rather than creating the ‘material conditions’ for the transition to 
‘communism’ (as Marx anticipated)” through the very “expansion of the ‘forces of production’ in 
the form of large scale industrialization”¾an expansion that was supposed to make scarcity 
“obsolete” but under capitalist production has instead produced “scarcity on a global scale.”215 
 It is in this sense that we have to follow Moore and Federici in thinking against the “ethereal 
tendencies” in Autonomist thought¾as well as Accelerationist thought¾that remain “wedded to 
a technologistic concept of revolution, where freedom comes through the machine, where the 
increase in the productivity of labor is assumed to be the material foundation for communism.”216  
 This also implies re-thinking the consequences of information overload that insidiously unfolds 
between what Bifo calls the “universe of transmitters” (the infosphere) and the “universe of 
receivers” (the social brain) or what Marazzi calls “information glut”¾where, although the 
“technological revolution has certainly enlarged social access to information,” the “limitless growth 
in the supply of information conflicts with limited human demand.”217 Information does not just 
consume attention. It does not just function at the psycho-neurological level of negatively shaping 
the brain’s plasticity (e.g. attention deficit disorder, info-stress, anxiety) or the level of monetary 
valuation (i.e. an attention economy). As Cubitt notes, “[c]heap energy has been part of the history 
of cloud computing.”218 The crisis of communication and computation is a crisis of biogeophysical 
processes of reproduction because information consumes gigantic amounts of electricity, oil and 
water: it is estimated that “data centers in the United States consumed 70 billion kWh of electricity 
in 2014, which is equivalent to 1.8% of the country’s total energy consumption for that year” and 
in that same year “data centers were estimated to have used 626 billion liters of water, which 
equates to 1 liter of water consumed for every .11 kWh used.”219 This accounts for approximately 
“2% of total global greenhouse emissions, or about 648 billion kilograms of CO2 in 2014” 
(although other sources indicate it could be around 4% as of 2019).220 
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 As Cubitt points out, there is not even enough storage to hold the sublime “300 billion 
gigabytes” of information generated by the digital universe¾and, according to a study in 2008, it 
was found that in 2011 “almost half of the digital universe” would not have a “permanent 
home.”221 As the “semiotization” and “informationalization” of everything (i.e. smart phones, 
smart cars, smart homes, smart cities) continues to expand by way of integrating more aspects of 
daily life into the digital network, producing more data and requiring more and more cloud 
services, information will continue to grow at exponential rates. Computation, in turn, will become 
a greater and greater stressor of the climate. As Bridle forecasts, this computational 
 
consumption is projected to escalate massively, as a result of both the growth of digital 
infrastructure and the positive feedback loop from rising global temperatures. In response 
to vast increases in data storage and computational capacity in the last decade, the amount 
of energy used by data centers has doubled every four years, and is expected to triple in the 
next ten years. A study in Japan suggested that by 2030, the power requirements for digital 
services alone would outstrip the entire nation’s current generation capacity.222 
   
For example, the New York Stock Exchange produces “up to 2,000 gigabytes of data per day that 
must be stored for years” and the “creation of single 3-D animated movie” generates “roughly a 
million gigabytes.”223 A large part of the energy that is consumed by data centers, moreover, is 
extravagantly wasted; most data centers only require “half of their average total energy usage” to 
offer a service that is almost identical to the service normally provided to clients.224 The extravagant 
consumption of energy is due to clients’ expectations of hyperreal smooth functioning and legalistic 
risk-management, especially given the sensitive information and nanosecond speed necessary for 
algo-trading. As Jacob summarizes, cloud services are “defined by three promises: fast network 
speeds, guaranteed data integrity, and most importantly, functional service at all times.”225  
 With the rise of Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple, it would seem adequate to talk 
about “deindustrialization” and “platform capitalism” as Nick Srnicek does, where, in the 
neoliberal era of post-Fordist production, “as a way to maintain economic growth and vitality in 
the face of a sluggish production sector,” data has become “increasingly central to firms and their 
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relations with workers, customers, and other capitalists”; hence, the platform emerges as a “new 
business model, capable of extracting and controlling immense amounts of data.”226 We see, 
however, that this shift to “platform capitalism” is as ambiguous as it is “hegemonic” in the recent 
report on the UK, ITC and climate change: 
 
The statistics...highlighted the extent to which “UK plc” is already reliant on the effective 
functioning of the ICT sector: 98% of business reliant on ICT, 90% of high street purchases 
using plastic cards, £50 billion online spending, 4.2 million working flexibly, 1 million 
directly employed in the sector. Comparing these statistics with the unrealised potential of 
current ICT, there is substantial scope for growth in these numbers. As generational shift 
occurs, this growth will be increasingly realised and the reliance on ICT will increase at 
least in proportion. Equally, wider more effective application of the ICT to all forms of 
work will further increase the demand.227  
 
The report is emphatic about not only how parasitic the economy is on the digital world but also 
how parasitic the digital world is on globe-wide material infrastructure (“assembly plants located 
to cheap labour,” “international shipping routes for supply and distribution,” “manufacture of 
chips and other ICT components,” “data center locations,” “telegraph poles sourced from high-
latitude pine forests”). It also grimly highlights how this material infrastructure, global populations 
and networks of supply chains will be affected by the increasing severity of “tropical cyclones,” 
dramatic rises in sea-levels that would affect “low-lying regions like Bangladesh, the Indian Ocean 
coast and the south-east Asian coast,” devastated food and water supplies in China, India and the 
Americas due to “glacial melt,” and the critical reduction of permafrost in Siberia, Canada and 
Alaska that puts data center and media “infrastructure at risk.”228  
 Platform capitalism, as theorized by thinkers in the global North, negates the fact that much 
of the digital network does not replace older models of exploitation but is built on precarious 
infrastructures, neo-colonial practices and unregulated factories stemming out of the 19th Century 
and spanning across the globe. This puts a new spin on what Deleuze and Guattari, call “archaisms 
with a current function.”229 As Ingrid Burrington writes, the “Cloud optimizes for real-time, not 
geologic time”¾while nevertheless appropriating the latter.230 The data center is not a hygienic 
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cathedral of technical efficiency. They are, as Ragnar Loobrök christens them, the “steel plants of 
this generation.”231   
 There is no doubt that information networks of “semio” or “platform” capitalism produce 
economic value (i.e. increase profit), cognitive value (i.e. increase knowledge) and have acquired 
near omnipresence. As the AEA report on information and communications technologies 
elucidates, “ICT is the only sector of infrastructure that directly connects any one user to any other 
across time and space using multiple pathways simultaneously and capable of dynamic re-routing 
in real time,” and while the “network is an asset at the level of infrastructure, the value of the 
network is not in the asset itself but in the information that travels on it” because nearly the entire 
British “economy relies on the ability to transmit, receive and convert streams of data in close to 
realtime¾whether it is the extraction of cash from an ATM, the use of credit or debit card, sending 
an email, controlling a remote pump or switch, despatching or receiving aircraft or a mundane 
phone call.”232 But this “surplus of code” relies on an ICT infrastructure that relies on “ecological 
surpluses” that are becoming increasingly strained, exhausted and temperamental. The report is 
revelatory because of how starkly it presents the crisis between “domains of commodification-
communication” and “domains of reproduction”¾explicitly demonstrating through statistics, 
global heat maps and graphs how climate change will increase business costs through damages 
incurred by climate induced disasters:  
 
These systems, and many others, are so embedded in the operation of businesses and our 
daily lives and so reliable that we are hardly aware of their existence. We only notice them 
when they do not function as we expect¾but they are completely integral. As was seen 
with the impact of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans, the shift from post-industrial society 
to chaos through the failure of these systems is measured in the space of a few hours.233 
        
 It is precisely this “shift from post-industrial society to chaos” that has to be mapped by the 
geophilosophical theory of value. As the temperature of the globe rises (nature as “waste frontier”) 
and more resources are depleted (nature as “tap”), it is not just a matter of peak oil but peak 
appropriation. “For any given forces of production, cheap nature comes to an end. Capital recognizes 
scarcity only through price, and price does not really cover the long run.”234 Technical innovation 
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and dynamism are not the only impetuses of successful regimes of accumulation. “Every technical 
fix is a geographical fix is a world-ecological fix.”235 Technology requires access to abundant flows 
of cheap nature. However, inasmuch as capitalist technicity opens up cheap flows of ecological 
surplus, it also increasingly “maxes” them out and runs out of space in its dialectic of productivity 
(capitalization) and plunder (appropriation): 
 
Capitalist technological advance not only produces a tendency for industrial production to 
run ahead of its raw material supply¾Marx’s ‘general law’ of underproduction. It also 
produces a general law of overpollution: the tendency to enclose and fill up waste frontiers faster 
than it can locate new ones....As ‘resource quality’...declines, it is not only more costly to 
extract work/energy, it becomes more toxic.236  
 
 The general intellect is not just techno-scientific knowledge embodied in machines. It is 
also embodied in its relations to the atmosphere¾to “spatialization” as such. The Anthropocene 
in the epoch of semiocapitalism forces us to re-think cognition (i.e. knowledge value, big data info-
commodities, computation) from the vantage point of the earth and relations of 
reproduction¾that is, to think a “transcendental geology” that has been repressed in a Western 
metaphysical tradition sutured to the hyperrealism of the cogito purged of all materiality (i.e. “res 
extensa”), alterity (i.e. otherness) and parasitic determination (i.e. structural relations of dependency). 
The warming world forces us to critically recalibrate the ontology and autonomy of the “sign.”     
 This requires an ontological shift from an expressionism that views language as a productive 
force (i.e. a philosophical genealogy we could trace through Spinoza, Deleuze, Virno, Negri) to an 
impressionism that views language as embodied in the material life of metabolic geo-technicity (i.e. a 
philosophical genealogy we could trace through Freud, Derrida, Stiegler, Parikka). This becomes, 
paradoxically, a major focus and major deficit in Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s work, for instance, 
because of his polemic against processes of “dereferentialization”237 indigenous to semiocapitalism 
and financial markets, not to mention his mantra that the “general intellect is looking for a body.” 
Within the epoch of semiocapitalism, however, we have to emphasize the fact that to put 
communication to work means to automatically put nature to work¾not merely bodies (e.g. nervous systems, 
affects) and brains (e.g. neuronal powers, ideas) as Bifo’s corpus wonderfully shows. The flesh 
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expands past the corporeality of the human. It is also geological and machinic. Everything is, à la 
Bataille, a solar engine of entropy, negentropy and metabolic decadence¾even semiotic flows.  
 As Maxwell and Miller declare contra eco-critics in the humanities, rather “than excavate 
the literature that represents the environment...we need to be aware of how the printed word changes 
that environment.”238 The “sign” exists as an amphibian interface between cognition and 
consumption, between “enlightenment” and “environment.” As the medium of signs becomes 
more abstract or “dereferentialized” (from oral culture to manuscript culture, from manuscript 
culture to print culture, from print culture to electronic culture), mediation becomes more metabolic.  
 
2.2 SEMIOCAPITALISM: A PRE-HISTORY OF PUTTING NATURE TO WORK 
 
 Paolo Virno gets flirtatiously close to a geological critique of semiocapitalism in When the 
Word Becomes Flesh (a book that has nothing to do with the earth) when, in both his critique of 
subjective and linguistic interiority as well as the purely aprioristic nature of the transcendental. For 
Virno, the “conditions making experience possible are themselves an object of immediate 
experience,” the transcendental is contaminated with sensuous empirical reality.239 In short, 
human elocution and the transcendental are “material” or “physiognomic” in nature¾that is, it is 
only by manifesting as a public (transindividual) and material object (reified phenomenon) that the 
transcendental has any causal power at all. “Following John, it would be easy to rebut those self-
described materialists who oppose the desiring body to a surreptitiously disembodied logos that has 
been made appear frail and impalpable.”240 John’s Gospel and the patristic debates regarding the 
incarnation of Christ¾et verbum caro factum est (“And the Word become flesh and dwelt among 
us”)¾retroactively opens up a path to explore not only the proto-geological critique of 
semiocapitalism but also the ontological necessity of the sign to be incarnated, materialized or reified. 
As Virno argues, a “Word that would not become flesh would be alienating. If the Word is not 
incarnated, it remains an inaccessible transcendental presupposition, an unconditioned condition 
that escapes experience while making it possible.”241  
 If fetishism imbues a meaningless object with powers that only belong to the mind (the object 
is invested with an imaginary soul or self-animating power), alienation implies the infinite regression 
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toward suffocating introversion (the soul is restricted to a pure object of solipsistic interiority). For 
Virno, reification is an antidote to both. This is how Virno understands the general intellect as the 
collective powers of cognition realizing themselves in an objectified system of machinery:  
 
The machine gives a spatio-temporal dimension to the collective, species-specific aspects of 
human thought. The pre-individual reality present in the human subject, unable to find an 
adequate expression in the representations of the individual consciousness, is projected in 
the external world into systems of universally receivable signs, intelligent machines, logical 
schemes made res.242 
 
Reification implies a process of exteriorization, individuation¾the metamorphosis of something 
internal to something external: as McKenzie Wark explains, “pure consciousness needs an external 
objectivication if it is not to fold back into alienation or end up imputing spirit to mere external 
things. The condition of possibility of subjectivity and consciousness are external.”243  
   Reification is that which “places the transcendental outside the I and by doing so allows it 
to experience itself directly,” preventing it from lapsing into the “privations and the misery of an 
introverted life.”244 However, rather than locate the transcendental operator in technical objects that 
constitute human becoming or anthropogenesis (Stiegler, Simondon), Virno consistently finds the 
transcendental in verbal language or the linguistic faculty of human nature¾in other words, the 
“transcendental is the ‘between’ of the human relations, that is, the original public nature of the 
human mind” that manifests primarily through the material fabric or political network of speech 
acts that determine the social world.245  
 One reason for not pushing the full implications of the “transcendental between,” 
“exteriorization” and “reification” to their breaking point and lapsing back into linguistic 
anthropogenesis is that, as Giorgio Agamben reminds us, linguistic anthropogenesis always 
partakes in a fundamental repression or operation of severance, one that enables human beings to 
constitute themselves as structurally autonomous creatures of reason and exception: the 
anthropological machine “necessarily functions by means of an exclusion (which is also always 
already a capturing) and an inclusion (which is also always already an exclusion).”246 
Anthropogenesis “is what results from the caesura and articulation between human and 
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animal.”247 The anthropological machine cuts off or suspends human beings from the animal. It 
also cuts off and suspends the human from the geological: “the flesh of the Word does not come from the 
muck of the Earth, but from the Word itself. The Word becomes flesh by itself, in itself and for itself.”248 This 
uncannily echoes Marazzi’s insistence about the autonomization of knowledge circulation:   
 
Thanks to new technologies and to the reticular organization of productive/distributive 
processes, knowledge is no longer embodied in ‘some other thing,’ in machines or materials 
or finished products, but in knowledge work itself. Communication support systems¾codes, 
languages, shared meanings¾allow knowledge to circulate on its own, independently of 
fixed capital or legal ownership.249  
 
We have to say with and against Virno, however, that the outside of logos grounds logos, that epistemic 
processes and their transmission in the epoch of semiocapitalism are more reliant on the earth than 
any other period in history. The problem Virno, Lazzarato, Negri and Marazzi perpetually 
encounter is that they do not account for how the technical apparatus is embodied¾either in its 
geological materiality (i.e. incarnation) or in the energy flows that power it (i.e. electricity, oil, etc.). 
Subjectivity and its machines are always already “there,” “present” or “ready-to-hand.”  
 Bernard Stiegler will encounter that same problem in his account of “retentional systems” 
and “grammatization”¾even if he will at times better emphasize how the social brain “spatializes” 
itself. If Jacques Derrida’s “governing theme of Grammatology was the question of the ‘repression’ of 
writing in Western metaphysics, Stiegler’s [Technics and Time] reformulates this question in terms of 
the repression of technology.”250 For Stiegler technogenesis constitutes anthropogenesis: the “who 
is nothing without the what, and conversely” because “the interior is constituted in 
exteriorization....Leroi-Gourhan in fact says that it is the tool, that is, tekhnē, that invents the human, 
not the human who invents the technical.”251 Technics govern the horizon of possibility for human 
existence¾especially as regards knowledge transmission, time and memory (retentional) systems. 
Technics are defined as the organization of inorganic matter; the term designates “both the history 
of fabricated objects (e.g. flint, hammers, pencils, computers) and the domain of techne: the 
techniques and practices involved in making (something with) technology.”252 Predicated on the 
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“logic of supplementarity,” the exteriority of technics and writing technologies “exceed and 
condition the interior life of the mind.”253 Technology as supplement means that it is not an 
augmentation or addition to something already sufficient, full and present to itself; rather, technology 
exposes a lack, insufficiency or dependency at the heart of hominization.  
 It is in this sense that “tertiary retention” (transindividual memory incarnate in technical 
objects)254 is a transcendental “support” for Stiegler:  
 
But from the beginning of that process of hominization that André Leroi-Gourhan 
describes as a process of exteriorization, all technical objects constitute an intergenerational 
support of memory which, as material culture, overdetermines learning...and mnesic 
activities. To this extent, therefore, tertiary retention always already precedes the 
constitution of primary and secondary retention. A newborn child arrives into the world in 
which tertiary retention both precedes and awaits it, and which precisely, constitutes this 
world as world. And as the spatialization of individual time becoming thereby collective 
time, tertiary retention is an original exteriorization of mind.255 
 
The deep structure of memory that conditions knowledge is transferable only through a process of 
concretization via technics¾of consciousness reifying itself in objects that become “orphaned” 
from their “origin.” This is, moreover, only possible for Stiegler on the basis of a more fundamental 
process of “grammatization”¾from gramme, “written mark”¾or what Tinnel calls “orthographic 
continuums.”256 It is precisely this “arche-writing” as memory, primordial mediation, reproduction 
and apparatus of recording that is crucial because it is the originary condition of “vulgar” writing, 
perception and consciousness as such.  
 Grammatization as a process of mnemotechnics is a process of “technical-remembering” (i.e. 
a system capable of recording, storing and sharing info). As Tinnel summarizes, grammatization 
refers to “processes by which a material, sensory, or symbolic flux becomes a gramme, 
which¾broadly conceived¾can include all manners of technical gestures that maintain their 
iterability and citationality apart from an origin or any one particular context.”257 This aspect of 
“detachment” inherent to “iterability” or “orthographic reproduction” is crucial to Derrida 
because it enables him to invert a number of problems¾i.e. “the metaphysics of presence” and the 
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“transcendental signified” that impose their hermeneutical authority on the horizon of their 
readers; but more than this, no signification is possible without the spacing effects of differànce, of 
the differential play of signifiers infinitely deferring transcendental signifieds (i.e. fixed meanings). 
For Stiegler, likewise, “all manner of ancient and contemporary technics” function as “distinct 
iterations of arche-writing”¾evident in “early picto/ideo-graphic writing, alphabetic writing, 
industrial machines, photography, cinema, digital media, and biotechnology.”258 
 Curiously, this is how both Canadian media philosophers Harold Innis and Marshall 
McLuhan describe how different “writing systems” have the ability to radically shape and structure 
the consciousness, politics and economics of their users. As Innis writes, “the art of writing provided 
man with a transpersonal memory. Men were given an artificially extended and verifiable memory 
of objects and events not present to sight or recollection.”259 McLuhan also elaborates Innis’ 
position that empires are determined by the efficiency and nature of their mediums of 
communication¾“stone” is a heavier medium predicated on the slow changing, quasi-
permanence of tradition, while “paper” is a light medium predicated on mobility and military 
logistics:  
 
Innis observed that writing upon stone and clay created priestly bureaucracies and gave 
command over time because of the permanence of the record. Writing on paper, on the 
other hand, created military bureaucracies and gave command over space because of the 
ease with which information written upon paper could be transported and hence provided 
command at a distance.260  
 
McLuhan, following Innis, also develops the same “Derridean” insight about the dislocating 
essence of iterability and grammatization: with “writing, what is recorded or remembered becomes 
separate from the writer, existing in a book or scroll. Knowledge takes on objective identity, 
separate from the knower.”261 McLuhan even claims that the Greeks “developed the notion of 
objectivity and detachment, the separation of the knower from the object of his awareness”¾and 
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that this detachment is the precondition of scientific knowledge, presumably situating the thinker in 
the ideal position of a-local “disinterestedness.”262   
 “Writing systems” (McLuhan), “arche-writing” (Derrida) or an “economy of retention” 
(Stiegler) are not really the issue per se. While all of these mediatic processes make up a regime of 
“tertiary retention” (where memory becomes technical, social and transindividual) and “constitute 
a process of grammatization,” (where a flux of language and human behaviour becomes broken 
down into a system of discrete elements that enable it to be reproduced), their reproducibility is 
reduced to the internal operations of the writing system, a theory of meaning or noetic indexes¾spacing, 
iterability, citationality, and sign differentials¾even though these “repressed” spectral operations 
disrupt the “metaphysics of presence.” The orthographic stability that enables a “gramme” (written 
mark) to be reproduced, orphaned and separated from the confines of a single hermeneutical 
authority has an even greater dependence on a “telluric element” or “substratum” (e.g. stone, 
paper, silicon) paradoxically “orphaned” from the earth, which leads us to argue that beyond “a 
flux of logos” or “technogenesis,” at the heart of mediation is the metabolic.  
 The real issue with theories of “grammatization” or “orthographic continuums” is that they 
form a feedback loop between techne (technical machines), temporality (memory) and episteme 
(knowledge) that eschews the insight of “exteriorization” or “spatialization” of the mind, reducing 
it to (technical) object or (linguistic) thing. What results is the repression of the metabolic integral to systems 
of writing, grammatization and the externalization of the mind¾or, what we can call, following Deleuze and 
Guattari, a repression of the “deterritorialization of the mouth”:   
 
The mouth, tongue, and teeth find their primitive territoriality in food. In giving themselves 
over to the articulation of sounds, the mouth, tongue, and teeth deterritorialize. Thus, there 
is a certain disjunction between eating and speaking, and even more, despite all 
appearances, between eating and writing, but writing goes further in transforming words 
into things capable of competing with food.263 
 
In the epoch of semiocapitalism, however, this disjunction between eating and writing breaks down 
to a degree even more intense than in European printing culture. We cannot say with Deleuze and 
Guattari, however, that to “speak, and above all to write, is to fast.”264 In a very real way, “writing” 
deterritorializes itself further into the “primitive territoriality of food”¾becoming, in the process, 
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a sublime parasite. Semiotic entities have stomachs. Incarnation implies exhaustion. Archival 
machines have fevers. These concepts lose their metaphoricity in the warming world, where oil is 
the subterranean lubricant of all narration.  
 We often forget that the prefiguration and processes leading up to the Enlightenment (i.e. 
the revolutionizing of the means of knowledge transmission) were intrinsically entangled with the 
geological¾that is, by the “grammatizing” and mediatic device par excellence of Johannes 
Gutenberg’s printing press (1440), which radically altered how communication and the 
dissemination of knowledge took place. It also opens up “semiotic fluxes” to a new epoch in the 
history of substrates and the problematic of impression. The typographer Beatrice Warde suggests 
that the ability to broadcast identical “messages to a thousand or more people, a thousand or more 
miles apart” inaugurates what is referred to as “modern times.”265 Warde also attributes “the 
spread of literacy and hence to the universal franchise to further technological developments in 
making paper and printing on it” to the communicative power opened up by the printing press.266 
However, Gutenberg’s printing copies of the Bible censors a more radical form of “primitive 
incarnation” present in John’s Gospel¾that is, how the epistemic and semiotic (contra Virno) 
coagulate from the “muck of the earth.” “Biblical printing consequently expanded the use of 
copper, lead, antimony, and tin.”267 This requires us to expand our notions of mediation¾a post-
Kantian computationality that shows not only how that “concept” organizes the “sensory manifold 
of intuitions” emanating from the noumenal but also siphons energy from the noumenal itself in 
order to “computate.” As Cubitt argues, mediation is first and foremost material rather than 
conceptual (representational) or communicative (intersubjective): “[m]ediations are not 
communications (though all communications are mediated). Mediating does not require messages, 
nor even senders and receivers.... Mediation names the material processes connecting human and 
non-human events.”268  
 The incarnation of the “gramme” has a long history. As the growth of readers started to 
outpace the “supply of handmade documents produced by scribes,” manual lettering became 
obsolete and a new amalgam of innovations spawned: “movable metal type, oil-based ink, and 
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wooden hand-presses.”269 The ink was a composite of three different elements: lampblack (which 
is deleterious to the lungs and mucous membranes), turpentine (which is deleterious to the nervous 
system, liver and kidneys), and boiled linseed oil (which caused skin irritations). “For most of the 
nineteenth century, turpentine extraction and distillation in the southern United States depended 
on slave labour; after the Civil War, forced labor became the norm.”270 Turpentine was primarily 
extracted from pine trees and became “increasingly labor and forest intensive.”271 From the early 
1800’s, as printing presses became more mechanical they also became more heavily reliant on fossil 
fuels. They not only increased the volume of printed pages able to be produced through coal and 
steam power but also contributed more significantly to atmospheric pollution. This is not even to 
mention the exorbitant demand for wood-pulp that subsequently increased as commercial print 
media and the advertising industry grew:  
 
Between 1899 and 1919, as these and other innovations¾such as illustrations and 
telegraph networks¾were standardized, tonnage consumption of processed wood pulp 
expanded by 1,175 percent in the United States alone. Advertising expenditures in print 
grew 742 percent in the same period, fuelling a ‘startling increase’ in newspaper, book, and 
paperboard consumption: from 25 pounds per capita in 1909 to 59 pounds in 1930. In 
1925, a New York newspaper accounted for 2,000 acres of forest. By 1930, papermaking 
had become ‘one of the principle industries polluting water.’272 
 
 As Maxwell and Miller continue to demonstrate, this trend continues in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries¾the epoch of semiocapitalism. They force us to recognize that 
“grammatization” is predicated on a deeper reproductive schema or modus operandi that is 
consumptive, that the “exteriorization of the brain” and knowledge production is a process 
inseparable from exhaustion and the chemical-metabolic processes of the earth system, especially, 
now, the atmosphere:  
 
By the end of the twentieth century, the pulp and paper industry was the ‘second largest 
consumer of energy’ within the world’s largest consumer of energy, the United States; the 
principle industrial consumer of water; and third largest greenhouse gas emitter across 
wealthy democracies of the OECD. In 2006, US papermaking used seventy-five billion 
kilowatt hours of energy, lagging behind just one industry: petroleum....By 2011, the United 
States produced nearly 100 million tons of paper annually, or about 663 pounds per person, 
of which approximately 90 percent was not recycled after use....The US book industry 
estimates the annual carbon impact of books at between 11.3 and 12.4 million tons, 
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equivalent to the total emissions from between two and seven million cars....Scholarly 
journals are responsible for twelve million tons per year worldwide.273 
 
This is not even going into the history of telegraphy and telecommunications¾which, through the 
course of its development, devoured copious amounts of elements used in batteries (i.e. zinc, 
sulfuric acid, nitric acid, mercury), wires, telephone lines and under-sea internet cables (i.e. copper).  
 The social brain¾the general intellect¾requires larger and larger amounts of the earth’s raw 
materials in order to sustain itself¾to produce “value.” But this symbiosis is not unidirectional, as 
if “cognition” was immune from the vagaries of the climate and only served to perpetually extract 
inputs for its thinking machines. The climate also consumes cognition:  
 
In 2015, and for the first time in at least 800,000 years, atmospheric carbon dioxide passed 
400 ppm. At its current rate, which shows no sign of abating, and we show no sign of 
stopping, atmospheric CO2 sill pass 1,000 ppm by the end of the century. 
 At 1,000 ppm, human cognitive ability drops by 21 percent. At higher atmospheric 
concentrations, CO2 stops us from thinking clearly. Outdoor CO2 already reaches 500 
ppm regularly in industrial cities: indoors, in poorly ventilated homes, schools, and 
workplaces, it can regularly exceed 1,000 ppm¾substantial numbers of schools in 
California and Texas measured in 2012 breached 2,000 ppm.274  
 
Given the scale of our digital networks, media infrastructures and cognitive interfaces that extract 
sublime amounts of data in real-time, “thinking about climate change is degraded by climate 
change itself.”275 The spatialization of “semiotic fluxes”¾via reification, grammatization and 
writing systems¾at this moment of semiocapitalism begins to generate aneurysms upon aneurysms 
of contradictions. The computation systems we have built to understand the world begin¾ from 
Gutenberg (printing presses) to Zuckerberg (data centers), through centuries of complicated 
entanglements, capital accumulation and fossil fuel use¾to collapse the very process of 
understanding. It is the energetic analytic, the relations of reproduction of the social brain and 
spectral petro-trace that remains unthought in the ontologies of the “sign” and “grammes.” Are 
we really in an era of “peak knowledge” as Bridle implies?276 This is a question I will try to address 
in the final chapter. 
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 Following Peter Sloterdijk, we have to affirm that anthropogenesis is coterminous with 
space creation, where humans require spheres to live¾surreal autogenous containers or 
“prosthetic husks” of “immunological dwelling” and “pneumatic value.” The supplement in 
Sloterdijk, while similar to Derrida and Stiegler, actually folds within its grasp not the typical anti-
orgasmic temporal spacing of difference and deferral or a transindividual process of mnemotechnics but instead a 
vitalistic geometry of air-conditioning dependencies (both atmospheric and prosthetic). On one hand, this 
registers as a “general theory of immune systems” that articulates techno-symbolic processes of 
shell ontogenesis integral to civilizations:  
 
Modernity is characterized by the technical production of its immunities and the increasing 
removal of its safety structures from the traditional theological and cosmological narratives. 
Industrial-scale civilization, the welfare state, the world market and the media sphere: all 
of these large-scale projects aim, in a shelless time, for an imitation of the now impossible, 
imaginary spheric security. Now networks and insurance policies are meant to replace the 
celestial domes; telecommunications has to re-enact the all-encompassing. The body of 
humanity seeks to create a new immune constitution in an electronic medial skin.277 
 
On the other, it is a novel “breath science” that¾in an age of global warming and atmospheric 
asphyxiation, where our very mediatic immune systems attack themselves¾forces us to reconsider 
the Judaic-Christian symbiosis or “pneumatic reciprocity” between breath and thought, inspiration and 
idea. In other words, ideal air-conditioning (the atmosphere in the non-metaphoric sense) is a pre-
condition for ideal cognition¾that is, the development of the general intellect. The “breathing-in 
of life is not simply an ornamental supplement to an autonomous bodily massif” but a necessary 
installation that generates a “pneumatic or noogenic bonus.”278  
 As experiments in climate geo-engineering and emulation like Biosphere 2 attest to, 
breath¾and its breaking-down in an epoch of atmo-terrorism¾once again becomes a theo-
technology needing to be examined, questioned and increasingly manufactured: “[b]reath was” 
(and is again becoming) “the epitome of a divine technology capable of closing the ontological gap 
between clay idol and the animated human with a pneumatic sleight of hand.”279 
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2.3 EXPULSION MACHINES: A NEGATIVE TRANSCENDENTAL REGIME  
  
 “Value does not work unless most work is not valued.”280 As I have tried to show, following 
Moore and Federici, capitalism does not univocally value everything. The production of value is 
highly specific in its computations of monetary and social worth: it “does not value everything, only 
labor-power in the circuit of capital¾and therefore rests on a series of devaluations.”281 Capitalism 
is increasingly externalization costs. The “conversion of the atmosphere into a dumping ground 
for greenhouse gases is a prime example. Such externalization of costs is also the internalization of 
spaces necessary for capital accumulation”¾hence, the atmosphere “must be put to work as 
capital’s unpaid garbage man.”282  
 This process of devalorization and externalization leads Vinay Gidwani and Anant 
Maringanti to develop the “waste-value dialectic” of capitalism.283 The waste-value dialectic 
articulates the fact that “the conditions of possibility of capitalist value lie in bodies, places, and 
things that come to be designated at the front end and back end of capitalism as waste,” where 
waste is a “vital, heterogenous entity that must be effaced, enrolled, exported, or expunged.”284 
The detritus of the commodity has to be managed in order that the circuit of capital accumulation 
is not interrupted: places of waste operate as “receptacles for capitalism’s detritus, even more, as 
toxic sinks and relay points in an infra-economy that continuously repairs and renews capital’s 
conditions of production,” a spectral infrastructural labour that “repairs and renews the city, 
continuously recreating the conditions of possibility for urban life and capitalist enterprise.”285 This 
infrastructural labour is precisely the expansive labour of reproduction.  
 As Mary Douglas argues in her brilliant structural analysis of how pathogenic elements (i.e. 
dirt) are not extraneous objects of dejection but work to legitimize and construct a stable, hygienic 
order: where “there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systemic ordering and 
classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements.”286 
Waste¾and the violence of its expulsion¾is essential to the functioning of any system. It is the 
non-sublatable excess that haunts order’s rational and productive enterprises. Echoing the 
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conclusions that Baudrillard made in the 1970s, Sean Cubitt makes clear that waste “is not an 
unfortunate by-product of consumerism. Without waste there is no consumer capital.”287 This 
waste includes the “e-waste” generated by technological infrastructure and media devices to the 
built-in obsolescence “required to generate new debt for new sales of new equipment to disciplined 
consumers in the new mode of destruction” but also “populations excluded from the centers of 
capital.”288 Waste does not happen at the end of a commodity’s life but is at work at all stages of 
the production process.  
 As Parikka reminds us, moreover, obsolete technology and consumer goods, even once they 
have “disappeared,” refuse to die: “media persists as electronic waste, toxic residue, and its own 
sort of fossil layer of disused gadgets and electronics.”289 It becomes “zombie media” and 
accumulates in areas all over the world¾especially China and Africa. Zombie media is, following 
Walter Benjamin and Jennifer Gabyrs, what happens to the mediatic once it is released from the 
luminescent, propulsive and wishful dimensions of the “sign” and “desire,” re-entering the 
hypokinetic strata of natural history, mortal decay and geology:  
 
In the United States, about 400 million units of consumer electronics are discarded every 
year. Electronic waste, like obsolete cellular telephones, computers, monitors, televisions, 
composes the fastest growing and most toxic portion of waste in American society. As a 
result of rapid technological change, low initial cost, and planned obsolescence, the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that two-thirds of all discarded 
consumer electronics still work¾approximately 250 million functioning computers, 
televisions, VCRs, and cell phones are discarded each year in the United States.290 
 
The logic of new media is predicated on short-termism. Paradoxically, this short-termism enters 
into the “long-termism” of geological time-scales and global populations due to its toxic afterlife. 
This afterlife, moreover, is one that continues to grow. According to a United Nations report issued 
in 2017, the officials estimated that in 2018 global e-waste output was “50 million metric tons,” a 
significant increase from the total output in 2014, which was “estimated to be around 41.8 million 
metric tons”¾a lot of which ends up in geographies of disposal (China, India, Nigeria).291 
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Garbology undermines the Deleuzean “society of flows” and forces us to think “sites of unexpected 
accumulation.”292 
 In short, the negative transcendental regime makes experience possible through perennial 
efforts of expulsion: the apriori (“before experience”) and aposteriori (“after experience”) are 
subsumed under a single centrifugal logic. Were not the “cogito” (Descartes) and the “ego” 
(Freud)¾denizens of the “sign” and “desire”¾always expulsion machines par excellence? One 
has to expel the tremors of doubt from creeping inside the foundational noosphere (inoculating 
itself from the uncertainties of res extensa). The other has to expel the tremors of trauma to the waste 
receptacle of repressed material (the unconscious, which flares up in bodily ciphers and symptoms). 
For detritus not to accumulate and clog the existential circuits of experience for the cognitariat in 
the metropolis, the pollution and e-waste that happens in knowledge production centers of 
semiocapital have to be pushed outside of it¾made independent of experience¾so that “pure 
reason” can function smoothly. “All that is hidden, evacuated or banished derives from this 
centrifugal logic, which consigns beings and things to the world of waste and holds them there in 
the name of the Ideal.”293 Less facetiously, this negative transcendental regime makes the 
metropolitian social commons and production possible through performing the double function of 
reproducing the life-worlds of the capitalist economy while at the same time inoculating them from the deleterious 
effects of their own detritus. As Moore has exhaustively argued, though, these relations of reproduction 
are becoming more and more strained, precarious and unyielding. Inoculation is becoming more 
difficult to maintain as the globe boils. Capitalism is running out of space. 
 To conclude with the brilliant insights of Federici, the fate of the general intellect will not 
rest in its ability to desuture work-time from life-time, ushering in an iridescent age of luxury 
automated communism, but instead in its ability to radically alter its relations of reproduction, the 
waste-value dialectic and social metabolism:  
 
Reflecting on the activities that reproduce our life dispels the illusion that the automation 
of production may create the material conditions for a nonexploitative society, showing 
that the obstacle to revolution is not the lack of technological know-how, but the divisions 
that capitalist development produces in the working class.294  
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The crises that we face in this moment of history will increasingly become (and already are) geological 
(i.e. the scarcity of cheap nature), geopsychological (i.e. the precarity of pneumatic symbiosis between 
cognition and climate) and geopolitical (i.e. international wars over resources) in essence: “the danger 
today is that besides devouring the earth, capitalism unleashes more wars of the kind the United 
States has launched in Afghanistan and Iraq, sparked by the corporate determination to 
appropriate all the planet’s natural resources and control the world economy.”295 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
295 ibid., 93. As Parikka notes in A Geology of Media, geologists are collaborating with the Pentagon to scout for a 
cornucopia of resources in the Middle East: “for instance, in Afghanistan, in parallel to military operations of war 
against terrorism, geologists are mapping the resource basis of the country. It promises, besides copper, iron, and 
gold, also lithium¾even enough for Afghanistan to be branded the ‘Saudi Arabia of lithium’ (6).  
 83 
GREY ECOLOGY: BOREDOM IN THE ANTHROBSCENE 
 
At Netflix, we are competing for our customer’s time, so our competitors  
include Snapchat, YouTube, sleep, etc. 
                 ¾Reed Hastings, Netflix CEO 
 
The sheer, asymptotic, never-delivered promise of the media flow demands 
a compulsive refresh of our screens. Real time is the new temporal  
standard. Enormous amounts of energy are expended for everything to be 
streaming live, so that we are not stranded in the past, in history, in the 
archive, where we might gather dust. 
           ¾Dominic Pettman, Infinite Distraction 
 
If, under neoliberalism, the gulf between enclaved rich and outcast poor 
has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time  
wherein for many speed has become a self-justifying, propulsive ethic that 
renders ‘uneventful’ violence (to those who live remote from its attritional 
lethality) a weak claimant on our time. 
                        ¾Rob Nixon, Slow Violence 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION: NOTES ON THE NETFLIXICATION OF ECOLOGY 
 
 We have seen that semiocapitalism is a geological operator. We have to say, in a perverse 
Baudrillardian inversion, however, that the Anthropocene is also a semiotic operator. The 
Anthropocene does not merely index, as Dispesh Chakrabarty famously argues, an industrial 
metamorphosis of mankind from psycho-biological agents to geological agents who no longer interact with 
nature in a simple unidirectional way but “are a force of nature in the geological sense.”296 
Alongside the environmental consequences of data centers, the materiality of media and the 
metabolism of simulacra, we ask what happens to the Anthropocene when it enters into the virtual 
realm of the mediasphere as a floating, groundless simulacral object of pure fascination (e.g. 
Edward Burtynsky) and metaphysical contemplation (e.g. Timothy Morton)? With Baudrillard, 
while at the same time going beyond his post-Kantian hysteria of representation cancelling out the 
noumena, even critically raising it to a new material dimension since we have already shown how 
information and simulacra production contribute to catastrophe in a very real and geological sense, 
we inquire into the Anthropocene as a media event in all of its dimensions:  
 
They are virtual and the virtual is what puts an end to all negativity, and thus to all reference 
to the real or to events. At a stroke, the contagion of images, engendering themselves 
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without reference to a real or an imaginary, itself becomes virtually without limits, and this 
limitless engendering produces information as catastrophe....However this may be, that image 
raises the problem of its indifference to the world, and thus of our indifference to it¾which 
is a political problem. When television becomes the strategic space of the event, it sets itself 
up as a deadly self-reference, it becomes a bachelor machine. The real object is wiped out 
by news¾not merely alienated, but abolished. All that remains of it are traces on a 
monitoring screen....Spectators then become exoterics of the screen, living their revolution 
as an exoticism of images, themselves exogenous, touristic spectators of a virtual history.297 
 
What are the conditions of visibility of the Anthropocene¾and its complex geo-materialism¾in 
the epoch of semiocapitalism, where everything must turn into iridescent pixellations of imagery, 
units of data, ephemeral sign-objects¾when the “strategic space of the event” is mediatic (in either 
sense of the spectators’ personal computer or geopolitical planetary computation)? 
 In the last few decades, there have been an innumerable proliferation of Hollywood films 
that depict the end of the world in the context of an apocalyptic framework: Mad Max (1979), The 
Matrix (1999), The Day After Tomorrow (2004), Children of Men (2006), I Am Legend (2007), The Road 
(2009), Melancholia (2011), World War Z (2013) and Train to Busan (2016). For the most part, the 
Anthropocene has been condensed into a repetitive series of spectacular images of apocalyptic 
collapse, an eschatology that renders the future obsolete, a negative future that spirals toward 
collapse and a devolution into bleak primitivism.298 There have also been numerous documentaries 
made over the past decade trying to bring “awareness” to ecological problems: from An Inconvenient 
Truth (2006), Manufactured Landscapes (2006), Watermark (2013) to the most recent Anthropocene: The 
Human Epoch (2018). Yet, the old contradiction persists: as Alexander M. Stoner and Andony 
Melathopoulos put it in Freedom in the Anthropocene, how can “a society that emerges from the 
Industrial Revolution...be both conscious of the degradation of planetary systems and seemingly 
powerless to do anything about it[?]”299 It is only partially true, then, when Rob Nixon claims that 
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ecological devastation has been made into a spectral object of inattention due to the incompatibility 
of our “flickering attention spans” to coherently map instances of delayed and dispersed 
ruination.300 
 Nixon, furthermore, has tried to distil the contradiction inherent in geological perception 
as it expresses itself in the radical antinomy between the two scalar extremes of mutual 
deterioration, a deterioration of “life-sustaining circuits of planetary biophysics” and “the wired-
brain’s neural circuitry”:  	
Over the past two decades, this high-speed planetary modification has been accompanied 
(at least for those increasing billions who have access to the Internet) by rapid modifications 
to the human cortex. It is difficult, but necessary, to consider simultaneously a geologically-
paced plasticity, however relatively rapid, and the plasticity of brain circuits reprogrammed 
by a digital world that threatens to “info-whelm” us into a state of perpetual distraction. If 
an awareness of the Great Acceleration is (to put it mildly) unevenly distributed, the 
experience of accelerated connectivity (and the paradoxical disconnects that can 
accompany it) is increasingly widespread.301  
   
Nixon does not go far enough here, though; despite the usefulness of the antinomy. Besides not 
making the connection that this “info-whelm” is itself already a material not simply neurological, 
source of immense geological attrition, Nixon fails to address the crucial concepts of competition, 
obscenity and post-political populism integral to semiocapitalism’s social production schema. As a result, 
the temporally dispersed “non-event” of slow violence gets condensed into the semi-reactionary 
problematic of distraction.302 This leads us to the problem of the “Netflixication of ecology”¾where 
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“awareness” fetishistically becomes the highest politico-ethical practice or driver of change, 
especially in a moment where we are living under the “dispositif of the image” and in a supposedly 
informatic and “self-reflexive modernity.”303   
 The Netflixication of ecology involves three intertwined problems¾obscenity, post-political 
populism and competition¾that generate the combined effect of spectralization and grey ecology¾that is, 
how the very circulation of visibility (meant to increase attention toward ecological crises) and 
“stimulatory regimes” of semiocapitalism simultaneously make eco-objects “invisible,” “opaque,” 
“boring” and “lackluster.” Obscenity names the paradoxical process whereby simulacra (images, 
data, virtual phenomena) take precedence, achromatize and spectralize the real object they attempt 
to represent. Post-political populism names the process whereby social antagonisms are displaced, 
and demands for climate change are “addressed to the elites,” technocrats and experts¾such that, 
it is less a problem of “replacing the elites” and re-structuring social relations than “calling on the 
elites to take action.”304 Lastly, competition¾in this context¾names the process whereby our 
attention is unevenly distributed and competed for by multinational corporations like Netflix, 
Google, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram, which transmutes our collective attentional flux into a 
scarce resource that not only cannot be everywhere at once (i.e. be solely engineered around looming 
ecological priorities) but also reduces the visibility, luminosity and desirability of phenomena that do not 
contribute to economic valorization (i.e. profit) or egocentric human capital (i.e. self-aggrandizing social capital 
measured in “likes” on platforms such as Facebook and Instagram).       
 This leads us to what can be called the “Anthrobscene”¾hijacking the term from Jussi 
Parikka (who only uses it flippantly to designate the exploitative role of capitalism within the 
environment) in order that we can extract from it the “obscenity” that Jean Baudrillard theorized. 
The Anthrobscene is a term used here to designate the phenomenon that occurs when the 
“Anthropocene” enters into the virtual realm and logic of the mediasphere and is thus converted 
into a reductive problem of “attention” (consciousness, awareness-raising, spectacle) and the 
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“experts” (technocrats, political institutions, academics, scientists) rather than a problem of 
collective praxis. Thus, the first section questions the process of “exhaustive visualization” as a 
critique of representational eco-politics and the second section questions the “distribution of 
attention” in order to further this critique.  
  
3.1 ANTHROBSCENE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND SEMIOCAPITALISM 
 
 One of the problems that the environmental movement incessantly poses for itself is the 
problem of representation: the cultural logic of environmentalism increasingly puts its faith in, or 
gives primacy to, an activism concerned with “consciousness” or “awareness” raising. Rob Nixon’s 
formulation of “slow violence” incarnates one of the more complex and paradigmatic versions of 
this logic.   
 Nixon begins the introduction of his analysis of slow-violence with the frighteningly sterile 
poison-redistribution plan proposed by the World Bank. The World Bank’s proposal to redistribute 
waste to poor countries was not scandalous by any means. It was an efficient form of planetary 
management that would shift the problem outside of the terrain of concern of rich-nation 
enviromentalists and also prove an economic benefit to the United States and Europe: when 
“Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated that the bank develop a scheme 
to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in 
the calm voice of global managerial reasoning.”305 Nixon hypothesises that if the proposal suggested the 
use of weapons of mass destruction, it would have been immediately targeted as a violent 
proposition. However, given that is was carried out in the sanitized logic of economic prudence 
and managerial rationality, the poison-redistribution plan made sense (notwithstanding the 
environmental racism of the “Empire”) because “countries in Africa are vastly under polluted.”306   
 Nixon, therefore, argues that we widen the radius of what constitutes as violence in order 
to include within its scope the dark rhizomatic capillaries of a violence slow to unravel, one that 
sprawls over inhuman temporal dimensions and is difficult to trace: “[c]limate change, the thawing 
cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, 
acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes.”307 Violence 
is “customarily conceived as an event of action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular 
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in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility.”308 Slow violence, on the other hand, is 
antithetical to the spectacle and the pornographics of the instantaneous. It is spectacle deficient. Slow 
violence is “incremental and accretive,” a “violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a 
violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that 
is typically not viewed as violence at all.”309 The temporal dimension of slow violence, however, 
due to its non-evental dispersal and the belated registration of its effects, poses a major 
representational challenge:  
 
how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long 
in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are 
attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-
world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough 
to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose 
repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?310 
  
This representational problem is exacerbated in an age where “media venerate the spectacular” 
and “public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need.”311  
 Nixon follows Edward Said’s argument that geographical struggles are never just armed 
and militaristic but also symbolic and dramaturgical. This struggle is only exacerbated in a “fast 
capitalism” that gives birth to vast structurations of forgetting and amnesia. As Jonathan Crary 
argues, the “acceleration of novelty production is a disabling of collective memory, and it means 
that the evaporation of historical knowledge” is no longer propagandistic or ideological but 
happens spontaneously from “fantasmatic construction of the present” emanating from 
communication and consumptive patterns.312 Part of the process of real subsumption is not to 
simply produce “new subjectivities” (i.e. cognitariat) and “new means of production” (i.e. 
rhizomatic digital networks) but also to implement a new “transcendental aesthetic” that 
manipulates time (i.e. 24/7 temporality, an insomniac temporality that privileges the continuous 
functioning of markets and information networks that exceed segmented clock time and calendars) 
and space (i.e. corporate, generic “non-places”¾Starbucks cafes, hospitals, airports, malls, website 
pages, offices, etc.). Our memories are nourished on memes, video-games and cartoons, on social 
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media posts, Netflix and commodity artefacts. As Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus in 
relation to the capitalist socius, “[m]emory has become a bad thing.”313 
 It is here we can talk about the materialistic “geo-unconscious” or, more specifically, a 
“geo-symptom” specific to anthropogenic global warming and slow violence: the heat of the past comes 
back to haunt us. The past is never quite past: for “if the past of slow violence is never past, so too the 
post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements 
we inhabit” as well as in “our bodies, which epidemiologically and ecologically are never our simple 
contemporaries.”314  Nixon’s activism, then, is largely composed of generating dramaturgical 
crystals of time (imagistic apparatuses) that can arrest, capture and freeze the belated effects of slow 
violence into a digestible item available for public attention and collective remembrance: to 
“intervene representationally entails devising iconic symbols that embody amorphous calamities 
as well as narrative forms that infuse those symbols with dramatic urgency.”315 
 At times, however, there seems to be an implicit form of idealism within Nixon’s project: it 
is as if inattention was a productive force in its own right and politics is therefore reduced to (or 
primarily concerned with) the creation of images and mythopoetic narratives by middle-class 
academics, scholars and activists in the global North (i.e. immaterial labour). This is one of the 
problems of the “Netflixication of ecology.”  
 Representational eco-politics fails to take into account what Andrew Kalaidjian calls the 
“spectacular Anthropocene”¾that is, while “environmental efforts can reach a larger audience 
than ever before, they are not immune to the paralyzing effects of spectacle.”316 What Nixon 
forecloses, for instance, in his dyadic analysis of representation between slow violence and quick 
spectacle¾that is, the challenge of suturing the radical disjunction between the slow, belated 
environmental devastation occurring at the level of planetary biophysics and the immediate, cinematic 
whirlpool of signs occurring at the level of neural circuitry¾is the question of how to compete with 
the spectacle that does not conform to its disintegrating logic, speed and auto-negating movement. 
To bring spectral objects of slow violence into the domain of the spectacle does not necessary help 
the overarching cause. Or, what Nixon misses, is the obsession with “representationality,” 
“consciousness” and “awareness-raising” that is already at the heart of populist ecological 
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movements, an obsession that is symptomatic of both a lack of organization on the ground and 
semiocapitalism’s regime of “hyper-expression” and demand to convert everything into an image, 
sign, or unit of information. 
 Irmgard Emmelhainz calls this representational overexposure of the Anthropocene in the 
epoch of semiocapitalism “exhaustive visualization”:  
 
the Anthropocene era implies not a new image of the world, but the transformation of the 
world into images. Humanity’s alteration to the biophysical systems of earth is parallel to 
the rapid modifications of the receptive fields of the human visual cortex announced by 
cubism and experimental film. This alteration is also accompanied by the unprecedented 
explosion in the circulation of visibilities, which are actually making the outcome of these 
alterations opaque.317   
 
What Nixon fails to take into account (or, rather, underestimates), given his emphasis on 
representation, is precisely the spectacle’s auto-negating procedure of overexposure: or, what is 
also cynically known as “ruin-porn,” a phenomenon that is also gaining traction and theoretical 
interest in the heterodoxical niches of eco-studies, a phenomenon that questions how typically 
white, typically middle-class artists, photographers and cinematographers make money and gain 
renown by showcasing disaster via an aesthetic medium. 
 Is not this the case of Edward Burtynsky’s Anthropocene: The Human Epoch (2018)? The 
Anthropocene becomes an object of spectacularism, “surreal images” and “stunning 
cinematography,” that functions in the same vein as Romantic sublimity (crisis consumed from a 
distance) rather than an environmental crisis per se. The Anthropocene becomes an orbital object 
of pure groundlessness detached from its referent. We can give the Anthrobscene a more 
determinate definition: the global South provides the catastrophic material and the global North 
provides the camera. Thus, the Anthrobscene converts the Anthropocene into a form of “ruin-
porn.” Exorcized of all of its sexual features, “ruin porn” operates through a bivalent logic of 
voyeuristic distance and imagistic immersion, “where the aesthetic pleasure or horror or curiosity 
depends largely on the ability of the viewer to disentangle himself from the ruination he is seeing 
in front of him.”318 The image of ruination enables one to indulge in a conservative relation of 
engagement with decay, ruination and exploitation. The problem with the Anthrobscene is that it 
registers the environmental crisis as a crisis immanent to the gaze: the cornucopia of saturated 
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images that expose the decimation of the planetary system “constitute something like a production 
sublime, as toxic, high-volume, post-production, and post-consumer waste is repackaged and 
framed at a scale and in a manner that minimizes waste’s catastrophic causes and effects,” 
foregrounding instead “the things in it that are beautiful” like all of Burtynsky’s documentaries and 
exhibitions.319 
 Emmelhainz argues, moreover, that this spectacular groundlessness emerges from 
semiocapitalism’s incentive to turn things into signs and images, giving rise to a “tautological form 
of vision”: with the omnipresent “use of photography and digital imaging, all signs begin to lead to 
other signs, prompted by the desire to see and to know, to document and archive experiences,” 
which leads to the “fantasy that everything is or can be made visible,” a fantasy that “coexists with 
the increasing automation of cognition, which, following Franco Berardi, is the basic condition of 
semiocapital (the valorization and accumulation of signs as economic assets).”320     
 Obscenity is predicated on a paradigm of forced transparency and immersion within the 
techno-linguistic automatisms of network culture: obscenity “begins when there is no more 
spectacle, no more stage, no more theatre, no more illusion, when everything becomes immediately 
transparent, visible, exposed in the raw and inexorable light of information and 
communication.”321 It marks the process whereby all forms of social life are “abolished into one 
dimension, the dimension of communication” and “information.”322 Although the “epoch of 
networks” transcends and moves past the “society of the spectacle,” it does retain a very important 
element: the “spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people 
that is mediated by images.”323 What is pornographic about obscenity is that it forces everything 
into a regime of exaggerated visibility in order to produce the effect of fascination, libidinal 
excitement and aesthetic pleasure. However, “obscenity and transparency progress ineluctably, 
because they no longer partake in the order of desire but in the order of the frenzy of the image” 
and this “solicitation of and voraciousness for images is increasing at an excessive rate. Images have 
become our true sex object, the object of our desire.”324 We do not desire the sexual act that is simulated in 
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pornography. What pornography reveals is the more fundamental desire to see itself, to be 
immersed in the luminescent exorbitance of the image. 
 The Anthrobscene makes environmental slow violence opaque not through lack of representation 
but through overexposure. Simulacral objects and images are not faithful representations of reality, 
photogenic devices of illumination or loci of manifestation that hold open a space for entities to 
appear within the spectral density of being. What is interesting about simulacral-objects and images 
is the power they have to devalorize, to make things opaque, irrelevant or derelict in their wake. 
Simulacra produce spectral umbra and envelopes of boredom: whatever objects or activities resist the 
stimulatory regime of telematic participation “tend to deteriorate in esteem and desirability,” real-
life activities “that do not have an online correlate begin to atrophy, or cease to be relevant.”325 
What emerges is an “insurmountable asymmetry” between the online and offline, the ubiquity of 
the screen and the primitivism of the local, immediate and public: due to “the infinity of content 
accessible 24/7, there will always be something online more informative, surprising, funny, 
diverting, impressive than anything in one’s immediate actual circumstances.”326 The condition of 
visibility (valorization) and invisibility (devalorization) rests on semiocapitalism’s injunction toward 
“exhaustive visualization” or “obscenity”¾a process that culminates in a formal principle of 
“pornography” (i.e. overexposure, more visible than visible). “Under the conditions of 
semiocapitalism, images and signs acquire value and/or power by means of being seen, largely 
through ‘likes’ and ‘retweets.’”327 
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 This brings us back to the conundrum of representational eco-politics and thinking through 
a “transcendental geology” (i.e. the earth as a condition of possibility for thought): as “digital 
culture becomes faster, higher bandwidth, and more image-based, it also become more costly and 
destructive¾both literally and figuratively” because it “requires more input and energy, and 
affirms the supremacy of the image¾the visual representation of data¾as the representation of 
the world.”328 Because the hyperobject of anthropogenic global warming cannot be cognized in a 
subjective or intersubjective mind, and thus only be registered at the level of the network, “made 
sensible through a vast distributed systems of sensors, exabytes of data and computation, performed 
in time as well as space,” leads to what can only be called the problem of geological reflexivity.329 
Benjamin Bratton encapsulates this problem and the general paradoxes of a transcendental 
geology perfectly in the anecdote of HP research scientist Stanley Williams who worked with a 
team of computer scientists asked by the US Department of Energy to “propose an architecture 
for a computer that would be capable of a high fidelity predicative simulation of the entire 
planetary climate, and of monitoring and simulating the entire planetary climate in real time.”330 
The problem of geological reflexivity, the immanent contradictions between computation and 
geological materialism, manifests explicitly in Williams’ anticlimactic conclusion of the group’s 
research as Bratton recites it:  
 
based on current technology, the necessary specifications would mean that the computer 
would not only be roughly the size of Paris, but it would consume so much energy that it 
would be the single most significant anthropogenic climate event that it itself would be 
modeling! Short of fundamental breakthroughs, his anecdote underscores the paradoxical 
recursivity that undergirds the demand for global ecological omniscience.331  
 
This is the obscenity of the Anthrobscene: in an effort to achieve global ecological omnipresence 
through political dramaturgy and global ecological omniscience through techno-scientific 
computation, everything becomes a matter of “exhaustive visualization” (simulacral image-objects) 
and “exhaustive informationalization” (epistemological sign-objects). Are these practices a priori 
evil? No, of course not. But they are entangled in deep rooted contradictions¾that is, constitutive 
tensions inherent to representation and technogenesis as such, tensions that are only really beginning 
to be questioned.    
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3.2 ATTENTION: COMPETING WITH THE DORITOS-NETFLIX ASSEMBLAGE  
 
 Attention is not the result of individual choices.332 It is structured and spellbound by 
“collective enthralments,” enthralments that are “inextricably architectural and magnetic, and 
which are induced by media apparatuses circulating certain forms (rather than others) among and 
within us.”333 Attention is constrained to follow paths and forms that are opened up to us on the 
basis of certain images and discourses circulating within the mediasphere. Yves Citton gives the 
example of Islamophobic enthralments that resonate throughout the mediasphere, drawing out 
certain saliences within our environment by drawing our attention to them (a woman who is 
wearing a veil) despite our common sense, liberal education or ideological position. Collective 
enthralments organize our perceptual behaviour around certain “attractors” that condense, bind 
and capture our attention. The formal principle of collective enthralment states that “human 
attention tends to fall on objects whose form it recognizes, under the spellbinding influence of the 
direction taken by others.”334  
 Citton argues that collective attention allows us to foreground the plurality of dynamics 
from which our common enthralment results. “Attention carries a power of collection which ensures 
very complex modes of interaction between social groups and the individuals emanating from 
them.”335 The etymology of colligere suggests the meaning of “gathering together”: collection—
uniting objects within an environment through a particular criterion. This form of gathering 
implies observation, choosing, filtering and analysis. The primary task of attention is to “select from 
among the phenomena surrounding us, those that are significant for our survival and the 
satisfaction of our desires.”336 We are enveloped not only within a collective sphere of attention but 
further parcelized within a particular “libidinal filter bubble” or “sensory filters” that selects from 
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our environment objects, activities and phenomena that (should) attract or preoccupy us. The 
collection describes me in a collective despite the fact that I might think it concerns only me. Thus, 
the principle of selective collectivization: “attention simultaneously ensures a certain adaptation of our behavior 
to our environment (by selecting in it what interests us) and a certain collective composition of individual desires (by 
spontaneously aligning our sensibilities and our preferences with those of others).”337 Our attention aligns with 
the attention of others. But, as we know from Frédéric Lordon, this alignment is primarily the 
function of domination and the “master-desire” delimiting the sphere our of desire to work, 
commodities, money and social prestige.338  
 Our attention tends to fall on familiar objects, content or attractors (i.e. it is transindividual 
and collection). But the content that it lands on is not neutral since we are bombarded by imagistic 
demands, nervous incentives and audio-visual content engineered by online streaming sites such 
as iTunes, Netflix, YouTube and the like. The flow of content is irreversibly enmeshed with and 
irrigated by the flow of capital because our attention has the ability to be converted into capital or 
monetized (i.e. it is a form of “immaterial labour”). This, however, increasingly makes our 
attentional flux an object of manipulation and decreases its existential availability at large. 
Phenomenology always produces a spectral non-phenomenology. What appears is simultaneously 
what spectralizes; in other words, the logic and process of appearing contains within it a logic and 
process of disappearing.339 Since neither our collective nor individual attention can be everywhere 
at once, it is capital (specifically platform capitalism) that (in the last instance) determines the 
orientation of our attentional powers. The “principle of competition” that Citton highlights follows 
both from the non-infinite quantity of collective attention available and the driving force of capital 
to produce and extract surplus value. Competition is the chief actor in “attention deficit disorders”: 
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“the amount of focused attention allocated to a certain phenomenon reduces the amount of focused attention available 
for considering other phenomena.” 340  
 Kalaidjian will even go so far as to say that the “Anthropocene is the physical manifestation 
of the spectacle’s aspiration to cover the entire globe, as well as the planetary fulfillment of the 
narcissism that drives endless speculation and reflection on the nature of humanity.”341 Is the 
Anthropocene a problem or a celebrity? The question that Kalaidjian raises is essentially the 
Baudrillardian question of is it possible for the globe to disappear under its own image¾its own 
hyper-simulation? Bridle, of course, will say yes: the complex crisis of geo-material reproduction 
competes with the image of this very crisis. This is the crisis of the Anthrobscene.  
 The Anthrobscene converges with the economy of attention at a very precise point: both 
are grounded in a Berkelean-esque ontology of visibility: it “is the accumulation of gazes and 
attention that constitutes value.”342 What appears is what is. What appears with more intensity, 
the more reality it has. Attention is a mode of valorization: the “simple fact of looking at an object 
represents a labour which increases the value of that object.”343 It constantly reinforces itself in a 
spiral of attraction: attention accumulates more attention (the logic of celebrity, Instagram and 
YouTube). Every issue, person and brand have to make themselves attractive, have to decorate 
themselves in the spectacularism of the commodity lest they fall into the abyss of irrelevance.344 To 
exist in platform capitalism is to appear. Competition and attentional capitalism put pressure on 
socio-economic agents to lift themselves out of unspectacular obscurity and into the draconic 
brightness of mediaspherical notoriety to compete for attention. The principle of competition and 
the ontology of visibility as economic imperative gives rise to what can be called a “grey ecology” 
(not the one that Paul Virilio develops, which is related to the pollution generated by the 
contraction of spatio-temporal dimensions by the instantaneousness of telecommunications 
networks).  
 Grey ecology is a term that designates not so much the failure of ecological issues to become 
“spectacular” mediatic objects of public concern but more so their inability to compete with other 
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“spectacular” mediatic objects of public concern (Kim Kardashian, neo-conservative’s obsession 
with terrorism, economic growth, a new book on Deleuze, a friend’s vacation pictures on 
Instagram). This attentional “scarcity” aggravated by competition, subsequently, is even more 
fractured by the differential virus of customization¾that is, “designer consciousness.” Given the 
neo-baroque surplus of content social media and platforms offer users, “distraction” is no longer 
unidimensional but individually customized according to the microphysics of individual desires, 
impulses, swerves. The automosaic brawl of incoming stimuli competing for our attention have to 
be parcelled out to greater degrees. We have to develop robust and personological filtering systems. 
Simmel’s “blasé attitude” integral to metropolitan subjectivity retains its formal structure of 
psycho-immunology, here, while becoming all the more complex in semiocapitalism and digital 
culture. We are not bombarded by stimuli unidirectionally but also increasingly construct, organize 
and choregraph this supersaturating influx¾hostages of our own collage of micro-interests, like 
Benjamin’s proto-digital “warm grey fabric” that sheaths the subject’s head and is lined with a 
psychedelic and baroque interior.345 Spectral objects of boredom on the “outside.” Lustrous objects 
of interest on the “inside.”  
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 Fisher distills the paradoxical aspect of this boredom without a subject that the baroque stimulation of 
cyberspace in semiocapitalism breeds in a neat formulation: no one is bored but everything is boring. He argues 
that “if the contemporary form of capitalism has extirpated boredom, it has not vanquished the boring.” (“No One 
is Bored, Everything is Boring”). On the contrary, we “endlessly move among the boring” because “our nervous 
systems are so overstimulated that we never have the luxury of feeling bored.” (ibid.) This is a common analysis. It 
updates the Freudian-Simmelian analysis of the metropolitan forms of subjectivity that emerged as a result of 
being immersed in the continuous electrocution of the crowd. The modernization of subjectivity necessitated by 
the “money economy” required the intensification of rationality¾hence, “ego-defense” or the blunting reflex of 
the “blasé attitude”¾and a minimization of emotional response that would enable subjects to “create a protective 
organ” shielding them from “the profound disruption with which the fluctuations and discontinuities of the 
external milieu” threaten internal coherence (“The Metropolis and Mental Life,” 12). This “rational intensification” 
is not an amplification of our epistemic faculties but rather a technique for pragmatic survival, denial and operative 
functionality. Rationality means conservatism. We act with reserve and muffle our impulses and agitations. 
Modern life requires a subjectivity that is more protective than it is receptive, that is engaged in a perennial mode 
of deflection, aversion and distantiation in order to ensure the smooth functioning of social life. This psycho-
immunological callousness, for Simmel, moreover, internalizes the indifference that is paradigmatic of exchange 
value: the “essence of the blasé attitude is an indifference toward the distinction between things” such that “the 
meaning and the value of the distinctions between things...are experienced as meaningless.” As Elizabeth 
Goodstein elaborates, “the blasé subject has adapted to the objectification of the lifeworld by becoming object-
like” (Experience without Qualities, 273).  
  Fisher’s boredom is slightly more complex: it retains the psycho-immunological shell that achromatizes 
the exterior world but through the glittery saturation of the interior with hyper-personalized pixels of 
entertainment¾again, establishing a diagonal relation of asymmetry between the micro-world of the transfixed 
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 Consciousness is not homogenous or hypersynchronized in an unambiguous manner. The 
social swarm does not merely standardize experience, attention and behavior so that it is 
increasingly compatible with patterns of consumption and the process of capitalistic valorization, 
so that we are all doing the same things in an automated way. To generate a standard experience 
is to generate the possibility of a standard platform of revolt, discontent and a “unified” common 
condition. We have transcended the Fordist era of television and mass consumption, where you 
can have any color of the Model T automobile as long as it is black. The axioms of enjoyment that 
capital deploys in the era of semiocapitalism are much more sophisticated and differential. 
Pettman, in contrast to Bernard Stiegler’s notion of industrial model of hypersynchronization, 
argues that social media functions instead through “hypermodulation”¾that is, “deliberate 
dissonance,” “productive delay” or “staggered distraction,” mechanisms of fragmentation and 
anti-solidarity that disable the possibility of “feeling the same way as other potential allies and affines” 
and constrain us to the atomic orbs of our own customized distractions.346 One minute we are 
absorbed in a penetrating article on climate change. Another minute we are absorbed in the 
hilarious hijinks of a cat video.  
 Crary, too, identifies the same deficit in Stiegler’s concept. To homogenize consciousness 
would be to get too close to orchestrating the prerequisites needed for “class consciousness.” 
Rather, attention, consciousness, desire and concern are customized to suture one’s attentional 
powers to the limited zone of one’s private island of activity 
  
against his idea of the industrial homogenization of consciousness and its flows, one can 
counterpose the parcellization and fragmentation of shared zones of experience into 
fabricated microworlds of affects and symbols. The unfathomable amount of accessible 
information can be deployed and arranged in the service of anything, personal or political, 
however aberrant or conventional. Through the unlimited possibilities of filtering and 
customization, individuals in close physical proximity can inhabit incommensurable and 
non-communicating universes.347 
 
                                                        
subject christened with digital dopamine and a pallidly disinvested macro-world of co-isolated sociality. The insular 
forms of cultural entertainment generated by the mediasphere are “experienced not as something which could 
have impacts upon public space, but as a retreat into private ‘OedIpod’ consumer bliss, a walling up against the 
social” (Capitalist Realism, 24). This boredom is not a symptom of civilizational repression (Freud). Nor is it simply a 
problem of “demotivation” or a symptom of a “motivational deficit” that plagues secular liberal democracies 
(Critchley)¾as if the revolutionary in each of us was just simply sleeping and needed to be roused. The 
“entertainment-control circuits of hypermediated consumer culture” function by “addicting its users” and 
substituting their deteriorating wages through the artificial stimulations of credit (Capitalist Realism, 25).  
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The inscription made on the socius by the axiomatization of capital allocates to each person a little 
island or monad of activity (i.e. a social function, a job, a problem) that they are responsible for, 
can enjoy and cultivate. The division of labour is coupled with the division of desire. Consciousness and 
one’s sphere of activity become highly fragmented, self-tailored and specialized¾becoming, in the 
process, more and more “post-political.”  
 This circulation of visibilities (i.e. competitive attentiveness and hypermodulation) within 
the global North obscures the brutal fact of our indifference to the material effects of the 
Anthropocene as such. It is another image and article to click away (for now). This is not a cynical 
epiphany or indulgence. It is a symptom of semiocapitalism and a larger blockage to the political 
sphere¾or, to be more abstract, the consumer-citizens’ structural position within the problematic topology of 
the Anthropocene at large. It is not a problem of plastic bags at the grocery store (i.e. individual 
responsibility and ethical preference). We often forget or are oblivious to the fact that “97 percent 
of waste is not the municipal solid waste that all of us create and are familiar with, but industrial 
waste.”348 The problem is that the problem of the Anthropocene is colonized by an onslaught of 
specialists, experts and technocrats. In short, the problem is left to the decision making of 
institutional or market mechanisms and multi-national corporations¾that is to say, “market 
environmentalism” or the “ecology of the upper-classes.”  
 As Erik Swyngedouw has it, post-political eco-populism only contributes to and reifies this 
ecology of the upper-classes because it renders climate change as a “techno-managerial issue” 
rather than calling into being a political subject capable of executing large socio-ecological 
transformation¾“populist tactics do not identify a privileged subject of change” that would 
articulate generative social conflicts inherent in the capitalist system and instead “invoke a common 
condition or predicament, the need for common humanity-wide action, mutual collaboration and 
cooperation.”349 Climate change becomes choregraphed around an ecology of fear and 
universalizing tendencies in rhetoric that speak of a de-politicized “common humanity”¾like in 
the New York Times or The Economist¾homogenously contributing emissions. “Post-politics is 
marked by the predominance of a managerial logic in all aspects of life, the reduction of the political 
to administration where decision-making is increasingly considered to be a question of expert 
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knowledge and not of political position.”350 Carbon dioxide, then, is fetishized as an abstract enemy 
that is “always vague, ambiguous, socially empty and vacuous.”351 Climate problems are therefore 
not the result of “unevenly distributed power relations” and contradictions integral to capitalism 
but “are blamed on an outsider” that brings disequilibrium into the market system.352  
 As technocratic solutions give way to de-politicization, de-politicization gives way to 
indifference. As Peter Mair has shown in Ruling the Void, exploring the relationship between 
indifference and the political sphere, in a neoliberal world that includes figures such as Tony Blair 
and Donald Trump (figures who paradigmatically express anti-political sentiments and the 
redundancy of democratic political decision making in the face of a widespread form of 
governmentality that seeks to run everything like a business), “politics” seems to be progressively 
“denigrated or devalued” and “indifference to politics” is “deepening further.”353 As Wolfgang 
Streeck points out in reference to Mair, the “analogy between the consumerization of political 
commitment and the new markets of hedonistic lifestyle capitalism, fed by individually customized 
products, is hard to overlook.”354   
 The process of market immanentization that hollows out traditional party politics and 
democratic party government in general, leading to large waves of “depoliticization,” as Streeck 
explains, involves the dual process of “individualization” and “globalization.” Individualization 
“refers to the erosion of the cohesive social environments that helped structure the original growth 
of mass parties—the world of trade unions, clubs, churches, business associations, farming groups, 
and so on—as well as the fragmentation of collective identities,” which includes Fordist era mass 
politics and the industrial working class.355 The consumerization of political commitment renders 
social bonds as a matter of infinite recombinability and disposability, uniform with the logic of the 
commodity¾that is,  
 
a matter of taste and choice rather than of obligation, making communities appear as 
voluntary associations from which one can resign if they require excessive self-denial, rather 
than as ‘communities of fate’ with which one either rises or goes under. The new social 
media that have fast become almost indispensable tools of human sociability enable people 
to connect and associate with like-minded others on the most esoteric ‘subjective’ matters. 
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As cyberspace trumps geography, the connection, elementary for traditional political 
mobilization, between shared interests and personal relations arising from physical vicinity 
is broken. One consequence is that social control among ‘network members’ is minimized; 
dropping out is easy, especially when people use pseudonyms—another facet of the new 
voluntarism of social relationships. Browsing the boundless supply of causes, tastes and 
lifestyles made available by the internet, one can freely decide to ‘like’ whatever one wishes; 
in contrast to old-school political parties, there is no pressure for ideological consistency or 
for adherence to a common programme.356 
 
Likewise, “globalization” signals “the declining ability of national governments to shape 
autonomous policies” due to the fact that nation-states’ economic and decision-making power has 
been thoroughly undermined and handed over to “‘non-majoritarian’ (i.e. elite) institutions, like 
central banks and regulatory agencies, which are insulated from ‘majoritarian’ redistributive 
pressures.”357 The political sphere is abandoned to experts and technocratic institutions. The 
citizen-consumer is left to withdraw into private life or what Fisher calls the “air-conditioned 
totalitarianism of contemporary securo-culture,” where “middle-class security” forms “the horizon 
of all aspiration”¾that is, the nice house, the nice family and the nice career that is projected as 
the bourgeoise ideal of modern life.358 This artificial and prosthetic dream of limitless air-
conditioning, however, is quickly becoming obsolete.  
 The Anthrobscene marks a moment in capitalistic development where the capitalist socius 
attempts to deliriously fashion itself according to the ontology of cyberspace as a purely virtual 
entity that can thrive amid environmental catastrophe, the decay of civil society, the collapse of 
institutions necessary for social protection (e.g. heath care, public education, social services)¾that 
is, detach itself from any reliance on material relations of reproduction or support. In the epoch of 
the “omnipresent screen,” in relation to Crary’s critique of the fraudulent identification subjects 
make with insubstantial electronic surrogates, thinking techno-salvational protheses offer 
exemption from mass biocide, Andreas Malm writes that the more one withdraws into the cocoon 
of “augmented reality,” “the more one detaches from things taking place in nature.”359 This is the 
most sophisticated form of climate denialism for Malm. In other words, permanent connectivity, 
the post-modern condition and semiocapitalism are the “final capitalist mirage of post-history” as 
the warming world gnaws at the iridescent bubble of economic hyperrealism.360 Global warming, 
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with “its dependence on the past and future directionality, its temporal logic contradicts hyper-
spatial postmodernity head on.”361 To conclude with Crary’s admonition, we need to fracture this 
“pervasive illusion that, as more of the earth’s biosphere is annihilated or irreparably damaged, 
human beings can magically disassociate themselves from it and transfer their interdependencies 
to the mecanosphere of global capitalism.”362  
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL AUTONOMISM 
 
The warming condition is hyper-human.... No one would ask 
CO2 molecules to come down from the heavens or demand that  
oil platforms scrap themselves and pay their victims¾not even  
Timothy Morton, for he would not find a way to communicate 
with the oil.  
          ¾Andreas Malm, The Progress of this Storm 
 
It is therefore time to end the pretense that ecology is, by itself,  
sufficient: the ecological movement is not an end in itself, but a stage 
in the larger struggle. It can throw up obstacles to capitalist  
development and force a number of changes. But when, after  
exhausting every means of coercion and deceit, capitalism begins  
to work its way out of the ecological impasse, it will assimilate  
ecological necessities as technical constraints, and adapt the  
conditions of exploitation to them. 
            ¾André Gorz, Ecology as Politics 
 
At some level, all life rebels against the value/monoculture nexus 
of modernity, from farm to factory....Hence, the struggle over the  
relation between humans and the rest of nature is necessarily a  
class struggle. (But not just a class struggle).  
   ¾Jason W. Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life 
 
 Because Andreas Malm has already sufficiently¾but by no means exhaustively or 
completely¾mapped out the compatibilism and incompatibilism between an Autonomist theory 
of class struggle and an eco-Marxist theory of the earth in The Progress of this Storm,363 it will suffice 
to regurgitate, inflect and build off some of his theses here, briefly, as they point toward new 
directions future research could take in thinking Autonomist thought through the prism of the 
Anthropocene (and vice versa). It is only through the “disjunctions,” “contradictions” and 
“paradoxes” that are generated in this encounter between Autonomism and the Anthropocene 
that one can get a precise account of how semiocapitalism operates at the planetary scale.  
 (1) The Anthropocene does not exist. It is analytically defective to attribute climate change to the 
human species in general¾as if the causes and origins of the fossil economy began with 
Prometheus stealing fire. If climate change is apocalyptic, “it is not universal, but uneven and 
combined.”364 The capitalist countries of the global North, which compose less than 20% of the 
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global population, as of 2008 were “responsible for 72.7% of the CO2 emitted since 1850” and in 
“the early 21st century, the poorest 45% of the human population accounted for 7% of emissions, 
while the richest 7% produced 50%.”365 It is more appropriate, then, to talk about the 
Capitalocene, “market environmentalism” or the “ecology of the upper-classes.” However, what 
one has to keep in mind is that climate change is not the subjective decision of the “ruling elite” per 
se. The fossil economy is the result of market fetishism and a-subjective investment decisions miraculized by 
capital flows:366 the “succession of energy technologies following steam¾electricity, the internal 
combustion engine, the petroleum complex: cars, tankers, aviation¾have all been introduced 
through investment decisions...but rarely through democratic deliberation.”367 Financial signs (e.g. valuation 
metrics that measure a company’s performance, gross margin ratios, carbon pricing¾that is, the 
right to pay to pollute), monetary simulacra (e.g. profit, revenue, expenses) and economic indicators 
(e.g. gross domestic product) are just as much part of the Anthrobscene as imagistic and 
epistemological ones because not only do they “virtualize the real” but also automate decision 
making according to price metrics, algorithms and a fiscal rationality that treats nature as an 
externality (i.e. in terms of price and costs). Insofar as the Anthropocene signifies that the human 
species is a “unified geological actor” (à la Chakrabarty and Crutzen), it does not exist and gives 
way to mystification and the flaccid demands of post-political populism.  
 (2) The hegemonic tendency of immaterial labour will not unfold as prophesied. Machines (i.e. techno-
capitalism, utopian impulses toward full automation and the general intellect) are parasitic on 
substrata of cheap energy and ecological surpluses. It cannot be repeated enough: the cyborg is 
predicated on the slave. The “affluence of high-tech modernity cannot possibly be 
universalized¾become an asset of the species¾because it is predicated on a global division of 
labour that is geared precisely to abysmal price and wage differences between populations” as well 
as conditioned by factors such as “capital accumulation, privileged resource consumption, and the 
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displacement of both work and environmental loads.”368 Geophilosophy forces us to read the 
existential analytic of the cognitariat (a figure surrounded by haloes of data, signs, desires and neuro-
chemicals) through an energetic analytic of the earth. As Federici has argued, this has major 
ramifications for the technologistic notions of revolution proposed by Autonomists and 
Accelerations alike¾where techno-scientific knowledge and an automated system reduce labour-
time to zero. Even “solar,” “aerial” or “eco-techno” communisms are not a priori off the hook: as 
Julia Adeney Thomas elucidates, the Anthropocene is not just about climate change or the 
fetishization of carbon dioxide because, in the case of Big Wind, the “production of the rare earths 
needed to meet China’s demand for wine turbines up to 2050...will result in the release of 80 
million cubic meters of wastewater,” where radioactive waste material generated from rare earth 
extraction is dumped in toxic lakes near Baotou.369 Techno-optimism in both its “green” and “red” 
forms has to questioned insofar as they carry out promethean tendencies at the scale and force as 
the capitalist mode of production does. As Marx writes at the end of the chapter on “Machinery 
and Large-Scale Industry” in Capital, capitalist production only “develops the techniques and 
degree of combination of the social process of production by simultaneously undermining the 
original source of all wealth¾the soil and worker.”370  
 (3) The earth and labour are non-identical but share in a common project of autonomy and resistance. The 
Autonomist thesis applies to the earth as well as to labour: nature too possesses an “ineradicable 
autonomy from capital” that does not restrict it to merely being a pliable object of appropriation.371 
This thesis has been affirmed by many thinkers: for instance, “unruly nature” (Malm), “nature as 
detour” (Neyrat) and the “superweed effect” (Moore). Nature possesses analogous forms of 
resistance and autonomy that thwart capitalist development and force it to restructure itself in the 
face of emergent barriers to accumulation. Moore labels these processes of resistance “negative-
value” or the accumulation of limits. In other words, capital does not just exploit the “workers’ 
antagonistic will-to-struggle as a motor of its own development” but also nature’s antagonistic 
tendencies.372 For Malm as for Moore, these non-human resistances are historical and not 
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primarily ontological features of life (as in Negri). “Major blowbacks happen in specific historical 
conjectures, when the displaced and condensed contradictions come to the fore in explosive unity, 
for labour as for nature,” but these two strata “follow their own rhythms, with no tendency to 
synchronicity.”373 One crucial dissimilarity between nature and labour for Malm, then, is that 
nature lacks revolutionary agential power in the strong sense: one “does not cheer on a superstorm 
as one does a strike combined with a sit-in.”374 This brings us to the next point.  
 (4) Nature is not a revolutionary subject/force in and of itself. If Hardt and Negri claim that the 
multitude is “many-colored, like Joseph’s magical coat,” an “inclusive concept” that transcends the 
ideo-typical figure of revolution (i.e. the white, male proletariat), they have to move beyond techno-
sociological reductionism¾where the multitude is only composed of heterogenous “figures of social 
production.”375 It is dubious that workers in the global North are more revolutionary than workers 
in the global South. Likewise, cycles of ecological struggle have to be incorporated into the logic of 
the multitude¾not merely as something that “limits” social production or anthropogenesis. We 
live in a period where the globe itself revolts against global capitalism; however, as Malm reminds 
us (contra new materialisms, hybridisms and constructivisms) nature cannot “liberate itself” and 
any “ecological politics must...be anthropocentric, in an elemental, methodological and as such 
fairly harmless way.”376 Nature’s revolutionary tendencies are not constituted by an antagonistic 
social subject but must be mediated by them if these tendencies are to achieve results conducive to 
the anti-capitalist left. The warming condition demands less “Latour” (i.e. flat network theories 
that, with false vengeance, tear down the purported relics of anthropocentricism and Cartesian 
dualisms and by doing so think they are doing the world a favour, when really they are unwittingly 
exposing the “poverty of philosophy”) and more “Lenin” (i.e. robust forms of political organization 
that seek to overcome current power relations destroying planetary life).  
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